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After two weeks of mass protests in Egypt for representative democracy and the ouster of President Mubarak, the Egyptian government agreed to concessions including allowing freedom of the press, releasing of political prisoners arrested during the protests, and commencing a committee with the opposition to consider constitutional amendments. According to The New York Times, the "regime also pledged not to harass those participating in the anti-government protests." That the government would agree not to harass the protesters could be read as a tacit admission that the regime had indeed been actively behind the pro-Mubarak people who attacked the protesters by surprise in the middle of the second week. Meanwhile, the strategic orientation of the American administration of Barak Obama was evident. According to The New York Times, the Obama administration was "struggling to determine if a democratic revolution can succeed while President Hosni Mubarak remains in office." The man whom Obama had sent to persuade Mubarak not to run for re-election eight month later, Frank Wisner, told a group of diplomats and security experts that “President Mubarak’s continued leadership is critical — it’s his opportunity to write his own legacy.” Meanwhile the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, "gave a strategy overview that stood at odds with that assessment." Earlier, she had "made the case at a gathering in Munich that the entire process would take time, and must be carefully managed." Revolutions must be "managed"? Isn't this an oxymoron?  When Mubarak resigned after eighteen days of protests, the Obama administration tried to catch up from its public position that Mubarak could another seven months until the regularly-scheduled elections would be held.

The New York Times goes on to observe, "It is hardly the first time the Obama administration has seemed uncertain on its feet during the Egyptian crisis. . . . The mixed messages have been confusing and at times embarrassing — a reflection of a policy that, by necessity, has been made up on the fly. 'This is what happens when you get caught by surprise,' said one American official, who would not speak on the record. 'We’ve had endless strategy sessions for the past two years on Mideast peace, on containing Iran. And how many of them factored in the possibility that Egypt,' and presumably whatever dominoes follow it, 'moves from stability to turmoil? None.'"  However, it could be that the reason is less being caught by surprise and more being too technocratically- or bureaucratically-minded. "Administration officials insist their responses have been more reaction to fast-moving events than any fundamental change in objective."  Is this saying, in effect, that the administration has been following rather than leading? Also, would it even matter if there had been any fundamental change in objective if the approach had been muddled and contrived according to the administration's advantage at the moment? In short, Barak Obama and his advisors might be too occupied with strategy to act on the basis of principled, big-picture, leadership. Fortunately, history proffers more principled exemplars of such leadership that the Egyptians can follow.

As an alternative to Obama's timid and incremental approach, Gandhi's teachings and example could serve the Egyptian protesters well. This occurred to me during the twelfth day of protests.  To my surprise, that night Gandhi was fortuitously being aired on the TCM channel. Rather than having responding in violence to the pro-government violence, the protesters could have taken the higher moral ground, and incredibly this could have won the day even over raw force. This is the incredible thing about moral power--it can affect even governmental power and the related force of the sword, or rock. 

Gandhi proffered a new way to fight. "We will fight against their anger--not provoke it," Gandhi says in the movie. Non-violent non-cooperation is indeed fighting. As in all fighting, there is pain.  Only rather than inflicting physical pain, Gandhi took others' anger and though his pain the others would feel pain. "Through our pain, they will see their injustice. This will call them pain." It prompts them to as questions about themselves--uncomfortable questions with even more unpleasant answers. This new way of fighting is not in the interest of governments. If their opponents do not turn to violence, governments such as the Egyptian will be inclined to actually tempt the non-violent protesters to violence because it is a government's currency. Ironically, governments are on firmer ground when their opponents turn violent because government is fundamentally a means of legitimately ordering societal violence. In dealing with non-violent civil disobedience, governments are not in control; rather, the protesters are acting at their choosing to provoke a reaction that will make the injustice transparent to all. This locus of control gives the non-violent the upper hand. Rather than joining government on its axis, non-violent civil disobedience fights not to punish for weaknesses that we all possess, but to change minds and hearts. It is thus active rather than passive.

In terms of character, particular traits are necessary for one to remain non-violent even when tempted to strike back. According to Gandhi, turning the other cheek is not just figurative; it requires courage to take the anger of those having the power of government. Relatedly, firmness is also required. It is to defy "not with violence that would provoke anger," but, rather, "with firmness that will open their eyes." In contrast, an eye for an eye "only makes the world blind." Gandhi looked back at history to find that even as tyrants might for a time seem invincible, they have all fallen in the end. He felt that noncooperation with evil is a duty. A sense of this duty is also required.  Strategizers, such as those in the Obama administration, would be like seeds on rock in terms of Gandhi's approach. That is to say, Gandhi preached and engaged in principled leadership rather than in what was most comfortable for him at the moment. His approach also called upon self-respect. One must willingly take others' blows without either hitting back or retreating, and this involves keeping one's head held high with a sense that what one is doing is the alternative worthy of self-respect. Such respect is worth something to the protester, for pain is indeed involved in making injustice visible.

