Showing posts with label U.S. military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. military. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

In the early evening of March 28, 2011, President Barak Obama addressed the American people and the world to explain his administration’s involvement in the international coalition that had been implementing a no fly zone over Libya while protecting Libyan civilians from their own ruler. He sounded much more like the first President Bush than the second in terms of foreign policy.  Similar to how the elder Bush had restrained himself from going all the way to Baghdad after he had joined an international coalition in removing the Iraqis from Kuwait, Obama said that directing American troops to forcibly remove Colonel Qaddafi from power would be a step too far, and would “splinter” the international coalition that had imposed the no fly zone and protected civilians in rebel areas of Libya. Interestingly, in taking the elder Bush’s route, Obama came out strongly against that of Bush II. Referring to the alternative of extending the U.S. mission to include regime change, Obama stated, “To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq . . . regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.” In effect, Obama was exposing a fundamental difference between George H.W. Bush and his son by saying essentially the same thing as the elder Bush had done while excoriating the foreign invasion of his son. Yet Obama did not stop there. He added a theoretical framework that the elder Bush could well have used.
The New York Times puts the theory quite well. “The president said he was willing to act unilaterally to defend the nation and its core interests. But in other cases, he said, when the safety of Americans is not directly threatened but where action can be justified — in the case of genocide, humanitarian relief, regional security or economic interests — the United States should not act alone. His statements amounted both to a rationale for multilateralism and another critique of what he has all along characterized as the excessively unilateral tendencies of the George W. Bush administration.” In other words, even in providing a basic framework, Obama was able to distance Bush the father from Bush the son.  Interestingly, Obama had awarded the senior Bush with the Metal of Freedom over a month earlier. I would be very surprised if Obama would award Bush the Son such a prize. In terms of foreign policy, the philosophical line in the sand clearly distinguishes the second Bush from both his own father and Barak Obama.
Of course, the President’s speech left his audience hanging in other respects. For instance, averting a large-scale massacre in Libya is in the U.S. strategic or national interest because of our humanitarian values as well as the proximity of Libya to the nascent upheavals in Tunisia in Egypt. So would not protecting a mass protest in Yemen, which is next to Saudi Arabia, or in Syria, which has particular strategic interest to the U.S. on account of Syria’s connection with Lebanon (and thus relevant for Israel) and Iran, also be in the American national interest?  The President could argue that neither Yemen (or Bahrain) nor Syria had come to the point where the civilians in a major city were at risk—but it could still be asked, what if?  Must there be a baleful hint of genocide in a city commensurate to the Libyan city of Benghazi for protesters to warrant invoking principled leadership with or without allies when a ruler has effectively lost his right to rule by having turned on his own people?
I contend that the President treated the U.S. strategic interest quite broadly by including the protection of large numbers of civilians against their own ruler, particularly when even the portent of carnage could destabilize emergent republics next door. Such interest is broader than questions such as, “how the civilians would view the U.S. were they to gain power?” and “what effect would a new government have on Iran and Israel?” Such questions pertain to a narrower conception of national interest—one that is much less of value to a country. Viewing the good will of protesters as an opportunity—essentially taking on the wider, humanitarian-inclusive, notion of national interest—Syria, Bahrain and Yemen become like Libya as soon as their respective protests and prospect of government brutality reach a certain threshold that Libya had surpassed. What that threshold is—meaning in terms of scale as well as brutality—is something the American Congress and President need to decide. For once that is set, attention can turn to the mechanism involved in forming an international coalition should a country cross the line. Differing from Obama, I submit that the establishment of a threshold can be relied up such that principled leadership could be invoked by the U.S. even in the absence of partners at the outset. Such unilateralism would differ appreciably from that of Bush the Younger, whose invasion of Iraq was based on a criterion used for that one case alone (WMD).  In other words, unilateralism need not mean capriciousness or impulsiveness. A humanitarian threshold undergirded by a strategic interest in there being a world wherein rulers serve rather than violently turn on their own people can justify not only international coalitions, but also instances of principled leadership.
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Thursday, March 24, 2011

