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In spite of $14.2 billion in global operating profit ($5.1 billion on U.S. operations) in 2010, GE paid no corporate income tax to the U.S. Treasury that year thanks to offsetting prior losses by GE Capital (i.e., bad loans).  In spite of that unit having received TARP funds from U.S. taxpayers, the corporation was able to avoid paying any income tax. This seems like Rousseau's social contract run amuck: corporate welfere in exchange for nada.  Such a modus operendi is in line with the corporate mission: to economize in the sense of maximizing (or satisficing) what is taken in while minimizing what must go out.  In other words, a corporation aims to turn itself from a productive, lean throughput to a concentration of capital in its own right.

In terms of U.S. corporate income taxation, the extent of resources that corporations devote to minimizing what they owe the U.S. Treasury is money that could be better spent, or invested, in productive enterprise. For example, G.E. files returns in 250 jurisdictions and has a staff of 975 working in the corporation's tax department. Even if those people pay for themselves and more by reducing the company's tax liability, the company could eliminate that entire department and orient its global operations in terms of efficiency rather than taxation were income tax applied only to individuals.  The legal person "doctrine" aside, corporations are not citizens; rather, they are groups of citizens. 

Robert Samuelson suggests that the top corporate income tax rate be reduced from 35%, which is one of the highest in the world. He argues that the 15% rate in individual income taxation on dividends and capital gains should be increased. The effect would be regressive, for the top one percent receive two-thirds of all the capital gains and dividends. At the very least, the 15% is relatively low in the individual income tax system and most of the taxpayers subject to the tax could afford a higher rate.

In my opinion, Samuelson does not go far enough, for even with a lower top corporate rate companies would retain their tax departments and steer profit into countries with low tax rates (for there would still be differentials between countries). Theoretically, it does not make sense to tax both corporate income and dividends.  Furthermore, corporate income taxation treats companies as end-points rather than as throughputs. The implications of taxing individuals rather than corporations are staggering not only for more efficient productive investment, but also for attracting foreign direct investment to the U.S. In addition, public accounting firms could eliminate their tax departments and focus all of their attention on auditing--an endeavor made all the more important on account of the misleading financials on Wall Street leading up to the financial crisis of 2008.  Rather than getting headaches over the intracacies of tax rules, public accountants could devote more attention to whether it is enough to follow GAAP in giving an unqualified opinion.

In short, taxation ought not to have so much gravity in orienting corporate America.  Instead, business would do much better in focusing more on building better mousetraps. Individuals who benefit financially from the productive enterprise would be taxed, perhaps even without all the deductions that enable them to avoid being taxed. Imagine a tax-returnless system of individual income taxation involving a fixed low rate applied like a fee on any income taken in, whether from wages, salary, dividends or capital gains. Ironically, by simplifying taxation, more of it could be collected even as businesses are left to do business.

Click to add a question or comment on GE and corporate income taxation.

Source: Robert Samuelson, "The Real GE Scandal," Newsweek, April 11, 2011, p. 21.

A year after the financial crisis of 2008, Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs,  found himself vilified for his firm’s quick return to risky trading in spite of its new bank holding company status. Populist resentment at the time was especially pitted against the hefty bonuses from the trades. Also, people were upset about the benefits that the bank had obtained from the decisions of its alums in the U.S. Government—specifically, in the U.S. Department of the Treatury. For instance, Goldman Sachs and other AIG counterparties got a the dollar-for-dollar payout from AIG thanks to an infusion of funds for that specific purpose by Treasury. Regardless, in an interview with the London Times, the highest-paid CEO (at least in the financial sector) dismissed such talk and defended his money-making machine and its compensation.  In addition to being the engine of economic recovery, according to Blankfein, Goldman Sachs provides a social function in making capital available to companies so they can expand. Stunningly, he adds, “I’m doing God’s work.”[i]  Such a claim is a far cry indeed from Thomas Jefferson’s warning that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.[ii]  Perhaps God intends to undo our liberties by bailing out the banks.

Besides these rather obvious problems with Blankfein's religious claim is his presumption to know what God's work is, and, furthermore, that he is doing it.   Even though a feckless system of corporate governance can enable a CEO to essentially function as his or her own boss, including doing the board's job of evaluating his or her own performance, it is a tall order for a human being to be able to evaluate his performance as God's work.   To be sure, it is possible that God is an intelligent being that bestows favor on his golden stewards for doing His work.

Lloyd Blankfein may have been involved in two conflicts of interest: 1) that of having excessive power over the board whose principal task it is to oversee him, 2) having communicated with GS alums in high posts in the U.S. Government (e.g., Hank Paulson) and perhaps having them enact policies on GS's behalf.   It may be that institutional and personal conflicts of interests can become so ubiquitous that they are simply not seen by the culprits. Furthermore, it could be that the denial enabled by a tacit presumptuousness is like a white movie screen on which even doing God's work can be projected. How ironic it is, that sordid proprietary interest could operate not merely under the subterfuge of being a neutral "market-maker," but also as God's work. Such work is two degrees of freedom away from squalid greed. So it is remarkable that the two could become conflated in a mind.

The financial reform bill approved in December, 2009 by the US House of Representatives proposed to regulate the financial industry and keep firms from growing “too big to fail.” The bill can be likened to a ship made of Swiss cheeze, yet seemingly seaworthy. A key intention of the bill was to gain control over the vast market in “over the counter” derivatives by forcing trading onto open exchanges, where regulators can monitor it. Unregulated derivatives were behind much of the havoc that nearly brought down the financial system in 2008, including the subprime-mortgage-backed securities that put many firms underwater and the credit default swaps sold by AIG, the giant insurance company that sucked up about $180 billion in bailout money. The $592 trillion global market in these mostly unmonitored derivatives remained in 2009 among the most profitable businesses for the biggest banks—Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley—and Wall Street doesn’t want Washington tampering with it. Early versions of Frank’s bill allowed many derivatives to continue trading off exchanges. The bill, Frank wrote, “could be subject to manipulation” by “clever financial firms” seeking to evade a requirement that they trade derivatives on open exchanges.

The story of how those loopholes got into the derivatives bill, even with Frank at the helm and the wind of public outrage at his back, shows just how powerful the Wall Street banking lobby remained nonetheless—and just how complex Wall Street’s financial instruments had become. Many of the key lobbyists were in 2009 in the same gang that helped get us into this mess before, and they were spending huge sums a year after the near meltdown. In the first three quarters of 2009, financial-industry interests  spent $344 million on lobbying efforts, putting them on pace to break all records. This did not include political donations and issue ads. Even more impressive was the lobbying strategy that money was buying. The banks sought to stay in the background and put their corporate customers—a who’s who of American business, including Apple, Whirlpool, and John Deere—out in front of the campaign. “This is an orchestrated, well-funded effort by the banks to manipulate our legislation and leave no fingerprints,” says a congressional staffer involved in drafting the legislation. The financial industry argued that curbs on derivatives do hurt just Wall Street, but also the corporations in Main Street America—the “end users” —that need them to hedge risks.  However, the more custom-made and out of public sight a derivative is, the harder it is for investors—and regulators—to assess its fair value and real risk. This makes it easier for the banks to charge a large “spread” and earn big profits. Frank heatedly denied that he'd been fooled, though he conceded he was catching up on some of the details of the bills he was pushing through. “I’ve become responsible for dealing with a lot of things that are new to me. I didn’t have a great deal of knowledge. I’ve been relying on a whole lot of people,” Frank said. In allowing some exemptions from exchange trading, Frank said he was merely accommodating the corporate end users—not Wall Street—who want to continue doing these private trades in derivatives.  The Wall Street lobby didn’t give up. After Frank had toughened up his stance on derivatives, the lobby tried to redefine what certain kinds of exchanges do.

The money that the industry can use to mollify congressional critics and bolster allies was not the only problem. The problem was even more intractable. Both Frank and his staff (and the corresponding committee in the US Senate) relied on the expertise of the banking industry in the fashioning of regulation for the industry.  Frank admitted that he didn’t know enough to keep on top of the drafts submitted by the industry (and end-users).  Additionally, it was difficult for him and his staff to assess where the industry’s “recommendations” were more “convenient” (meaning self-serving for the banks) than informational.   The financial instruments (e.g., derivatives based on mortgages) were at the time so complicated that congressional staffers who wrote the legislation depended on drafts submitted by the industry itself without being able to adequately screen them for bias.  There is an inherent conflict of interest in an industry even providing information. Therefore, I wonder whether the practice was worth its benefits to congressional staffers. 

The case seems to me like that of having a wolf provide the sketches for the design of the chicken koop, as if the design were an objective plan without any holes.   Even so, without the information from the industry with the vested interest, legislative staffs often do not feel competent to legislate on the complex markets of modern finance.  Indeed, they may not be, given the complexity out there.  But that is not a given.  We miss this point. To reduce the informational asymetry, Congress could direct that the markets be simplified to what they and the regulatory agencies could understand and thus regulate effectively. Opponents of the House bill claimed that the changes ensuing from the bill would limit consumer choice and stunt financial market innovation. Shortly after the House bill passed, President Obama suggested these risks are worth taking.

While applauding House passage of overhaul legislation, the President expressed frustration with banks that were helped by a taxpayer bailout and even as they were “fighting tooth and nail with their lobbyists” against new government controls.  The bank lobbyists spent more than $300 million in 2009 trying to scuttle the bill.  This alone should be enough to shut every congressional office to the lobbyists.  How widespread is the fecklessness!  As the wake of the bill’s passage, Obama said the economy was only then beginning to recover from the “irresponsibility” of Wall Street institutions that “gambled on risky loans and complex financial products” in pursuit of short-term profits and big bonuses with little regard for long-term consequences. “Americans don’t choose to be victimized by mysterious fees, changing terms and pages and pages of fine print. And while innovation should be encouraged, risky schemes that threaten our entire economy should not,” he said. “We can’t afford to let the same phony arguments and bad habits of Washington kill financial reform and leave American consumers and our economy vulnerable to another meltdown.”

So where were our legislators on this point?  Missing in action, most of them.  However much Obama's remarks can serve as a palliative, it must be admitted that the President could have gotten on the banks and refuse to sign a final bill containing deflating loopholes gained by the efforts of the lobby with a vested interest in the legislation.   I don’t believe the President would have risked his re-election contributions from Wall Street by telling Congress to be firmer in resisting the banker taskmasters.  Hence, the U.S. Government is unlikely to take on the very existence of the banks too big to fail even as the most profitable of them quickly returned to risky trading on their own accounts.

Too often, congressional legislators (and the President) wince when it counts, ignoring the inherent conflict of interest in the industry’s warning of Armegeddon.  We need to accept the fact that ery reform has a cost, and that “reform” does not mean “catastrophe.”  If we capitulate to the wolves because there might be a cost otherwise, we miss the greater cost in capitulating.  That cost is not only economic, for it includes the selling of ourselves and our government to the highest bidder and the loudest bully.  When I look around the world, I see fecklessness at home.

By comparison, the British and French states of the E.U. set a 50% windfall tax on ALL banker bonuses within their respective states.   Throughout the U.S., it has been difficult simply dealing with the bonuses of the bankers at the banks that were bailed out; we were so afraid that the credit markets would collapse from a tax or that we shouldn’t touch the other bonuses.  Treasury limited the cash compensation for executives at companies that received the largest taxpayer bailouts to $500,000 and delayed some other payouts. The 25th through the 100th top earners at Citigroup, GMAC, American International Group and General Motors had to take more than half their compensation in stock, and at least half had to be delayed for three or more years. About 12 executives were granted exemptions to the $500,000 cash cap because they were necessary for the companies to “thrive, be able to compete, and not lose key people.”  The European industry-wide approach was stronger, and less apt to result in “talent poaching” that was likely to occur where only TARP reciprients are targeted.

Why is that we were convinced that we couldn't or shouldn’t go beyond the TARP reciprients in limiting exorbitant executive compensation?  Is imposing compensation (in all its forms) limits to protect the market from firms too big to fail really beyond the pale?  Is it really so much a threat to economic freedom? Certainly, it is a legitimate role of a government to protect the viability of the market.  The lack of any enacted windfall tax on bank bonuses (or compensation) in the Congress in 2009 or 2010 intimates the subterranean power of Wall Street in Washington.  Indeed, according to The New York Times, “heeding complaints from banks, the House rejected an effort to allow bankruptcy judges to restructure mortgage payments, a plan that has passed the House before but not the Senate.”  When the same thing happened in the U.S. Senate, Sen. Dick Durbin said publically that the banking lobby owns Congress.  House members also agreed to relax some of the proposed new controls on trading in derivatives. Rather than subject all over-the-counter derivatives to open trading, the bill would have subjected such derivatives only if they were traded between Wall Street firms, or with a major player like AIG. But the transactions between dealers and customers will remain largely hidden, so customers will not be able to compare the prices they are being charged with the prices charged to other customers.  That’s nice for the banks.  We miss this point, paying attention instead to speeches.  Words.

We are not keeping our eyes on the ball, folks; rather, we all too easily allow ourselves to get distracted.  In watering down financial reform, we agree to construct fake walls  on what reform is viable and constructive.  We convince ourselves that we must play inside the pen because insiders have told us that we should. We take harsh words against the pen on our behalf as tantamount to tearing it down.   In actuality, the words are a subterfuge meant to assuage us so we don’t vote differently in the future.  The wolves know that mere words can’t tear down the walls they have directed our representatives to observe.  We have become like herd animals, and our leaders like subterfuges.  It is no wonder that “real change” contrary to the vested interests has been restrained at best.  If a new consumer protection agency is the high-water mark of reform (i.e., banks too big to fail being allowed to go on…even as they have returned to risky trades for much of their 2009 income), we really do deserve the next financial crisis.  …or can a speech going after the financial industry obviate such a thing from happening again?

Sources: http://www.newsweek.com/id/225781 ; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/business/global/11bonus.html?_r=1&ref=world ; http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34380551/ns/business-us_business/ ; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/business/12regulate.html?_r=1&ref=business ; http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34393630/ns/politics-white_house/

Neil Kashkari wrote up the U.S. Treasury department’s Break the Glass Bank Recapitalization Plan in April, 2008—months before the financial crisis—as a “just in case.” It was essentially the TARP program.  Karshkari states in his plan that governmental purchases of toxic mortgage-based assets would do “nothing to help homeowners without [there being] a complimentary program.” He notes that should there be a crisis, “there would be enormous political pressure” for relief going to homeowners in trouble.  Considering the noted downside to his plan, he may have viewed any such pressure from “the masses” as a problem to be ignored rather than even assuaged.  He also admits in his plan that it would provide “no guarantee banks [would] resume lending.”  It is odd that his was made explicit yet not dealt with.  He does gloss an alternative option (C) that would involve refinancing the troubled mortgages, though he assumes a (needlessly cumbersome) case by case basis and that the servicers would determine which loans to put into the program.  The culprits could opt out to insist on the higher payments. In other words, Kashkari was assuming that the government shouldn’t or couldn’t force the banks to take write-downs.  As a former Goldman Sachs man himself (like his boss at the time, Henry Paulson), Kashkari probably didn’t want to propose anything that the bankers wouldn’t view as being in their interest.

In December of 2009, a spokesperson at Bank of America announced that the bank would pay back its $45 billion in US Government aid. The government is all in favor of such repayments.  “As banks replace Treasury investments with private capital, confidence in the financial system increases, taxpayers are made whole, and government’s unprecedented involvement in the private sector lessens,” said Andrew Williams, a spokesman for the Treasury.  The Obama administration had already begun talking with lawmakers about using unspent money from the financial bailout program to help offset the costs of spending to create jobs.

As laudable as efforts to reduce unemployment are, the government is essentially skipping stones over the homeowners in trouble and facing foreclosure.  It could be argued that a “bottom up” approach to TARP—using it to help with mortgage payments (while enabling the government to impose refinancing on the adjustable-rate sub-prime mortgages) would have obviated the foreclosures while prompting further bank lending.  To skip over such a use as banks repay the government suggests that the government officials are not willing to put our money where their mouths are—such as in “pressing” banks to do better in refinancing.  In other words, it is telling that a use that is closer-related to the purpose of TARP was being (yet again) skipped over—only that time so that a purpose further from the mission of the TARP program could be funded.  Sometimes it is worth noting what people decide not to do…

TARP, the “bank bailout,” was the first big issue facing the Obama administration before its roughly $800 billion stimulus plan and its health insurance overhaul that stoked the rise of the Tea Party movement. After supporting TARP, several Republicans lost elections largely because of their votes. For many Americans, TARP is more than a vote; it is a symbol of big government at its worst, intervening in private markets with taxpayers’ billions to save Wall Street plutocrats while average Americans struggle to make mortgage payments.  “This is the best federal program of any real size to be despised by the public like this,” said Douglas J. Elliott, a former investment banker now associated with the Brookings Institution. “It was probably the only effective method available to us to keep from having a financial meltdown much worse than we actually had. Had that happened, unemployment would be substantially higher than it is now, the deficit would have gone up even more than it has,” Mr. Elliott added. “But it really cuts against the grain for a public that is so angry at banks to think that something that so plainly helped the banks could also be good for the public.”  Furthermore, the TARP could conceivably earn taxpayers a profit. Whatever the final losses from housing, auto companies, A.I.G. or smaller banks, those will be offset by taxpayers’ profits from the big banks that have been the focus of their ire since 2008. Treasury reckons that taxpayers will lose less than $50 billion at worst, but at best could break even or even make money. Its best-case assumptions, however, assume that A.I.G. and the auto companies will remain profitable and that Treasury will get a good price as it sells its corporate shares in coming years.

Anger at fat cats getting bailed out even as they were complicit in the financial crisis has blinded the public to the priorities in the TARP—saving the banks rather than troubled home-owners.Treasury has been ready to use up to $50 billion to help modify mortgages for people facing foreclosure, but its initiatives have been such a failure that little has been spent. Yet little of the protest against the TARP going to the banks has been directed in favor of the home-owners. It has hardly been even considered that a law might be passed to make foreclosures illegal.  The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness surely includes the right to shelter. A person’s house should not be treated as a mere commodity of a market, to be transferred at will.  In other words, in our blind devotion to the sanctity of contract, we are settling for less security on things that could be considered rights because they are necessary to being able to live.  The same problem exists in basic health-care.  Do we really want to hang life in the balance?  The priorities in TARP are telling for what was relegated.  Rather than pointing in jealousy to those who were privileged in TARP, we might have been more concerned about who was left out. So I am not so inclined to celebrate breaking even on TARP—but primarily because the complicit bankers got a windfall that they did not deserve.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/business/01tarp.html?_r=1&hp

Despite the weak U.S. economy, 2010 could be the second most profitable for New York City's securities industry, and the average bonus may top last year's because so many bankers and brokers have been laid off. Wall Street earned $21.4 billion during the first three quarters of 2010. The prior year's record of $61.4 billion was fueled by the bailout by the U.S. Government. Wall Street paid out $20.3 billion in bonuses on the $61.4 billion in profits. According to New York City Comptroller John Liu, "The astounding recovery of financial firm profitability in 2009 has been followed by a mixed year in 2010, yet total compensation in the industry is expected to be up modestly once year-end bonuses are paid," Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs’ Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein and his top deputies will collect about $111.3 million in stock in January, 2011, in a delayed payoff from 2009 and their record-setting 2007 bonuses, according to a Bloomberg News report. Within a year after the bonuses were approved, Goldman Sachs took $10 billion from the U.S. Treasury, converted to a bank and was borrowing as much as $35.4 billion a day from Federal Reserve emergency programs, Bloomberg reported, adding that in 2010 the firm paid $550 million to settle U.S. regulators’ fraud charges related to a mortgage-security the company sold in 2007.

Analysis:
Three points come to mind from this report from MSNBC.  First, the disjunction between Wall Street and Main Street means that any recovery underway in 2010 was not uniform through the U.S. economy. In other words, the "jobless" recovery did not hurt bonuses in the financial sector.  Secondly, the dictum that the fraudulant must inevitably pay is effectively countered by the example of Goldman Sachs.  Blankfein testified before Sen. Levin's Investigations committee that Goldman Sachs had merely been a market-maker even as the bank had traded on its own books to short against the mortgage derivatives even as it was selling them to its clients. In other words, the bank was profiting both ways even as it was contributing to the financial crisis.  After an infusion of government cash, the bank has made off quite well. Lest I be accused of envy, it is the unfairness involved that has inspired this post. Lastly, the positive impact of the bank bailout on the industry (and its bonuses) can be distinguished from the lack of help from the U.S. Government to the millions of homeowners who have lost their homes.  I say "homes" rather than houses to extentuate the point that foreclosure extolls rather severe costs in addition to the financial kind. I distinguish the luxuriating bankers from the plight of the foreclosed in order to point to Barak Obama's priority. His chief economic advisor until the end of 2010, Larry Summers (whose high school economics teacher is one of my mother's cousins), had been involved in obstructing efforts to regulate derivatives in 1998 (Summers was one of Rubin's deputies in Treasury under Clinton at the time).  Furthermore, Tim Geitner, Obama's Treasury Secretary, had been appointed as President of the New York Federal Reserve by a board with the urging of Citibank).  In other words, Obama's leanings toward Wall Street can be understood both from the directionality of the bailout and whom he has appointed. We should not really be surprised that the big banks and their employees whom the banks have not let go came back to vigor so quickly while the general recovery has been jobless.  Those who have, get more, while those who don't have, remain stuck.  The impact on the viability of our republics can not be good. Increasing inequality exascerbated by government policy cannot but render us even more a plutocracy (i.e., rule by the wealthy). To reply that any effort to tamper with this increasing inequality threatens property rights and economic liberty ignores the disparate impact of government policy (e.g., the bank bailout) on the wealthy. Moreover, when economic inequality threatens the viability of representative democracy, that democracy has a right to correct that which threatens it. One might call the policy-driven inequality a systemic risk that cannot be allowed to continue to exist without threatening the viability of the system. To put it plainly, a person does not have the right to riches if they risk the entire system coming down or even being compromised.  An absolute right to property, like an absolutist conception of sovereignty, is simply irresponsible and ultimately selfish. The 2010 bonuses coming out of Wall Street so soon after the crisis of 2008 and the subsequent bailout suggest that the extent of economic inequality in the U.S. is neither an accident nor natural.

FYI: If any of this post is significant enough to be logged in memory and reflected on later, it might be that the bank bonuses occurred during a jobless "recovery." This juxtaposition is in itself indicative of something troubling going on.

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40681578/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/%22%3Ehttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40681578/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/%3C/a%3E%3C/p