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According to David Firestone of The New York Times, a “surprising number” of the Tea Party members were calling for the repeal of the 17th Amendment of the US Constitution during the election campaign season of 2010. That amendment, which was ratified in 1913, provides for direct election by the people of each state of US senators. According to Firestone, “allowing Americans to choose their own senators seems so obvious that it is hard to remember that the nation’s founders didn’t really trust voters with the job. The people were given the right to elect House members. But senators were supposed to be a check on popular rowdiness and factionalism. They were appointed by state legislatures.” That it may seem so obvious to us does not mean that we have it right. Yet Firestone presumes so in writing, “a  modern appreciation of democracy — not to mention a clear-eyed appraisal of today’s dysfunctional state legislatures — should make the idea unthinkable.” Should it really?  Firestone seems biased in his dogmatism.

For one thing, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1786 didn’t want to restrict direct representative democracy in the US Government to the US House only out of fear of mob rule as Firestone suggests.  They thought the direct power of the state governments in the US Government would be necessary to keep the new empire from consolidating at the imperial level (i.e., in the US Government). Firestone himself admits that to most authors of the Constitution, “allowing states to appoint the Senate was the linchpin of the entire federalist system and the real reason there are two houses of Congress.” Whereas the British House of Lords represents wealth, the US Senate was to represent not only that, but semi-sovereign republics as well.  The latter likens the US Senate to the European Council rather than to the upper chamber of one of the EU’s states.  Firestone makes a category mistake where he avers that it “may be true that appointed senators, accountable only to state legislators, would never approve of many useful federal mandates designed to put the national interest above local parochialism — including everything from the minimum wage to the new health care reform law.” States commensurate with European kingdoms/countries are not local polities.  Furthermore, reducing the US Government to a “national” interest ignores the semi-sovereign nature of the states (and thus the international principles in the design of the US Senate as opposed to the US House, which is national in nature).

Firestone seems to misunderstand what the US Senate is.  In referring to returning to having the state legislatures appoint their delegates to the US Senate as an “elitist notion,” Firestone forgets that state legislators are elected by the people and in fact have smaller electorates than do US House or Senate members.  Empowering state legislators would ironically be to bring power back closer to the people.  ”Senate candidates have to raise so much money to run that they become beholden to special interests,” Tea Party members say according to Firestone.  The members ”argue that state legislators would not be as compromised and would choose senators who truly put their state’s needs first.” That in turn would restore checks and balance to federalism, wherein both the state and federal governments would be checked (by the other). This is not just a matter of state rights; rather, it is a matter of a viable federalism instead of consolidation. As Tim Bridgewater, who ousted Sen. Robert Bennett of Utah as the Republican candidate writes, “We traded senators who represent rights of states for senators who represent the rights of special interest groups.” By rights of the states, one can infer an empowerment of the representatives elected by the people of the states.  Such a change would hardly be anti-democratic or elitist; rather, it would reduce the power of the elitism in Washington DC.  A writer ought to be careful in dogmatically writing that something is ridiculous or unthinkable, for the lack of thought could come back to haunt him or her.  It is clear that Firestone is not very open to the possibility that he could be wrong.  The arrogance of centralized power at an empire-level is truly remarkable, even in its press.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/opinion/01tue4.html?hp

In 1928, the Senate stopped the bill that would have given WWI vets their bonus then rather than in 1946.  Mass protests for weeks by thousands of vets on the U.S. Capitol may have swayed the U.S. House, but the Senate was undaunted: passage of the bill would be economically disasterous .   Such a scenerio is exactly what the delegates in the U.S. constitutional convention in 1787 would have predicted.  They designed the House to reflect the passions of the people, and the Senate as a check on such passion where it is intemperate.   Looking back at Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, the delegates feared excess democracy.  No supporter of the Senate, Madison nonetheless points out that “a numerous body of Representatives were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose against impetuous councils” (Madison’s Notes, p. 194).

However, the delegates also designed the U.S. Senate “to represent the wealth of the Country” (Pinkney, in Madison’s Notes, p. 198).  Col. Mason claimed that “one important object in constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property” (Madison’s Notes, p. 200).  Does being wealthy make one temporate or enlightened?   Madison observes that “wisdom & virtue” are among the objects of the proposed Senate (Madison’s Notes, p. 195).  Does being wealthy mean that one is apt to stand up for virtue?  Does wisdom come from having inherited or earned wealth?

As if these two purposes etched in the design of the U.S. Senate are not sufficiently disjoined, the delegates also intended that the Senate represent the State governments so as to proffer them a means of defending their turf against encroachment by the U.S. Government.  Senators were selected by State governments before the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913.  It was debated in the convention whether popular election would give the senators a sufficient incentive to protect their respective State governments.  The delegates concluded that it would be insufficient, and history has proved them right–as the governments of the States have steadily lost power to the expansive U.S. Government.

