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On his first visit to the Turkish capital since becoming prime minister in May, 2010, David Cameron of the EU state of Britain likened the state of France’s opposition to Turkey’s bid join the EU to the French veto of Britain’s bid to become part of the EEC in the 1960s. I contend that his is a faulty comparison. Britian and Turkey do not occupy the same situs with respect to Europe. Notwithstanding the claim by some that not being on the contenent renders the British non-Europeans, Britain is in Europe. British culture is European. In contrast, only ten percent of Turkey is on the continent, and the Turkish culture is dissimilar to that in Europe.

Cameron also pointed to Turkey’s role in NATO, particularly with respect to the alliance's role in Afghanistan.  However, Turkey made it clear that it will not join EU sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. Turkey does not have the same interests as do the states in Europe. For European leaders to essentially use Turkey as a state in order to have more influence in the Arab world is problematic. First, the Turks would not necessarily be welcomed by the Arabs as intermediaries, given the history and perceptions between the two groups. Secondly, the accession could force the EU to take an active role in resolving the Kurd issue in eastern Turkey (and northern Iraq). Rather than giving the Europeans more influence in the Middle East, having Turkey as a state could put the EU in a mire it can ill-afford, given its own challences within the current EU. In short, European strategic over-reaching could compromise what has been accomplished thus far in terms of European integration.


To add a very large Middle Eastern state to a union of European states would compromise, and perhaps buckle, the EU.  Already, the EU has struggled to make changes internally to accommodate its expansion to the east.  Turkey’s very different culture and interests could render the EU impotent, given the amount of power still being exercised by the governments of its states. Rather than use the EU to gain leverage in the Middle East, I recommend that Europeans solidify their “ever closer union” so it will be able to withstand the inevitable political storms in Europe.

As Britain is one of the more “euroskeptic” states in the EU, it is possible that Cameron made his statements in the hope that expanding the EU beyond Europe would effectively relegate the union into an international organization. As the EU stands now, it has an executive branch, a legislature (a Parliament and a Senate, or Council), and a supreme court (the ECJ).  From a euroskeptic standpoint, the EU’s government simply does not exist.  Admitting Turkey (and other non-European states) would make the EU more international and less of a federal union of governance. That is to say, the move would undo the EU.

To be sure, Britain is just one of 27 states in the EU. With regard to Turkey’s accession as the 28th state, 35 “chapter,” or subject areas, would need to be agreed on. As of July, 2010, only 13 had been opened and only one — research and development — had been provisionally concluded. Most of the rest were blocked — five by France — leaving the realistic prospect that only a further three could still be opened.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/world/europe/28iht-britain.html?_r=1&hp

The UN’s Electoral Complaints Commission recommended in 2009 that Afganistan’s Independent Election Commission invalidate 210 polling stations where the ECC found “clear and convincing evidence of fraud.”  The IEC in turn announced a run-off election because Karzai no longer had over 50% of the vote.  MSNBC reported that “the Karzai-influenced election commission may refuse to call for a runoff.” CNN reported that Karzai and Abdullah were trying to “cut some sort of deal” on a coaliation government that would have obviated, or skirted, a run-off.  Such a compromise would have been woefully inadequate from the standpoint of democratic process.

Even Karzai’s announcement that he would go along with a run-off can be read as presumptuous.  If he didn’t want to go along with it, he need not have taken part.  That one candidate’s feels his refusal to participate would or should cancel an election suggests a rather squalid presumptuousness that ought to be made transparent to the voters.  It is a sad commentary on representative democracy that the Afghan IEC’s decision was probably dependent on Karzai having been under international pressure to agree to the run-off.   Is it too idealist to insist that the candidate should have been informed by the IEC of its decision rather than permitting it?   For one of the candidates to have had a de facto veto on the election commission evinces a lack of democratic infrastructure.  It is like a cart pulling the horse.

In retrospect, we know that Karzai’s victory was fraudulent, even though he continued on in the campaign as a viable candidate.  What does it say when fraud is not punished?  Is having a run-off sufficient punishment?  Were all of the candidates benefitting from the fraud tossed out and a new open election held, would this be so catastrophic? I contend that the protests that occurred in the Middle East in 2011 for greater democracy can be interpreted as having been occassioned by years of frustration stemming from the sort of electoral facade perpetuated by dictators such as Karzai.  If so, the costs of not nipping electoral fraud in the bud far outweight any trouble involved in insisting on electoral accountability.  In the case of the U.S., foreign aid to Afghanistan could have been cut off in 2009 unless or until an open and fair election could be verified. With such a substantive signal given and repeated with regard to other dictators in the Middle East who were using the facade of democracy for legitimacy, some of the mass protests taking place two years later might have been obviated and lives saved that were otherwise lost.

Sources:
http://cnnwire.blogs.cnn.com/2009/10/23/karzai-challenger-prefers-opposition-to-coalition/
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33394277/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/

Abdullah Abdullah withdrew on November 1, 2009 from the runoff election in Afghanistan.   Interestingly, Hilary Clinton and a spokesman for President Karzai characterized Abdullah’s withdraw in virtually identical terms—namely, as “his personal decision.”  Such a stance makes sense because both the American Government and Karzai had an interest in the Afghan electoral process being perceived as legitimate.   It is interesting, however, that the identical interpretation was instantly available to the press.   Perhaps U.S. Senator John Kerry had urged Karzai to agree to the runoff by telling him of a secret deal between the American Government and Abdullah that would have Abdullah pull out with a statement affirming the legitimacy of the electoral system.   That is, I wonder if the U.S. senator promised Abdullah something that essentially short-circuited the electoral process.  Karzai would look like a statesman without having to risk losing power, and Abdullah would get something rather than a probable election defeat.  The US would get stability in a Karzai government without having to worry about another controversial election.
As it turned out, Abdullah did not keep to the script; he denounced the continued corruption in the continued occupants of the Karzai-hired electoral commission (a blatant conflict of interest for any electoral body, to be sure).   Also, the runoff itself was cancelled.  Was this part of the deal?  If so, the deal I suspect took place was very well hidden, or subterranean in nature and intention.

What concerns me overall from this case is the extent to which such a deal would deviate from the story that we, the public, were told.  If there was such a deal, it would have been at odds with the democratic process, which really needed a fair runoff election rather than a collapse (or fait accompli).  A runoff could have served as an opportunity to fix or strengthen the democratic process while demonstrating that electoral fraud can be extinguished without resort to revolution.  Not only was the world left with no such hope; we saw the democratic process truncated ,and thus as still deeply flawed. 

This might be naive, but for many years American presidents have been giving lip service to supporting representative democracy around the world.  It would be sad were the same presidents actually thwarting it on account of political expediency (such as clearing the way for a decision on a new troop surge).   I refuse to accept that integrity in place duplicity is too much to realistically ask for.  Ironically, had the US and UN invested people and energy into building fire-walls in Afganistan’s electoral process such that the runoff would have truly been free and fair (including from threats of violence), the American goal with respect to the country would have been much closer to being realized than by sending in a surge of miltary force.   In going for the expedient route, the American elected representatives and their appointees looked corrupt or compromised themselves.  In the end, it is up to us, the citizens—of whatever republic—to say enough is enough and to resist the temptation to pull the lever in the voting booth as we did last time.  Otherwise, we are to blame—as enablers rather than as game changers.

See: http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/11/01/afghanistan.election/index.html