Saturday, February 5, 2011
Coordinating Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the E.U.: Is Ever Closer Political and Economic Union Advisable?
Posted by Find Insurance Online at 6:42 AMInitiating a bold effort on February 4, 2011 at a summit of the European Council (composed of heads of the state governments) to strengthen the euro by coordinating fiscal policies among the 17 states that use the currency, the German Chancellor and French President laid down far-reaching plans to deepen economic and political integration for the group of states within the EU. From the standpoint of the US, a subset of states relatively integrated federally seems strange, though perhaps such flexibility will obviate a war between EU states in the future. In other words, Americans ought not dismiss the arrangement out of hat. This is not to say that bringing fiscal policy up to the EU level to join monetary policy will be easy, even for just seventeen states. The particular interests of the latter must be balanced against the interest of the ECB (the EU's central bank) for some degree of fiscal coordination and accountability.
According to The New York Times, “France has long wanted the euro zone to be on a basis that made it more important and the Germans have now accepted that logic.” Deutsche Welle reports German Chancellor Angela Merkel as saying, "We want to bring in a competitiveness pact and step by step bring about a more linear, shared growth." The New York Times reports that Merkel and Sarkozy “appeared to have reached the conclusion of many critics of the single currency who argue that the financial crisis exposed a flaw in the design of the euro by creating monetary union without either economic convergence or political union.” However, even mentioning “political union” to the heads of the state governments is like bringing a lightening rod into a crowded elevator car during a thunderstorm. Even if monetary union is itself political and requires further political and economic integration, efforts to do so will face a strong headwind at the state level. Whereas in the U.S. the objections of states to further political integration are typically easily dismissed by the U.S. Government unless a branch of that government acquiesces (e.g., the Federal Courts that have declared the Affordable Care Act’s health insurance mandate to be unconstitutional), such objections in the E.U. typically have the edge because of the power of E.U. state governments relative to the E.U. Government. For one thing, whereas the U.S. state governments are no longer directly represented in the U.S. Government through the congressional Senate, the E.U. state governments sit as the European Council and the Council of Ministers. In vital areas including taxation, approval in these “senatorial” bodies must be unanimous. With 27 states in the EU as of 2010, each state government has enormous power in deciding whether to retain fiscal policy or shift still more sovereignty over to the E.U. (in which the state governments participate via the councils, albeit under qualified majority voting on all but the most important matters).
According to The New York Times, “France has long wanted the euro zone to be on a basis that made it more important and the Germans have now accepted that logic.” Deutsche Welle reports German Chancellor Angela Merkel as saying, "We want to bring in a competitiveness pact and step by step bring about a more linear, shared growth." The New York Times reports that Merkel and Sarkozy “appeared to have reached the conclusion of many critics of the single currency who argue that the financial crisis exposed a flaw in the design of the euro by creating monetary union without either economic convergence or political union.” However, even mentioning “political union” to the heads of the state governments is like bringing a lightening rod into a crowded elevator car during a thunderstorm. Even if monetary union is itself political and requires further political and economic integration, efforts to do so will face a strong headwind at the state level. Whereas in the U.S. the objections of states to further political integration are typically easily dismissed by the U.S. Government unless a branch of that government acquiesces (e.g., the Federal Courts that have declared the Affordable Care Act’s health insurance mandate to be unconstitutional), such objections in the E.U. typically have the edge because of the power of E.U. state governments relative to the E.U. Government. For one thing, whereas the U.S. state governments are no longer directly represented in the U.S. Government through the congressional Senate, the E.U. state governments sit as the European Council and the Council of Ministers. In vital areas including taxation, approval in these “senatorial” bodies must be unanimous. With 27 states in the EU as of 2010, each state government has enormous power in deciding whether to retain fiscal policy or shift still more sovereignty over to the E.U. (in which the state governments participate via the councils, albeit under qualified majority voting on all but the most important matters).
The criteria identified in a German policy paper that circulated before the summit meeting included items that the state governments have hitherto sought to retain for themselves. According to The New York Times, the approach proposed by France and Germany is “controversial because it touches some of the most sensitive areas of policy — like taxation and wage policy — where many nations guard their sovereignty jealously.” The items identified include abolition of state-level wage indexation systems, the creation of a common base for assessing corporate tax, the alignment of pension systems and legally binding commitments to tough fiscal policies. According to Deutsche Welle, “Germany's ideas also include raising the pensionable age depending on a country's demographics, limiting wage increases, and agreeing a common tax base for corporations.” The plans also strengthen the rescue fund for the euro zone by allowing it to lend its full, €440-billion ceiling figure, and perhaps use its funds more flexibly. Lastly, with regard to stricter fiscal discipline, the plans also include the idea of a "debt brake" that would establish a constitutional limit on deficits—the existing limit of 3.5% of GNP having been essentially ignored even by Germany.
The proposal was greeted with criticism from governments that fear they may have to raise corporate tax rates or scrap deals that link annual wage increases to inflation. “I totally disagree with the current proposals,” Leterme of Belgium said. "There must be more economic cooperation, but member states must be left the room to carry out their own policies," Leterme affirmed. "Each member state has its own accents, its own traditions. We will not allow our social model to be undone," he added. To be sure, such diversity is part and parcel of a federal system, which is essentially “unity in diversity.”
Representing the “unity” part, Sarkozy, in reacting to the opposition from state governments including Ireland over taxation, said, “We will not let the cornerstones of this system be undermined.” Simply put, monetary union requires some fiscal coordination. He explained that the aim of the proposal was “not to impose the same thing on everyone.” The objective at the meeting, he added, was not a detailed agreement but to reach a consensus on a desire “for a pact, economic government and convergence.” Yet the proposal would go beyond a “pact” in that it would be binding on the states, and it would go beyond merely economic coordination, as greater political union would be involved. “The E.U. — but above all those countries that use the euro — wants to grow together,” Merkel said. Such growth would be political as well as economic. “Politically,” Merkel continued, “we will grow step-by-step closer together.” Charles Grant, director of the Center for European Reform, opines, “I think we are seeing the beginning of a euro group which could become a more important organization politically as well as economically.” However, the Dutch prime minister, Mark Rutte, may well have put up a roadblock in stating, “We welcome stronger economic coordination on the basis of best practices, but we will always remain the master of our taxes, pensions and wages.” Such tuft battles amid “states’ rights” are to be expected in a federal system that still has a place for state governments. State interests have to be accommodated, even if compromise is also needed. Ireland, for example, sees its low rate of corporate tax as one of its few weapons in the battle to revive an economy so badly battered by the crisis that it accepted a bailout last year. Estonia and Slovakia also want to protect their low tax regimes. France and Germany are not immune to the pull of their respective self-interests either, even if that pull happens to be in the direction of closer economic and political integration at the moment. For example, France and German politicians have long complained at being undercut by the E.U. states with lower corporate tax. Other states—particularly some of the smaller ones—view their interests as ironically better protected by E.U. institutions that are not embodied by the state governments. Such states dislike the fact that the new structure would be orchestrated by governments, rather than the bloc’s executive, the E.U. Commission European, which is seen by many smaller nations as a protector of their interests.
In addition to all of the particular interests of the seventeen "eurozone" states, a common and long-term interest in matching monetary with fiscal power at the E.U. level should be recognized in the E.U.. Although the tension may seem intractable, it is simply part of the messy business of federalism, which is slow and incremental, but it is also the best political system devised to accommodate both diversity and the benefits of unity at the empire scale. The state leaders who stress the differing interstate differences have a point, but the history of European integration through the E.C. and then the E.U. afford much evidence that directives and even regulations can be assuaged by the state governments to take account of the particularities of the respective states while not necessarily relegating the common interest and accountability. Dynamic federalism requires not only tolerance (for differences to be accommodated), but also patience, for two systems of government are active for any given territory covered by the federal system. As more power lies with the state governments than with that of the EU as a whole at least as of 2011, the challenge for Europeans in the second decade of the twenty-first century is not to let the former hijack the project such that the power stays unbalanced between the states and the federal authoriity of the union. Meanshile, the challenge for Americans is just the opposite: to decide whether to allow the U.S. to continue toward consolidation at the expense of any residual federalism. In both cases, there is optimality in the mean, wherein a federal balance allows for the messy tug-of-wars that characterize healthy federal systems that stay in balance.
Sources:
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
0 comments:
Post a Comment