So, the U.S. Senate was designed as a check on the excess democracy possible in the U.S. House, to protect the interests of property, and to represent the State governments and protect the balance of power so crucial to the viability of federalism.   It is not clear to me that these three functions are mutually-supporting or even compatible.  I don’t see evidence in Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of any consideration of the assumed compatibility.

Just as any human institution is apt to subtly morph if it endures for a sufficient time, the U.S. Senate has changed through the centuries.  As a result of the 17th Amendment wherein U.S. Senators are now popularly elected (by State), the U.S. Senate is more democratic–hence more like the House.  The six year senatorial term is a buffer, to be sure. However, re-election is never too far off to be absent from a given Senator’s political and legislative calculation.   Hence we are unwittingly leaving ourselves vulnerable to our own excesses.  Are we assuming that our passionate, spur-of-the-moment, collective impulse cannot be reckless and ultimately not in our own best interest?

I have already pointed to the implications for the State governments, and we have seen their eclipse through the last century.   What about the protection of property?  How does this mix with the more-democratic “structural tendency” in the Senate?   Are Senators more oriented to the upper-class voters while soothing the rest as if we too are being represented?  In other words, is there a sort of duplicity built-in to this combination?

In my opinion, the U.S. Senate can represent the State governments while simultaneously serving as a check on the intemporate excesses possible in the U.S. House.  Property is sufficiently represented in the U.S. Government as a whole, given the small number of elected and appointed officials relative to the entire population.   I would look to the commensurate European Council in the E.U.   The Council not only represents the State governments, the chief executives of the States (or their ministers when specialized topics are decided) sit on the Council.   It is a viable check on the European Parliament, which is commensurate with the U.S. House (i.e., elected representatives by the people of the EU).   We could do better by emulating the European Council.

Accordingly, I recommend that the governors sit in the Senate (which would meet periodically…with the governors’ respective staffs doing the leg work), with the relevant members of the States’ cabinets meeting on specialized topics.   This might seem confusing, but it works in Europe.  Essentially, officials in the respective State governments would meet in a common council.  50, not 100 members.  The latter number is too numerous for a council.   Because governors are elected, democracy would not be shirked even as the Senate would be a viable check on the excesses in the House (because the governors acting in a council are “two degrees” from the voters while the U.S. Reps are only one).   To be sure, the Senate would not be meeting every day, but meeting periodically to decide the major points.

The Senate representing the State governments would distinguish the Senate from being a replica of the House.  Do we really need two Houses?   Strictly speaking, proportional representation applies where citizens are being represented.  In contrast, in an intergovernmental council each government is a member–a person, as it were–regardless of how much each weights (e.g., different populations, territorial size, or wealth).  The European Council deviates from the “intergovernmental council” model because the number of votes assigned to the governments is influenced by its population.  I don’t see why the Senate would no longer be an intergovernmental council just because the votes are proportional; the key would be that governments would be voting, so the one vote per government could be relaxed.  Because proportional represention is the rule in the U.S. House, the big States can protect themselves.  So I don’t view the one vote per government in the Senate as problematic in terms of the Congress as a whole.  In general terms, the more we can distinguish the two bodies of the Congress, the more we enrich our system of government by taking advantage of the unique contributions from different forms of polity.   If there is a downside to proportional representation,  a Senate not partaking of that method would automatically be a check (and vice versa, of course).

“In a sense, Europe seemed to be living down to expectations. Earlier, the foreign minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, warned against a 'minimalist solution' that would reduce the European Union’s 'opportunity to have a clear voice in the world.'"  Olivier Ferrand, president of Terra Nova, a center-left research institute in France, said, “It is quite astounding. . . . It is jaw-dropping. It is the end of ambition for the E.U. — really disappointing.”

I think these are rather extreme positions on the selection of Herman Van Rompuy on November 19, 2009 as the first non-rotated president of the European Council.  Moreover, I don’t think the E.U. is going the way of the dinasaur just because Van Rompuy was not well known at the time of his selection.  He has written six books, is a writer of Japanese poems, has consensus-skills, and seems humble enough.  Would popular election have yielded a better candidate? As the election would have been E.U.-wide, it is doubtful that a high proportion of the voters would have been sufficiently familiar with him to make an informed decision. 

The New York Times continues, “The deal that produced the two choices emerged as a result of backroom negotiations among leaders jockeying for future and more important economic portfolios that could be more powerful in the enlarged European Union, which is still more of an economic union than a political one and looks to remain so.”  However, the E.U. includes a popularly-elected Parliament. Is a parliament not political? Is a parliament not a government body?  Perhaps, moreover, we should simply say that transfers of sovereignty are now economic in nature.

