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The US Senate is “absurd.” So said Katie Connolly of MSNBC in 2010.  She was referring to Sen Shelby (R-AL) being able to singlehandedly place a hold on all pending nominations.  Citing a congressional scholar, Johathan Chait noted that a blanket hold has never been used before. Connolly argued that Shelb was doing it “because he wants a European corporation to build some planes in his state.”  Such a reason would be ubiquitous if not squalid enough in either body of the US Congress, so it is certainly plausable.  One might recall the money Sen. Ben Nelson got for Nebraska by agreeing to the health care reform bill.  In needing all 60 votes from the democrats and two independents, that bill gave us all a reminder of what an international body is like where each member has a veto.  In singlehandedly blocking all pending nominations before the US Senate, Sen Shelby was drawing on this theory as well.  While it is easy to trounce on each Senator (or each state) having a veto, I would argue that it is far less sordid than Shelby’s reason (i.e., more pork).  Because every state in the Union is semi-sovereign (and enjoys residual sovereignty as per the tenth amendment), there is constitutional support for any state represented in the US Senate having a veto on any legislation or appointment.  Because the veto is based on governmental sovereignty (i.e., the US Senate being in this respect an international body—unlike the US House), Alabama can use its veto even for reasons we might find disgusting.

So if each Senator (who represents his or her state as a political body even though he or she is elected by the citizens of his or her state) having a veto makes the US Senate “absurd” (and I join with those who are frustrated by it), we might want to consider the consequences that would be involved in depriving the political members of the Union of their vetos in the General Government (ie., Washington).  We could expect an acceleration in the consolidation of power in the General Government at the expense of the state governments—resulting in one size fits all in a heterogenous empire-scale Union (i.e., empire).  Any state government objecting to Washington taking over yet another domain of power would be powerless to stop that train without breaks running down the tracks toward a central state.  Meanwhile, that train would be able to pass more legislation through the US Senate, further accelerating its speed.

Some time back, I asked Sandra Day O’Connor of the US Supreme Court why she wasn’t objecting to the US Government going beyond its enumerated powers.  She replied to the small group that Congress was acting like a state legislature.  Disgust was palpable in her voice.  In a sense of futility, she added that it takes five on the US Supreme Court to have a majority decision (meaning that a majority would not go along with her on the enumerated powers matter).   You might be wondering what is wrong with Congress acting like a state legislature. The problem is that the US is in scale (and its make-up) commensurate with an empire by today’s standards.  In other words, most of our states are equivalent to countries.  You just can’t (or shouldn’t) run a combination of countries as though it were one country.  For one thing, a combo is inherently diverse.  Also, its center is further from the people.  It means less democracy or republican principles of representation because there are far fewer US Reps and Senators than state Reps and Senators.  Also, the US Government is designed as an empire-level polity.  Whereas the states’ Senates represent citizens (just as the states’ assemblies do), the US Senate (unlike the US House) represents political entities (the states) rather than US citizens.  In other words, both US citizens and US states are members of the US.  The US Government isn’t fashioned like a state government because the Union is a combination of such states (whereas a state is not a combo of republics in turn).

So we ought to be very careful about kneejerk reactions to fix the “absurd” US Senate.  To be sure, holding up appointments to get pork is squalid even by a pig’s standards, but turning the US Senate into a state senate would drastically alter what the US are.   Even though we use “the US” as a singular noun, the entity itself and its government were formed and designed with it as a plural noun (the states) in mind.  The US constitutional convention delegates invented modern federalism to suit this new genus of an empire: the Union.  The EU has since come into being along similar principles because it is of the same genus.  To treat either the US or EU as though it were commensurate with one of its states would be to treat something other than what it is.  That can only lead to a downfall.   So perhaps rather than change the US Senate to fit our understanding, we might alter our understanding to fit what the US are. This would entail taking the pressure off of the US Senate by returning most of the domestic legislation to the state governments (where there is more democracy).  Consider the coherence in having the US Senate  mainly involved in foreign policy (and regulating between the states) and having a filibuster (which is close to the principle of international organization).  That is, the state governments meet in the US Senate technically on an international basis. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution forms a hybrid between or composed of international and national governance.  This unique situs fits with the empire-scale of the United States, especially as they have expanded to fifty. 
Treating the US Senate as a state legislature…legislating on everything from healthcare to education…is a gross departure from this coherence.  It is indeed absurd—only we have the arrows reversed.  It is our use of the US Senate that is absurd—not the Senate’s principles (even though they can be abused, such as by Nebraska and Alabama). Treating the US Senate (and the Union) as other than what it is can only lead to the fall of our empire…our Union of States. To be sure, every empire that rises must fall.  So why write?  I’m merely trying to stay the fall a bit, but the outcome is certain.  In the meantime, let’s not help it along.  This will take more humility and much less presumptuousness in what we think we know about our system of public governance.  With more humility, perhaps more of us will be content to get involved in our state governments.  As it is, we overlook them and advocate changing the US Senate into our own image of what it should be, presuming the extant Senate is "absurd" (perhaps it is sheer hubris to make such a summary judgement?).
Source: http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2010/02/05/need-more-evidence-the-senate-is-absurd-look-no-further.aspx