The New York Times describes the War Powers Act of 1973 as follows: “(P)assed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, [the act] puts limits on the ability of the President to send American troops into combat areas without Congressional approval. Under the act, the President can only send combat troops into battle or into areas where 'imminent' hostilities are likely, for 60 days without either a declaration of war by Congress or a specific Congressional mandate. The President can extend the time the troops are in the combat area for 30 extra days, without Congressional approval, for a total of 90 days.” While the law is beneficial in that it enables the President to act in his capacity as commander in chief when time does not permit a preceding Congressional declaration or more specific resolution (e.g., the U.S. being attacked), the act is not limited to such cases. Therefore, the President can put off Congressional approval even when he could obtain it before sending the troops into battle.  Regardless of the exigency of the military action, Congressional approval is required within 90 days, and this applies even if the President is acting on behalf of the U.S. as a member of the United Nations to enforce a Security Council resolution.

President Obama, on behalf of the U.S., decided that the U.S. military would take part in the international coalition enforcing the Security Council’s resolution allowing members to use all means necessary to protect Libyan civilians from Qaddafi’s government, which had turned on its people. The President did not need to obtain a Congressional declaration or resolution before he did so, even though he could have done so by asking Congress’ House and Senate to convene to debate and vote on the question. Although some thought hearings would have been necessary, that would have been excessive, as the judgment required was beyond simply requiring more information. In any case, a closed briefing for both chambers could have been held before the debates and votes. The President knew of the Security Council’s debate and vote beforehand, so he could have notified Congressional leaders in enough time for them to prepare to convene a day or two afterward. “We should have been called into session yesterday or the day before,” Rep. Nadler said at the time the American involvement in the international enforcement action commenced. Even though the President did not have to take this route, I contend that he would have been on firmer ground democratically had he done so. Had either of the Congressional chambers voted down a resolution authorizing American involvement, I believe the President would have acted illegally in involving the U.S. military in enforcing the U.N. resolution. The U.N. itself cannot activate any military of any of the members.

Because in a republic the legislative representatives should have a role in the decision up front if doing so is possible, the President should have done so in the Libyan case because there was time for it. “I think [the President] has a duty and an obligation to come to Congress,” Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah.) told The Huffington Post. “I see no clear and present danger to the United States of America. I just don't. We're in a bit of the fog at the moment as to what the president is trying to ultimately do.” Chaffetz was saying, in effect, that the War Powers Act should only be applied when there is not time for a President to get Congressional approval up front.

Other members of Congress challenged the War Powers Act itself. “In the absence of a credible, direct threat to the United States and its allies or to our valuable national interests, what excuse is there for not seeking congressional approval of military action?” asked Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) in a separate interview. “I think it is wrong and a usurpation of power and the fact that prior presidents have done it is not an excuse.” The usurpation language challenges the constitutionality of the Act. Similarly, Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.) was circulating a resolution "[e]xpressing the sense of Congress that the President is required to obtain in advance specific statutory authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces in response to civil unrest in Libya." The measure was supported by Reps. Michael Honda (D-Calif.) and John Conyers (D-Mich.), among others. This resolution directly challenged the War Powers Act, presumably because they thought the President could have obtained Congressional approval before acting.

As it stands, the War Powers Act gives a President 90 days to get Congressional approval. To limit the Act to cases where there is no time to get Congressional approval would ensnare application of the law to judicial interpretation: Was there really a window for Congressional approval? Yet to give the President 90 days regardless of whether he could obtain such approval at the outset enables him to take cover under the letter of the law even when he violates its spirit. The members of Congress who criticized the President for not obtaining Congressional approval before sending troops over the Libya were essentially accusing the President of having done precisely that. Had the President secured Congressional approval beforehand, his hand as commander in chief would have been strengthened because a majority of the American people and states would have been behind him. Had Congress refused, he should not have proceeded with the action; doing so anyway, while expedient, would not have been in line with our republic. So going to Congress first would have been a win-win for the President from a democratic standpoint, although not from that of wanting to take part in the international effort. Sometimes it takes self-discipline for a President to put the republic form above even what he wants to do in a particular case.

Click to add a Comment or Question (or View Posted Comments) on Congress and the UN Seccurity Council as war powers.

Sources:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/20/obama-libya_n_838219.html

Monday, February 14, 2011

While in the U.S. Senate, Paul Kirk, the interim U.S. Senator who took Ted Kennedy’s seat, said, “Without a legitimate and credible Afghan partner, that counterinsurgency strategy is fundamentally flawed. The current Afghan government is neither legitimate nor credible. . . . We should not send a single additional dollar in aid or add a single American serviceman or woman to the 68,000 already courageously deployed in Afghanistan until we see a meaningful move by the Karzai regime to root out its corruption.” 

Kirk was essentially arguing that the U.S. was enabling (i.e., in the sense that one enables an alcoholic) President Karzai, who had been reelected by widespread fraud. Whether the U.S. Government was trying to have it both ways, or was utterly unwilling to put its money where American principles are, the perception around the world was probably that the United States had sold itself out for short-term strategic/military advantage. 

How resilient are principles that are upheld only when they don't cost anything?  Could it be that standing more on principle--insisting on fair and free elections as a precondition for any American aid and military involvement--would mitigate the need for a surge? Such thinking runs against the grain in the modern world, which is actually rather primitive in its insistance on knee-jerk force.  An eye for an eye and the world will be blind (Gandhi).  September 11, 2001: we must hit back.  There is no other option. They must pay. Ironically, practicing Christians were not only cheering, but also leading the charge.  An eye for an eye.

“Be realistic!” you might say.  "It's a real world out there!" Ok, how about this: the U.S. Government could have concentrated its military force in Afghanistan on the actual culprits, rather than on rebuilding the country or taking on the Taliban.  Is it really so idealistic to cut off U.S. aid to autocratic governments? I suspect that we are limited by the status quo as a normative and descriptive limitation that is actually quite dogmatic in the sense of being arbitrary.  In other words, we believe our self-constructed walls are real; we don't see how rigid we have become.

Given the emphasis on force, does it make all that much difference who is occupying the U.S. Presidency? President Bush invaded Iraq. President Obama criticized this policy then led a surge of his own in Afghanistan.  Eisenhower warned of the military-industrial complex, and both Bush II and Obama played ball with these pay-masters.  Meanwhile, we were mollified with the government's “scoldings” of Wall Street banks (the strongest of which went back to their old ways anyway).  Can we blame the bankers for ignoring government officials whose principled leadership is so contingent? People, especially powerful people--like Wall Street bankers and Karzai--can sniff hypocrisy and automatically reduce the respect given.

The United States is like a giant machine, or a very fat person, who can only move slowly…turning woefully slow with a rudder that is too small.    Meanwhile, we vaunt our ship as the biggest ever made: A city on the hill, from Puritan lore. We can’t sink, we assure each other.  But our ship of state is made of iron. I assure you, it can sink, and all the more because we have drifted out into deep water without realizing how far we have gone…how far off course.  Our rudder is too small for our mechanized monstrosity--our Titanic laden with $14 tillion in federal debt alone (not counting those of the states). Our primative knee-jerk reactiong after 911 suggests that everything we know is wrong, even as we presume we can’t be wrong.   So as we rearrange the deck-chairs at our mascurade dance, we order more champaigne and congraduate each other on having the biggest ship.  Meanwhile, is anyone looking ahead for icebergs?  We are so sure of our ship, and thus so vulnerable.

Source: http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/afghanistan.liberals/index.html

 

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