One might ask: who would have a vested interest in perpetrating such a subterfuge wherein governmental institutions, whether intergovernmental (e.g., the European Council) or national (e.g., the E.U. Parliament) are to be portrayed as solely economic in nature? According to The New York Times,  “The leaders of Europe’s most powerful countries, France and Germany, did not want to be overshadowed. Nor apparently did their foreign ministers.”   After the European Council elected Van Rompuy, Gordon Brown, the then-current British Prime Minister who had been pushing for Tony Blair (his precursor), told reporters that the posts are only ceremonial anyway since the state governments are still in control.  However, is Van Rompuy's role in presiding over the European Council merely for show? Is there not power in chairing a political institution? Furthermore, are the heads of the state governments in charge of the E.U. Commission, the E.U. Parliament, and the European Court of Justice? Even within the European Council where the governors of the states sit, qualified majority voting on most issues means that any given state government is not in control. We can conclude that E.U. level officials are not mere gloss on a window, and that the member states have indeed transferred some of their governmental sovereignty to the E.U. Government. Lest is be thought otherwise--that the E.U. does not have a government, there is a saying in English: If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, and swims like a duck, odds are it is a duck.  It might be useful to ask why it is in the interest of some that the obvious conclusion be withheld.

My only caveat concerning the selection of Van Rompuy is that the consensus maker was not the sort to make transparent the "duck" subterfuge and denial, which had gone unchecked at the expense of greater European integration. In other words, the E.U. needs its own leaders who can garnish attention for the E.U. itself (i.e., apart from its state governments) because if integration falters, the danger will be dissolution unless or until more governmental sovereignty is transferred to the E.U. As for Van Rompuy's low name recognition outside Belgium at the time of his selection, let’s not forget that few, if any, presidents of the U.S. Senate (the Vice President of the U.S.) have been known at the beginning of their respective terms. Of course, outside of breaking tie votes, the president of the U.S. Senate (whose members are the member states of the union) is more ceremonial than is the president of the European Council.  In fact, senators regularly stand in for the presiding officer when the U.S. Senate is in session, whereas Van Rompuy himself presides over sessions of the European Council.  Also, the European Council is possibly more powerful among E.U. governmental institutions than the U.S. Senate is in the U.S. This is probably so because the state governments in the E.U. have more power at the E.U. level than the American state governments do in the U.S. This could explain why Van Rompuy's position, the President of the European Council, is powerful (because the Council he chairs is powerful) even if Van Rompuy had been an unknown outside of Belgium and was not an attention-getter in the media (e.g., unlike Tony Blair).

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/europe/20union.html?_r=1&ref=world

I suppose most Americans are unaware that the EU has a Supreme Court, a Parliament and a Council/Senate.   Few Europeans are wont to admit that these institutions constitute a government, so perhaps we can’t be blamed here in America for not taking greater notice of the relatively new government across the pond.  So it is no surprise to read that President Obama decided to skip the 2010 EU-US summit in Europe.  To be sure, he was increasingly facing challenges implementing his domestic reform agenda and had indicated that in 2010 he would spend more time on American soil. His approval ratings in the US dropped as the economic recovery was slow to translate onto the job market. Even so, officials in Brussels reacted with disappointment to the news. I don't blame them. “It is normally the case that the summits are summits precisely because they are attended by heads of state and government,” EU commission spokeswoman Pia Ahrenkilde Hanson told reporters. Even though as US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon stated to reporters, “The president as you all know has travelled to Europe in his first year more than any president has ever done in the past,”   the US President had yet to formally meet the new president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy.   Obama would likely insist that he had meet with several of the EU’s states’ heads of state or government, andthat they held more power in their union than their counterparts in the US.  Even so, if the EU and US are indeed commensurate as empire-level unions of comparable republics, the US President should have made meeting the EU leaders a priority.   In contrast to the US, the EU spreads out its presidency over at least three people.  The EU Commission, which is the executive branch involved in legislation as well, has a president.  The EU’s Senate or Council (which represents the state governments) has one as well.  Also, there is a rotating presidency, wherein one of the state governments holds a figure-head presidency.

So it is not difficult to understand why President Obama would skip the EU-US Summit  in 2010 (though he attended the next year's) even though the EU’s states are now semi-sovereign (as are the American states) and the EU holds the rest of the governmental sovereignty.  Obama's decision was based in part on a category mistake that implicitly relegates the US to being akin to a state in another union.  If the American President is serious about feeling pride for the Union for which he stands, he must lead in a manner that treats like with like.  This would involve standing for real change in that it would mean dealing with the European state governments through the EU, rather than independently.  They are in a Union, after all.  Es ist die Zeit zu aufwachen.  Il faut que nous nous réveillions.  Indeed, it is difficult to awaken to changed political realities and reorient oneself.

Source: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5202541,00.html

In an article from MSNBC on the public debt crisis facing some of the EU’s states, the reporter writes: “Analysts are also growing more worried about the U.S. budget deficit, which remains higher than that of most eurozone nations. But Greece, Spain and other troubled countries in Europe do not command the kind of economic clout the United States does and, in many cases, have yet to escape the Great Recession.”

I contend that this statement is misleading because it is premised on a category mistake.  Firstly, the EU is not simply “eurozone nations.”  In having a Parliament, Supreme Court (the ECJ) and a Senate or Council representing the states, the EU has a government. Accordingly, some of the governmental sovereignty that used to be held by the state governments has been transferred to the EU, so the governments of the union and its states are both semi-sovereign.