In terms of Egypt, Gandhi's strategy of a general strike throughout British India, with Indians at prayer rather than work, such that the entire country just stopped, is, I submit, morally superior and more effective even against government than answering rocks with rocks. Rather than joining the government's forces on their ground, the Egyptian pro-democracy protesters could have simply stopped.  Egypt, stopped. Something stopped cannot be governed, hence a government cannot cope with such a strategy.  Hence it is no coincidence that the pro-government forces on the street lured the protesters into engaging in violence. The protesters might have looked to Gandhi rather than take the bait. Even though tyrants might seem invicible for a time, one can have faith that the apparently-mighty in terms of worldly power will eventually face their own downfall. When their injustice has been suffered in a way that exposes it, that downfall can be facilitated. Ironically, returning violence for the violence of the state actually extends the current regime's tenure as providing order in the context of violence is a government's foremost rationale to exist.

Not taking the bait was on the mind of Hussein Ramadan, a political activist and organizer who helped lead the protests in Bahrain the week after Mubarak had fallen in Egypt. “The people are angry, but we will control our anger, we will not burn a single tire or throw a single rock. We will not go home until we succeed. They want us to be violent. We will not.” The "they" here refers to the government. When a people spurs its own government's instigations to be violent, the legitimacy of that government is compromised and the people gain the upper hand, even if this is not apparent at the time.  When soldiers working for the British beat unarmed protesters at the Salt Works in India, any moral right that the British had had to maintain order in India was lost. Of course, changes in government policy can lag, but in the end a government that has lost its moral basis to government must fall.  It is like a romantic relationship that ends. At one point before it actually ends, one of the two people in it has the sense that the relationship will end because of something intrinsic to it. Even so, the other person may be stunned when it does end--not having had the same sense. One could also use the analogy of jets. Once one has run out of fuel, it must inevitably fall back to earth. So too, a government that has lost its moral legitimacy on account of illegitimate violence exacted on its citizens must fall, sooner or later. If such a government takes its time in succumbing to this natural law, citizens can simply sit and do nothing. In other words, active non-violent non-cooperation can be viewed simply as waiting for nature to do its work on the human organization that still takes itself as immortal. Protesters resisting the temptation to return violence know and have faith in this natural law, so they are not so desparate to hit back. It is the comparative lack of desparation that gives the protesters the upper hand in being able to provoke a government to overstep.  Unlike such protesters, government officials typically attach an urgency to protests and thus feel compelled to act under the assumption: "before things get out of hand." Ironically, it is such a mentality that causes things to get out of hand. The lack of order is in the officials rather than the protesters who foreswear violence.

Sources:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06policy.html?_r=1&hp

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41445147/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/middleeast/16bahrain.html?ref=todayspaper

Despite several days of overwhelming popular grass-roots protest in Egypt, on January 30, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stopped short of urging the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, to resign.  According to The New York Times, she spoke of "a process that must include a government dialogue with the protesters and “free, fair, and credible” elections, scheduled for September." In the face of overwhelming protests going on in Egypt, the top U.S. diplomat was urging a dialogue through September. It is as though she viewed the current Egyptian president as legitimate in democratic terms, yet she also said: “We have been very clear that we want to see a transition to democracy. . . . And we want to see the kind of steps taken to bring that about. We want to see an orderly transition.”  If a transition to democracy means that the Egyption officials have not hitherto been legitimately elected democratically, then why was Clinton so timid? On February 1, 2011, The New York Times reported that President Obama had sent a message to President Mubarak through Frank Wisner that the Egyptian president not run for reelection in September. According to officials, it "was not a blunt demand for Mr. Mubarak to step aside now, but firm counsel that he should make way for a reform process that would culminate in free and fair elections in September to elect a new Egyptian leader." According to The New York Times, Obama was continuing his balancing act by "resisting calls for Mr. Mubarak to step down, even [while calling] "for an 'orderly transition' to a more politically open Egypt." As a result, it was still  not clear whether the Obama administration favored Mubarak turning over the reins to a transitional government. On February 5th, just days after suggesting that it wanted immediate change, the Obama administration said it would support an “orderly transition” managed by Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman. The New York Times reported that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "said that Mr. Mubarak’s immediate resignation might complicate, rather than clear, Egypt’s path to democracy, given the requirements of Egypt’s Constitution." Not coincidentally, Israeli officials, who have long viewed Mr. Mubarak and Mr. Suleiman as stabilizing influences in a dangerous region, "have made clear to the administration that they support evolution rather than revolution in Egypt." Accordingly, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden urged Vice President Suleiman on February 8th to take specific steps toward democracy. The technocratic turn presupposed the evolution rather than revolution approach, as per the interests of Israel and contrary to that of the Egyptian protesters.

