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On January 5, 2011, John Boehner was sworn in as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. He had promised to decentralize the power that had been so tightly held by the previous Speaker and others further back.  Indeed, it had been Gingrich's micromanaging of Boehner in 1995 that may well have prompted Boehner to want to give more power to lower-level party leaders and committee chairs. Boehner even promised to better provide for the minority party in that proceedings would be more open and fair.  Of course, obstructionism, favoritism, and in general the realities of governing may force the Speaker to consolidate power. The exigencies of his position may well trump any bad memories of having been one of the low men on the totem pole.  It is in the nature of <i>human</i> nature to identify with the present at the expense of the past. Adding to these factors, consolidating power into a few select hands may seem necessary to getting the trains to run on time.

Indeed, Boehner might be tempted to add trains. Noting the inherent difficulty in having one legislature governing an empire-scale union, the anti-federalist (and pro-commerce) Agrippa of Massachusetts wrote in 1787, "A diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces friendship." (Agrippa, Letter 8, 4.6.30). Agrippa was bemoaning the consolidation that he feared would ensue from the powers granted by the U.S. Constitution to Congress (at the expense of the state governments). Agrippa was by in large right. The dual-sovereignty in American federalism has largely been eclipsed by decades of encroachments by the general government. It would have taken self-discipline for Congress not to have encroached when it could. Similarly, self-discipline is required for a Speaker of the House, which is a constitutional office, to preside, which is to say, to look to the overall interest of the whole rather than to engage in partisanship.  

In spite of his asseverations to return some power to the states and to decentralize his power in the House, Speaker Boehner is apt to reverse himself in practice. Should he do so, he might find that his tenure is shorter rather than longer, for those who clutch most to power tend to see it slip through their hands faster than otherwise. Despite pushing through a lot of big legislation, both Speakers Gingrich and Pelosi lost their Speakerships relatively quickly. The nature of power may well be paradoxical: those who love it most may well be least equipped to manage it.

Sources: Naftali Bendavid and Patrick O'Conner, "New Speaker Vows to Share Power--a Tricky Proposition," <i></i>Wall Street Journal<i></i>, January 4, 2011, pp. A1, A6.
Agrippa, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 243

In the New York convention for ratifying the U.S. Constitution, Melancton Smith favored having the state legislatures rotating their U.S. Senators rather than keeping the same men in the Senate for life. "It is a circumstance strongly in favor of rotation, that it will have a tendency to diffuse a more general spirit of emulation, and to bring forward into office the genius and abilities of the continent. If the office is to be perpetually confined to a few, other men of equal talents and virtue, but not possessed of so extensive an influence, may be discouraged from aspiring to it." (Storing, p. 348)  This argument could easily be applied to the people electing U.S. Senators. To be sure, Smith also said, "It is a maxim with me, that every man employed in a high office by the people, should from time to time return to them, that he may be in a situation to satisfy them with respect to his conduct and the measures of administration." (Storing, p. 348) Term limits limit this maxim. Such a limit may be worthwhile anyway because incumbants can enjoy such advantages of office (e.g., fundraising) that the will of the people could be warped or hindered after an elected official has become entrenched in office.

In general terms, the anti-federalist writers in 1788 viewed both the U.S. House and the Senate as aristocratic on account of the relatively few legislators relative to the population represented.  The anti-federalists were looking at 65 House reps representing a total U.S. population of 3 million; in 2010 by contrast, there were 435 House representatives out of a population of 310 million.  In other words, the average congressional district has increased populationwise, with the implication being that the democratic body of the Congress is even less democratic and more aristocratic.  The overwhelming tendency for incumbants to be re-elected (should they wish) can be explained by the increasing aristocratic nature of the body.  The anti-federalists looked out at the 2,000 representatives in the state houses as being more representative and responsive to the electorate than the 65 U.S. House representatives could be to their constituents. The critics of the proposed constitution advocated stronger firewalls against encroachments by the general (U.S.) government, for less representation in their eyes translated into fewer powers being justifiable in the U.S. Government. Smith observed in New York's ratifying convention that “a complete representation would make the legislature too numerous; and therefore, it is our duty to limit the powers, and form checks on the government, in proportion to the smallness of the number.” (Storing, p. 345) In 2010, 10,000 reps would have been necessary to meet the 30,000 inhabitants per House representative as per the bench-mark that George Washington had proposed on the last day of the constitutional convention. Adding to the problem in the difference between 434 and 10,000, the U.S. Government has practically consolidated power at the expense of our State governments. In other words, the U.S. House is more aristocratic--perhaps not far from the aristocratic U.S. Senate--even as the powers of Congress have vastly increased. 

In short, we have unwittingly been putting more power in the hands of a legislature that the anti-federalists viewed as aristocratic even in 1788.  Because expanding the House size is not advisable and returning some of the federal government's power to the state governments is not likely, term limits may well be worth the cost in terms of popular sovereignty (i.e., the people being able to reelect the incumbant).  To be sure, such a reform would only be as a patch on an old tire that is severely out of balance.

The basic problem both of federalism and representation facing the United States at the time of this writing is the lack of balance in power, and thus of a government-on-government check, on account of encroachments by the U.S. Government. This matter is distinct and does not reduce to the question of limited government, for transferring some domains from the U.S. Government to the state governments does not necessarily mean "less government."  Indeed, it could mean more government where people want it, as government closer to the people may enjoy greater confidence. In other words, one could expect both "more" and "less" government--depending on the state.  Vermont could have a single-payer health insurance system while Texas relies exclusively on private insurance companies.  For the rest of us: why not tolerate this, if it is in line with the greater representation that is at the state level?  The U.S. Government would be freed up to concentrate on areas that the states cannot reach and on providing a check on abuses by the states.

Source: Melancton Smith, Speech Delivered at the New York Ratifying Convention of the U. S. Constitution, June 23, 1788, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.