Secondly, of course the respective state governments of the EU do not “command the kind of economic clout the United States does.”  That they should evinces a category mistake. Both the US and EU operate common markets.  That a part of one common market is not equivalent to a common market made of such parts should go without saying (see: fallacy of treating a part as a whole).

Thirdly, in treating the US public deficits and debt as equivalent to those of the EU’s state governments, one ignores the fact that many of the US’s state governments also face daunting public deficits and debt.  In other words, comparing the US debt to those of the EU’s state governments is misleading.  Because the EU government does not have a significant debt (that I know of) and some of the US states do have such debt, the comparison understates the debt on the US side.

In general terms, the presumed comparison assumes that there are no significant differences between a union of states and a state of such a union with respect to political or economic functions.  It might be, for instance, that because an empire-scale union is further from the people, accountability with respect to running up debt might be different than in a state.  I suppose it could be argued that the political entity composed of the states could be expected both to buffer public demands for more spending and to be more profligate than what the people want.  In any case, my point is that different dynamics come into play at the empire-level. Ignoring the qualitative differences in going from a kingdom-level polity to an empire-level policy made up of kingdom-level polities results in the kind of statements I have critiqued here (i.e., as if the US merely has more economic clout than a state of the EU, rather than that the US is not comparable with a state in another union). 

I think we moderns tend to skip over category mistakes when they have become the default in our societies.  This makes us susceptable to relying on erroneous results from comparisons based on such mistakes.  In other words, we take too much for granted in what we read (and hear) in the public square.  Although we don’t realize it, we desparately need Socrates-like writers (and speakers) to point out to us that we don’t know as much as we think we do.  This goes for such writers ourselves.  My thesis on the EU and US is of course merely a theory or argument…far from perfect, perhaps wrong, and doubtlessly improveable by others.  One way out of our epistemological presumptuousness is to subject taken-for-granted assumptions in the public square , including my own, to critique.  We simply do not go far enough, which permits vested interests to get away with too much.

Socrates, where art thou?  You should have slipped out when you had the chance. You were aiding Athens…not corrupting the youth.  Your detractors were just jealous (they owe you a written Apology).  Please come back. Spit out that hemlock.  We need you!

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35268117/ns/business-washington_post/

In other posts, I have argued that the EU and the US are of the same political genus or level.  That is, both are modern empire-level Unions that contain polities on the scale of the early modern kingdom.  In other words, the American states are roughly equivalent to the European states.  I have also argued that once this basis of comparison is established, useful comparisons (and contrasts) can be made.  Contrarywise, likening apples with oranges is apt to lead to erroneous conclusions (which has been the norm).   In the March 2, 2010 issue of the NYT, Roger Cohen illustrates how useful EU-US comparisons can be.  He is careful to compare the EU now not to the current US, but to the US a few decades into its founding.  One would not compare new with old wine; new should be compared with old when it too was new.   The US under its Articles treaty (and before that as a military alliance) was far less integrated politically and economically than the EU is today (which is roughly at where the US was in 1790). 

Lamenting the concern of the EU states that have done a better job than others (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) on debt-management, Cohen sees a parallel in the early US.  He writes, “More than two centuries ago, the newborn United States faced a similar crisis of integration. With the Constitution approved, Alexander Hamilton, as treasury secretary to President George Washington, grappled with proving that the government of the 13 states that now existed on paper could function in practice. The economy was a shambles, beset by debt incurred in the fight for liberty. In 1790, Hamilton set about establishing the financial credibility of the federal government. Central to his proposals was that the government would assume the debts of the states. This precipitated the “assumption” crisis because different states had different levels of debts and had proved more or less conscientious in paying them off.”  Cohen maintains that a similar “assumption” crisis would befall the EU as states like Finland and Germany brissle at the EU assuming the outstanding debt of some of the Southern states (notably Greece).

Cohen goes on to note that the “assumption” crisis was resolved in the US by creating Washington, D.C. near Virginia to appease Madison and Jefferson (the US’s institutions had been in New York City).  Cohen doesn’t see any such deal in the works in Europe, so he concludes that the tensions between having a centralized currency and federal (i.e., EU and state-level) fiscal policy will continue.  Comparing oranges with oranges (which is rare…at least during the winter of 2010 given Florida’s cold weather then), he argues that “Greece is a far smaller economy than crisis-hit California, but thanks to Hamilton, California’s travails are absorbed within a huge economy where most taxing and spending is done by the federal government. Athens agonistes has no such cushion.” This is a very good point.  After the earthquake of 2010 in Chile, I was thinking along similar lines (i.e., the difference that a SAU would make for Chile’s recovery). 