The ambiguity in the Obama administration's "policy" on Egypt bespeaks an underlying lack of clarity in regarding principle as distinct from diplomatic expediency. At the time, the protestors in Egypt saw through the American strategic moves as such and continued to demand Mubarak's immediate resignation; the half-way, or "balanced," measures of convenience were regarded as wan from the standpoint of the protestors' acting on principle. I contend that both Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama put short-term tactical advantage above leadership. It should have been obvious that the breakdown of Egptian law and order and the accompanied strikes went beyond a need for "dialogue" and an evolution toward democracy. It was as though a soldier hemorrhaging on the battlefield were being told to relax and be orderly rather than that a tourniquet would be immediately applied.  It is sad, indeed, how bad things would need to get on the ground before the Obama administration would admit that a new government from the top was urgently necessary. In my view, the loss of law and order itself meant that the government had lost its right to govern. The U.S. administration lost this window by letting things "evolve."

If "real change" means anything, it surely involves departing from business as usual in order to lead by principle. Principled leadership entails taking risks. Indeed, tacticians are so cautious in part in order to obviate such risk. That is to say, principled leadership involves the risk that being guided by one's principles can involve short-run costs. As regards Egypt, standing up for the Egyptian protesters by saying that President Mubarak should step down immediately (and that no further U.S. aid would go to Egypt otherwise) would risk that president's displeasure should he retain power. Also, representative democracy unguided by Mubarak and his supporting offiicals could have brought to power parties such as the Muslim Brothershood that were not in the U.S. interest.  However, such is democracy; the victors of another country's elections are not necessarily going to favor U.S. interests. A principled leader would not be so selfish and manipulatory as to hold back from exercising principled leadership simply because he or she might suffer drawbacks. Ironically, the drawbacks might be less than expected, for a principled leader has such credibility from being authentic and principled that any resulting resentment is apt to be tempored by respect.



In general terms, the American problem lies in prioritizing self-interested calculation over principled leadership.  The American society has embraced the bureaucratic age such that leadership is exterpated and replaced with incremental strategic management--even in the Oval Office. Sadly,  being "professional" had replaced being "principled," such that the highest officials in the U.S. Government privileged the expertise of immediate tactical advantage over the principles that were innately felt by the Egyptian protesters (and presumably by ordinary Americans as well).  The American "leaders" had forgotten that in trying to have it both ways, they would be apt to end up stagnate, confused, and not well respected.  Were the officials bold in putting principle above immediate tactical advantage, I submit that the tenor of the U.S. government would better reflect the values of the American people. In the context of the Egyptian protests, as in that of the preceding Iranian protests, People the world over were crying out--yearning--for principled leadership rather than professional bureaucrats in the U.S. Government. It is in human nature to value and respect leaders who have the courage of conviction to say, "This might piss off some powerful people whom I could otherwise use, but this is what we as Americans believe in." Simply stated, the belief is that a government is no longer legitmate if it loses the consent of a significant number of citizen, especially if they are willing to put everything on the line to "just say no."  Incrementalist bureaurats look quite wan and feckless in comparison. Such officials have forgotten that management is not leadership; tactic is not principle. I suspect that the attempt by business schools to "managize" leadership into managerial strategy lies behind the "tactic as leadership" error. In other words, too many managers want to be known as leaders without actually leading. They treat leadership itself as a commodity that they can appropriate without actually being leaders. There is indeed an expertise in principled leadership, and I suspect an instinct for it, which the typical manager (and government official) does not have. I contend that principled leadership is more valuable than technical expertise in the upper echelons of organizations. 

The irony of the Egyptian protests and the muted or ambiguous incrementalist reactions of Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton, the American "dream team" of 2008, was that there was a disjucture between the U.S. Government and the American people. In other words, I suspect that the typical American preferred the stance of the protesters to that of our own "leaders." Perhaps one day an incrementalist and short-term oriented U.S. administration might find itself surrounded by protesting Americans. Will the government's answer be "evolution"? Citing the "need for dialogue" amid the country at a standstill would be laughable even if bureaucratic technocrats would still take their response to be "prudent" and thus appropriate. "Prudent" and "incremental" were not the words that came to my mind in watching the popular protests in Egypt in 2011. It was far easier to agree with the foreign protesters than with my own government.

Sources:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/middleeast/31diplo.html?_r=1&hp

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/world/middleeast/02transition.html?_r=1&smid=tw-nytimes

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/world/middleeast/09diplomacy.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper