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The philosophy of leadership in the EU is evinced in the fact that the major governmental institutions each have a president.  The EU Commission, the European Council, and the EU Parliament each have a full-time president.  Also, there is a rotating E.U. Presidency occupied by what in American terms would be the governors—each one assuming the office on behalf of his or her state for six months. The presidents of the European Council (e.g., van Rompuy in 2010), the Commission (e.g., Barroso in 2010) join whichever State occupies the E.U. Presidency in jointly representing the EU abroad. This picture, as well as the underlying political philosophy, differs from that which has been dominant in the US, wherein the U.S. Government has only one president representing it. The Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate do not jointly represent the US with the US President abroad. My main contention is that both approaches have their pluses and minuses, as do their respective undergirding assumptions; both are heavily informed by culture, which in turn is formed by historical experience. Because it typically goes unquestioned in the U.S. that only one person can be in charge (i.e., “The buck stops here”) and this generally accepted premise has led to criticism of other unions—namely, the E.U.—I pay particular attention here to making the drawbacks of our own system transparent. At the very least, this project might prompt greater humility in the recognition that our system is not necessarily the default that others should emulate. The E.U. should not become a replica of the U.S. even if both are federal governments on the empire-scale. Indeed, in some ways, we might learn something by looking at the E.U.’s system of governance and even potentially improve our own from the observations. Simply put, humility regarding one’s own dominant assumptions is not of weakness; rather, it is inherently of strength and confidence as well as a willingness to improve by learning from other cases having different presuppositions. Such an attitude would also make us a better partner to the Europeans.</p>&#13;
<p>The “unitary” leadership theory, which is dominant (and typically unquestioned) in the U.S., is evinced even in the classic epic film, The Wizard of Oz. When the Wizard leaves Oz in his balloon, he announces that the Scarecrow would rule in his place by virtue of the Scarecrow’s brain. The Scarecrow would be assisted by the Tin Man (by virtue of his heart) and the Lion (by virtue of his courage).  This is Platonic rationalism applied to governance—reason controlling the passions of love and courage in not only the psyche, but the polis as well. This assumption was evinced in the U.S. constitutional convention.Governeur Morris, on August 9 in the convention, argued “we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible.” (Madison, Notes, p. 421. Both the assumption that intelligence is primary and that one of the three characters must be singled out as the ultimate boss are vulnerable to critique. The Wizard could have announced that the three figures would be co-rulers: reason, love and courage ideally governing in balance. To set reason above the other two can be reckoned as artificial. It could be argued that as governance involves power, which can result in other people being hurt emotionally or physically, the leader’s heart ought to be forefront—assisted by reason and courage. In other words, both Plato’s ideal of reason dominating the passions not only in the psyche, but also in the polis, and the assumption that one person must be chosen to be the executive can be questioned; they are both cultural assumptions. In criticizing the E.U. for its multiple presidents, one might keep the subjective nature of these assumptions in mind rather than simply castigate the Europeans.

In his article in Newsweek, for example, William Underhill criticizes the E.U. in arguing that “Europe still lacks the unity it needs for a proper partnership with the U.S.”  What is needed, Underhill maintains, is a greater clarity of purpose. This is being impeded, he argues, by the “continuing muddle over who’s in charge in Brussels.” Underhill traces the root cause to the inordinate power still being enjoyed by the state legislatures. I don’t think the fact that the EU has multiple presidents (i.e., of EU institutions) is a function of the relative power of the state governments at the expense of the EU; The union’s lack of energy, on the other hand, results in large part from the entrenched power of the states. No do I agree with Underhill that the lack of clarity of purpose is a function of there being essentially four co-presidents in the E.U. Government. In other words, the problem is not that the E.U. has too many chiefs. The system of multiple presidents representing the EU is a function of the dominant philosophy of leadership in the EU, which has been formed out of the European culture that included dictatorships. The resulting theory can be called “pluralistic” leadership and governance because no one person is put at the helm. That is to say, no one person is trusted to have a monopoly of power. Given the twentieth century in Europe, this assumption is reasonable.

The hegemony of the “pluralistic” theory of leadership in the E.U. in the twenty-first century is due to the disastrous “One Man Rule” of several of the twentieth-century European nationalisms (e.g., Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini).  Europeans living in the century after that of the two world wars are much more cautious regarding “one man rule” because of the other things that can come instead of the promise of greater wisdom in one person. Mussolini may have made the trains run on time, but he did other things as well. I suspect that even the assumption that one person has much better wisdom than the rest has also been discredited by the practice of housing leadership in just one person as per the European nationalisms of the twentieth century. In the US, this view has been recessive because of the different experience even in spite of the colonists' experience with it in the form of George III and of the plurality that goes with an empire-scale polity. In other words, even the eighteenth-century Americans' experience should have produced a pluralistic approach. In the constitutional convention, Ben Franklin points to the inexplicable bias in favor of one-person leadership. "We seemed he said too much to fear cabals in appointments by a number, and ato have too much confidence in those of single persons" (Madison, Notes, p. 601). Even so, the plurality view can be found in theconvention.

In the convention, Randolph opposed “one person” as the executive (i.e., the President of the U.S.).  Besides noting that the “permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy,” Randolph argued “that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department.” He “was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country.” (Madison, Notes, p. 58).  The assumption here is, as Sherman observed, that no “one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom.” (Madison, Notes, p. 62)  Furthermore, on July 20 in the convention, Madison pointed to the downside of the unitary leadership model. “In the case of the Executive Magistracy [i.e., the U.S. Presidency] which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.” (Madison, Notes, p. 333) Four days later, Williamson brought up another objection against “a single Magistrate”—“that he will be an elective King, and will feel the spirit of one.” (Madison, Notes, p. 357)  Similarly Ben Franklin averred that experience "shewed that caprice, the intrigues of favorites &amp; mistresses . . . were nevertheless the means most prevalent in monarchies" (Madison, Notes, p. 601). Besides the association with kingship, the empire-scale of the U.S. even in having thirteen republics was relevant. Williamson "did not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the N. &amp; S. States [the case is different than in Britain].” (Madison, Notes, p. 357) Similarly, Col. Mason "was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President alone . . . he suggested that a privy Council of six members to the president should be established; . . . two out of the Eastern [,] two out of the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union" (Madison, Notes, p. 596). In other words, the fact that the U.S. is on the empire-scale is an attribute exacerbating the downside of the one person theory that would not be present in the States of Europe (whereas it would be present at the E.U. level of governance). That is, the diversity inherent in an empire-scale polity made up of republics, which in turn are equivalent to the early-modern kingdoms in scale, is more difficult to square with having just one person at the helm--which brought up associations of a king (e.g. George III).  The empire-scale of both the EU and US works against the unitary theory, and the experience of the British colonists with kingship and of the Europeans in the twentieth century with dictators work against the approach as well. Furthermore, it might run contrary to being in a republic. On June 6, 1787, Wilson observed in the constitutional convention that the nature of republican government cannot “give to an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest.” (Madison, Notes, p. 79).  This, Wilson noted, gives rise to a difficulty in rendering the executive competent to its own defense.

Americans ought not blame Europeans for wanting to avoid the "one person" consolidation of power in the E.U.'s government. From the standpoint of the problems with the “unitary” approach, the E.U.’s approach to having multiple presidents representing the E.U. abroad may be better than the imperial U.S. Presidency as a leadership approach for the U.S. This is the irony in pointing to the E.U. as having too many chefs in the kitchen—too many chiefs—while presuming that the U.S. model is and should be the default. Perhaps we (meaning here Americans, as I am one) ought not be so presumptuous, and instead examine our own presuppositions.  Being open to learn from others could make us stronger, which would include being humbler. Yet we are not even aware of the minority position expressed in our own constitutional convention against the “unitary” approach; we are much more familiar with the dominant position on the matter. Wilson, for example, expressed the dominant philosophy in arguing that a “principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.”  (Madison, Notes, p. 67). In other words, unity and energy of government favor one person.  I contend that another assumption along with the unity and energy is that one person can be found to be distinct in being qualitatively more wise than the other candidates.

One might think that the colonial experience with King George III might have led the convention’s delegates to favor splitting the presidency up between two or more persons.  However, the colonists had accepted the imperial rule of the Crown; they viewed the province of Parliament to be solely within the host kingdom (Great Britain).  So it was the taxation by Parliament over the North American British colonies that had the colonists so much up in arms.  That the king went on to support the usurpation of Parliament to imperial rule implicated the king as corrupt in not having stood up for the distinction between rule of the empire (the domain of the king) and of the host kingdom (the domain of the king and of Parliament).  In other words, the real beef was with Parliament rather than with one man rule.  So Wilson’s view won out in the constitutional convention, and has remained dominant in the US ever since in part because the European nationalisms of the twentieth century were so far from the American experience.

Theoretically speaking, aside from the contending virtues of diversity, unity and energy applied to governance, the question seems to be whether certain human beings really are so distinct with respect to leadership and governance that the rule by one person is justified. Even without the European experience of the twentieth century, it is unlikely that there is apt to be one person in a republic so superior that he (or she) should be the unitary president. Furthermore, the Obamamania of 2008 in the U.S. and the subsequent wide-spread disappointment in the man in office (approval ratings in 2010 were down considerably from those just after Obama was elected) may suggest a fine line between the “great man” theory of leadership and hero-worship, which is a form of idolatry. Fortunately, the E.U. provides an alternative by which Americans may check such an excess and perhaps even re-evaluate the “wisdom” assumption undergirding one man rule. Of course, having three presidents in a council has the disadvantage of dissent and perhaps even conflict, hampering the energy of the European executive. Perhaps this disadvantage could be put at one extreme and hero-worship on the other—both underlying assumptions having their downsides.  The point is perhaps not to go to the extreme in either direction. The salience of popularity in the U.S. Presidential election of 2008 may suggest that the U.S. has gone too far in the direction of one man rule.  Part of the lack of energy at the E.U. level of leadership may suggest that the E. U. has gone too far in esteeming consensus—though this could have more to do with the power of the state governments than with the pluralistic approach to leadership. Both unions therefore have their respective challenges, and could thus ill-afford not to learn from each other.

Source on the EU: William Underhill, “Europe Still Has Too Many Chiefs,” Newsweek, November 22, 2010, p. 6.
Source of quotes from the U.S. Constitutional Convention: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987.