However, Cohen falters from his otherwise excellent basis of comparison.  Ignoring the governmental sovereignty that the European Court of Justice has ruled belongs to the EU over its state governments (and constitutions), he  views the EU as simply “the halfway house of monetary union, fiscal divergence and à la carte national politics.”  In actuality, the EU is far more—just ask a European whether he or she has encountered any of the EU’s laws and regulations (which go beyond monetary union).  I suspect that Cohen is thinking of the EU only in terms of its monetary authority and generalizing that to “what Europe is.”  His ending line, “The differences between America and Europe go beyond the political to their very nature,” can be interpreted as a denial of the EU-US basis of comparison that is the basis of his comparisons (oranges with oranges).  If the EU is merely economic whereas the early US was political and economic, then the EU and US are not of the same political genus, which would render comparisons between them questionable at best.  But the EU does have political or governmental institutions, such as a court (the ECJ) and a parliament.  The ECJ functions as the Supreme Court (even ruling against state constitutions at odds with EU law in an EU enumerated power).  Furthermore, the EU Parliament has a role in the enactment of laws that cannot be reduced to state laws.

Undoubtedly from his truncated view of the EU,  Cohen generalizes too much in concluding that “ever closer union” will not occur in the EU because of the differences among the state governments’ respective debt-levels (relative to the state economies).  The EU is much more than a currency, I would argue, and other lines of integration will not necessarily be impeded by monetary divergences.  To be sure, political differences from the latter may spill over onto other policy domains, but I believe that Cohen is being to much of a monetary reductionist in casting doom on the EU as a whole.

Comparing the EU now to the US in 1790, there are more adequate structural safeguards against consolidation at the Union-level of government than there were in the US.  For example, the heads of the state governments sit on the European Council whereas the counterparts in the US sent delegates to the US Senate (which represents the state governments even today).  The US could learn a thing or two from the Europeans and replace the US Senate with the Governor’s Association.  More balance in power between the state governments and that of the Union would be more likely as a result.  Of course, that the EU began with regulations and is only now picking up powers that are more typical for the Union level could mean that the EU could consolidate power from its state governments (esp. as Europeans gain more of a sense of being Europeans…perhaps in 100 years or so…as was the case in the US).

My advise to the Europeans is: don’t be afraid to deny all that the EU has become, and redouble your efforts to safeguard the state governments from an encroaching EU government.  These to things sound contradictory, but they are not.   For only by realizing what the EU is politically (i.e., a federal government) will you realize how important it is to construct a federal structure that works against a consolidation of power far from the people of Europe.  Of course, this does not mean starving the EU, for then dissolution and possible future wars would be likely.  So it is a federal balance that should be strived for, and you can structure your Union (and its states) in such a way that balance is achieved (you are not yet there) and maintained.  US History provides a case study of what NOT to do if this is your goal.  We have really screwed up federalism here (and most of us don’t even realize it).  Hopefully, by comparing the EU with the US you can do better.  Maybe that will prompt folks like Cohen to look at Europe and say, “Hey, we can do that too. Afterall, the US is a Union of states too.”   It is of course possible to re-trace and correct for a wrong turn federally speaking.  Anyway, bonne chance, mes Amies!  Gut Gleuck! Viel, viel Gleuck!

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/opinion/02iht-edcohen.html?hp

A republic is characterized by the citizenry electing representatives, who in turn legislate (i.e., make law). As an alternative, the citizenry itself could vote directly on legislative proposals. The latter is called direct democracy. Ancient Athens, for example, practiced it. In the United States, the republic form is the prevalent form of government.  In spite of Wilson’s comment made in the constitutional convention that representation “is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively,” direct democracy has typically limited to an occasional “referendum” question even though more vital questions could be put to the body politic directly. Typically, referendums have to do with elections (and thus with representative rather than direct democracy) or with general taxing or spending limits for a government. The rationale for putting general taxing or spending limits up for referendum is that they apply to a government as a whole—this perspective being from that of popular sovereignty (i.e., the citizenry, whose electoral power transcends their government). Rarely, an “issue” is put up to be decided directly by the voters. In 2010, for example, Californians decided on whether to legalize pot in California. I contend that many more matters of policy could be decided directly by the voters. Since the elected representatives represent the citizenry, the former should not be presumed as having the definitive right of such decision. Deciding on matters of general policy are primarily value-judgements, rather than requiring expertise.  Issues such as abortion, gay marriage, the Bush tax cuts, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could—and I would argue should—be decided by the voters directly. Beyond issues, the voters could decide more general governance questions, such as whether federalism should be continued. Such a question could lead to more specific proposals at the next election. For example, if the majority of American voters want the US to be of federalism, representatives could work on not only constitutional amendments, but also proposals for the voters on which broad areas of power would be transferred back to the states (or the voters could be asked—assuming a majority still want federalism—whether X or Y areas of power should be transferred back to the States). Should elected representatives counter that we should not trust the people to make such decisions, I would argue that it is nonsensical for an agent to contend that his principal is somehow inferior to himself. In a representative democracy, the representatives are the agents of the people; it is not the other way around.

In short, I contend that popular sovereignty ought to be strengthened rather than vitiated. Elected representatives are best suited to working out the technical details rather than deciding broad questions of policy.  An election campaign is a bricollage of factors; it is rare for a victor to be able to claim a mandate on a particular issue. In fact, a representative may be elected for reasons having nothing to do with his or her positions on “the issues.” The midterm election of 2010, for example, could be informed by a mix of factors; it was not even clear whether people voting Republican, for example, were saying yes to that party’s platform or no to the previous two years of legislation (which was informed by both Democratic and Republican law-makers—neither party being able to enact its platform as given).  Even voters blaming the Democratic Party for the resulting legislation is not strictly speaking accurate, as compromises had to be made with Republicans.  So an election of representatives is a broad brush that cannot be divined as a mandate on particular issues.  Regarding particular policies—even foreign policy, such as whether the US Government should continue to support Israel—the only way to know if there is a mandate is to put the matters up for decision by the voters. Political parties could have a say on how the questions are worded so they are objective (or two versions could be provided). Courts would still be able to declare the resulting law unconstitutional, but even here constitutional amendment is possible.  Even in terms of amendments, the voters, rather than their constitutional delegates or state or federal representatives, could decide directly.  For example, the voters could decide whether US Senators should continue to be elected, or whether they should be appointed by the state governments or be the governors themselves (the US Senate being like the European Council of the E.U.). The voters could also decide whether abortion should be decided by the state or US courts, or directly by the voters—by state or US—as an amendment.

At the very least, basic decisions would be made that have been mired in disputes between governmental institutions and/or government officials. We are depending much too much on elected and appointed government officials to “make” policy. Ultimately, the will of the people should be freed up and exercised beyond the confines of simply electing representatives—being subject only to the judiciary protecting individual rights (which can be overruled by constitutional amendment, which can be of the people).  Sadly, those in power—the elected representatives—will naturally and ironically resist efforts to expand the will of the people. Because the election of a representative involves many elements, an elected representative could easily get around interpreting his or her victory as a mandate to expand the will of the people.  This is precisely part of the problem, and it maintains the monopoly of power that our elected representatives enjoy.  I suspect this is no accident. Hence I am not optimistic on any expansion of popular sovereignty any time soon.  Even so, I hope my thoughts here are thought-provoking. Although not the best person to cite, Richard Nixon pointed in one of his books to the need for political development: “In terms of material progress, the twentieth century has been the best in history, but in terms of political progress the record has been disappointing.”  (See Richard Nixon, 1999 Victory Without War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 16). What I am suggesting is that our political system is so antiquated that were it to develop as technology has, our use of elections could make quite a leap forward.  In spite of all the technological change, we tend to hold very rigidly to the way things have “always been done” in politics.  It is time for politics to catch up. In fact, the technological progress could facilitate the expansion of popular sovereignty.  For example, voters could surf the internet for information before voting on general policy areas. The challenge may well be in how to enable illiterate voters to be able to take part.  As one possibility, voters could vote at desks (as in a classroom) while a reader reads through the questions on the ballot. My point is that we can begin to think outside the box and shake loose our assumptions.

Source of Wilson quote: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 74.

I think one difference between the E.U. and U.S. is that specific EU institutions have presidents, whereas the US has just one overall.  There is the President of the European Council and the President of the European Parliament, and the President of the EU Commission. Each institution has a president presiding over it. Well, actually, the US Senate has a President (who is the VP of the U.S. Government). The President of the U.S. Senate is largely ceremonial, though he can break a tie. I do think that the term president is used differently as applied to the EU and US…which makes it interesting to study!

In terms of comparing the US and EU more specifically, I would say that Van Rompuy’s office—President of the European Council—is equivalent to the President of the U.S. Senate (though only roughly equivalent). The European Council is still intergovernmental because the state governments themselves sit on it, whereas since the 17th amendment wherein US Senators are popularly elected (rather than appointed by State legislatures) the US Senate has been less intergovernmental (though the Senate represents polities rather than the voters, and each polity has equal suffrage as per international law).  Even today, the U.S. Senate is technically an international body along the lines of international law because polities rather than individuals are represented (i.e., members). This was very much in the minds of the founders when the Senate was created. However, the election of the Senators by the people of the States makes the Senators accountable not to their state governments, but to the people of their state, and there is a difference with respect to the interests of the state governments in the U.S. federal system.  Specifically, the citizens may not want to protect the interests of their respective state governments, whereas the state officials would want to do so.

I hope the European Council stays intergovernmental, as the E.U.’s state governments should be directly involved in EU governance for the European federalism to remain viable…as per the theory at least.  In fact, just yesterday I told a friend that the E.U. is a stronger federal system than is the U.S.  The latter is heavily biased toward consolidation, which creates pressures because of the inherent diversity that exists when a polity is made out of large republics.

The philosophy of leadership in the EU is evinced in the fact that the major governmental institutions each have a president.  The EU Commission, the European Council, and the EU Parliament each have a full-time president.  Also, there is a rotating E.U. Presidency occupied by what in American terms would be the governors—each one assuming the office on behalf of his or her state for six months. The presidents of the European Council (e.g., van Rompuy in 2010), the Commission (e.g., Barroso in 2010) join whichever State occupies the E.U. Presidency in jointly representing the EU abroad. This picture, as well as the underlying political philosophy, differs from that which has been dominant in the US, wherein the U.S. Government has only one president representing it. The Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate do not jointly represent the US with the US President abroad. My main contention is that both approaches have their pluses and minuses, as do their respective undergirding assumptions; both are heavily informed by culture, which in turn is formed by historical experience. Because it typically goes unquestioned in the U.S. that only one person can be in charge (i.e., “The buck stops here”) and this generally accepted premise has led to criticism of other unions—namely, the E.U.—I pay particular attention here to making the drawbacks of our own system transparent. At the very least, this project might prompt greater humility in the recognition that our system is not necessarily the default that others should emulate. The E.U. should not become a replica of the U.S. even if both are federal governments on the empire-scale. Indeed, in some ways, we might learn something by looking at the E.U.’s system of governance and even potentially improve our own from the observations. Simply put, humility regarding one’s own dominant assumptions is not of weakness; rather, it is inherently of strength and confidence as well as a willingness to improve by learning from other cases having different presuppositions. Such an attitude would also make us a better partner to the Europeans.</p>&#13;
<p>The “unitary” leadership theory, which is dominant (and typically unquestioned) in the U.S., is evinced even in the classic epic film, The Wizard of Oz. When the Wizard leaves Oz in his balloon, he announces that the Scarecrow would rule in his place by virtue of the Scarecrow’s brain. The Scarecrow would be assisted by the Tin Man (by virtue of his heart) and the Lion (by virtue of his courage).  This is Platonic rationalism applied to governance—reason controlling the passions of love and courage in not only the psyche, but the polis as well. This assumption was evinced in the U.S. constitutional convention.Governeur Morris, on August 9 in the convention, argued “we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible.” (Madison, Notes, p. 421. Both the assumption that intelligence is primary and that one of the three characters must be singled out as the ultimate boss are vulnerable to critique. The Wizard could have announced that the three figures would be co-rulers: reason, love and courage ideally governing in balance. To set reason above the other two can be reckoned as artificial. It could be argued that as governance involves power, which can result in other people being hurt emotionally or physically, the leader’s heart ought to be forefront—assisted by reason and courage. In other words, both Plato’s ideal of reason dominating the passions not only in the psyche, but also in the polis, and the assumption that one person must be chosen to be the executive can be questioned; they are both cultural assumptions. In criticizing the E.U. for its multiple presidents, one might keep the subjective nature of these assumptions in mind rather than simply castigate the Europeans.

In his article in Newsweek, for example, William Underhill criticizes the E.U. in arguing that “Europe still lacks the unity it needs for a proper partnership with the U.S.”  What is needed, Underhill maintains, is a greater clarity of purpose. This is being impeded, he argues, by the “continuing muddle over who’s in charge in Brussels.” Underhill traces the root cause to the inordinate power still being enjoyed by the state legislatures. I don’t think the fact that the EU has multiple presidents (i.e., of EU institutions) is a function of the relative power of the state governments at the expense of the EU; The union’s lack of energy, on the other hand, results in large part from the entrenched power of the states. No do I agree with Underhill that the lack of clarity of purpose is a function of there being essentially four co-presidents in the E.U. Government. In other words, the problem is not that the E.U. has too many chiefs. The system of multiple presidents representing the EU is a function of the dominant philosophy of leadership in the EU, which has been formed out of the European culture that included dictatorships. The resulting theory can be called “pluralistic” leadership and governance because no one person is put at the helm. That is to say, no one person is trusted to have a monopoly of power. Given the twentieth century in Europe, this assumption is reasonable.

The hegemony of the “pluralistic” theory of leadership in the E.U. in the twenty-first century is due to the disastrous “One Man Rule” of several of the twentieth-century European nationalisms (e.g., Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini).  Europeans living in the century after that of the two world wars are much more cautious regarding “one man rule” because of the other things that can come instead of the promise of greater wisdom in one person. Mussolini may have made the trains run on time, but he did other things as well. I suspect that even the assumption that one person has much better wisdom than the rest has also been discredited by the practice of housing leadership in just one person as per the European nationalisms of the twentieth century. In the US, this view has been recessive because of the different experience even in spite of the colonists' experience with it in the form of George III and of the plurality that goes with an empire-scale polity. In other words, even the eighteenth-century Americans' experience should have produced a pluralistic approach. In the constitutional convention, Ben Franklin points to the inexplicable bias in favor of one-person leadership. "We seemed he said too much to fear cabals in appointments by a number, and ato have too much confidence in those of single persons" (Madison, Notes, p. 601). Even so, the plurality view can be found in theconvention.

In the convention, Randolph opposed “one person” as the executive (i.e., the President of the U.S.).  Besides noting that the “permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy,” Randolph argued “that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department.” He “was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country.” (Madison, Notes, p. 58).  The assumption here is, as Sherman observed, that no “one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom.” (Madison, Notes, p. 62)  Furthermore, on July 20 in the convention, Madison pointed to the downside of the unitary leadership model. “In the case of the Executive Magistracy [i.e., the U.S. Presidency] which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.” (Madison, Notes, p. 333) Four days later, Williamson brought up another objection against “a single Magistrate”—“that he will be an elective King, and will feel the spirit of one.” (Madison, Notes, p. 357)  Similarly Ben Franklin averred that experience "shewed that caprice, the intrigues of favorites &amp; mistresses . . . were nevertheless the means most prevalent in monarchies" (Madison, Notes, p. 601). Besides the association with kingship, the empire-scale of the U.S. even in having thirteen republics was relevant. Williamson "did not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the N. &amp; S. States [the case is different than in Britain].” (Madison, Notes, p. 357) Similarly, Col. Mason "was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President alone . . . he suggested that a privy Council of six members to the president should be established; . . . two out of the Eastern [,] two out of the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union" (Madison, Notes, p. 596). In other words, the fact that the U.S. is on the empire-scale is an attribute exacerbating the downside of the one person theory that would not be present in the States of Europe (whereas it would be present at the E.U. level of governance). That is, the diversity inherent in an empire-scale polity made up of republics, which in turn are equivalent to the early-modern kingdoms in scale, is more difficult to square with having just one person at the helm--which brought up associations of a king (e.g. George III).  The empire-scale of both the EU and US works against the unitary theory, and the experience of the British colonists with kingship and of the Europeans in the twentieth century with dictators work against the approach as well. Furthermore, it might run contrary to being in a republic. On June 6, 1787, Wilson observed in the constitutional convention that the nature of republican government cannot “give to an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest.” (Madison, Notes, p. 79).  This, Wilson noted, gives rise to a difficulty in rendering the executive competent to its own defense.

Americans ought not blame Europeans for wanting to avoid the "one person" consolidation of power in the E.U.'s government. From the standpoint of the problems with the “unitary” approach, the E.U.’s approach to having multiple presidents representing the E.U. abroad may be better than the imperial U.S. Presidency as a leadership approach for the U.S. This is the irony in pointing to the E.U. as having too many chefs in the kitchen—too many chiefs—while presuming that the U.S. model is and should be the default. Perhaps we (meaning here Americans, as I am one) ought not be so presumptuous, and instead examine our own presuppositions.  Being open to learn from others could make us stronger, which would include being humbler. Yet we are not even aware of the minority position expressed in our own constitutional convention against the “unitary” approach; we are much more familiar with the dominant position on the matter. Wilson, for example, expressed the dominant philosophy in arguing that a “principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.”  (Madison, Notes, p. 67). In other words, unity and energy of government favor one person.  I contend that another assumption along with the unity and energy is that one person can be found to be distinct in being qualitatively more wise than the other candidates.

One might think that the colonial experience with King George III might have led the convention’s delegates to favor splitting the presidency up between two or more persons.  However, the colonists had accepted the imperial rule of the Crown; they viewed the province of Parliament to be solely within the host kingdom (Great Britain).  So it was the taxation by Parliament over the North American British colonies that had the colonists so much up in arms.  That the king went on to support the usurpation of Parliament to imperial rule implicated the king as corrupt in not having stood up for the distinction between rule of the empire (the domain of the king) and of the host kingdom (the domain of the king and of Parliament).  In other words, the real beef was with Parliament rather than with one man rule.  So Wilson’s view won out in the constitutional convention, and has remained dominant in the US ever since in part because the European nationalisms of the twentieth century were so far from the American experience.

Theoretically speaking, aside from the contending virtues of diversity, unity and energy applied to governance, the question seems to be whether certain human beings really are so distinct with respect to leadership and governance that the rule by one person is justified. Even without the European experience of the twentieth century, it is unlikely that there is apt to be one person in a republic so superior that he (or she) should be the unitary president. Furthermore, the Obamamania of 2008 in the U.S. and the subsequent wide-spread disappointment in the man in office (approval ratings in 2010 were down considerably from those just after Obama was elected) may suggest a fine line between the “great man” theory of leadership and hero-worship, which is a form of idolatry. Fortunately, the E.U. provides an alternative by which Americans may check such an excess and perhaps even re-evaluate the “wisdom” assumption undergirding one man rule. Of course, having three presidents in a council has the disadvantage of dissent and perhaps even conflict, hampering the energy of the European executive. Perhaps this disadvantage could be put at one extreme and hero-worship on the other—both underlying assumptions having their downsides.  The point is perhaps not to go to the extreme in either direction. The salience of popularity in the U.S. Presidential election of 2008 may suggest that the U.S. has gone too far in the direction of one man rule.  Part of the lack of energy at the E.U. level of leadership may suggest that the E. U. has gone too far in esteeming consensus—though this could have more to do with the power of the state governments than with the pluralistic approach to leadership. Both unions therefore have their respective challenges, and could thus ill-afford not to learn from each other.

Source on the EU: William Underhill, “Europe Still Has Too Many Chiefs,” Newsweek, November 22, 2010, p. 6.
Source of quotes from the U.S. Constitutional Convention: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987.