A republic is characterized by the citizenry electing representatives, who in turn legislate (i.e., make law). As an alternative, the citizenry itself could vote directly on legislative proposals. The latter is called direct democracy. Ancient Athens, for example, practiced it. In the United States, the republic form is the prevalent form of government.  In spite of Wilson’s comment made in the constitutional convention that representation “is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively,” direct democracy has typically limited to an occasional “referendum” question even though more vital questions could be put to the body politic directly. Typically, referendums have to do with elections (and thus with representative rather than direct democracy) or with general taxing or spending limits for a government. The rationale for putting general taxing or spending limits up for referendum is that they apply to a government as a whole—this perspective being from that of popular sovereignty (i.e., the citizenry, whose electoral power transcends their government). Rarely, an “issue” is put up to be decided directly by the voters. In 2010, for example, Californians decided on whether to legalize pot in California. I contend that many more matters of policy could be decided directly by the voters. Since the elected representatives represent the citizenry, the former should not be presumed as having the definitive right of such decision. Deciding on matters of general policy are primarily value-judgements, rather than requiring expertise.  Issues such as abortion, gay marriage, the Bush tax cuts, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could—and I would argue should—be decided by the voters directly. Beyond issues, the voters could decide more general governance questions, such as whether federalism should be continued. Such a question could lead to more specific proposals at the next election. For example, if the majority of American voters want the US to be of federalism, representatives could work on not only constitutional amendments, but also proposals for the voters on which broad areas of power would be transferred back to the states (or the voters could be asked—assuming a majority still want federalism—whether X or Y areas of power should be transferred back to the States). Should elected representatives counter that we should not trust the people to make such decisions, I would argue that it is nonsensical for an agent to contend that his principal is somehow inferior to himself. In a representative democracy, the representatives are the agents of the people; it is not the other way around.

In short, I contend that popular sovereignty ought to be strengthened rather than vitiated. Elected representatives are best suited to working out the technical details rather than deciding broad questions of policy.  An election campaign is a bricollage of factors; it is rare for a victor to be able to claim a mandate on a particular issue. In fact, a representative may be elected for reasons having nothing to do with his or her positions on “the issues.” The midterm election of 2010, for example, could be informed by a mix of factors; it was not even clear whether people voting Republican, for example, were saying yes to that party’s platform or no to the previous two years of legislation (which was informed by both Democratic and Republican law-makers—neither party being able to enact its platform as given).  Even voters blaming the Democratic Party for the resulting legislation is not strictly speaking accurate, as compromises had to be made with Republicans.  So an election of representatives is a broad brush that cannot be divined as a mandate on particular issues.  Regarding particular policies—even foreign policy, such as whether the US Government should continue to support Israel—the only way to know if there is a mandate is to put the matters up for decision by the voters. Political parties could have a say on how the questions are worded so they are objective (or two versions could be provided). Courts would still be able to declare the resulting law unconstitutional, but even here constitutional amendment is possible.  Even in terms of amendments, the voters, rather than their constitutional delegates or state or federal representatives, could decide directly.  For example, the voters could decide whether US Senators should continue to be elected, or whether they should be appointed by the state governments or be the governors themselves (the US Senate being like the European Council of the E.U.). The voters could also decide whether abortion should be decided by the state or US courts, or directly by the voters—by state or US—as an amendment.

At the very least, basic decisions would be made that have been mired in disputes between governmental institutions and/or government officials. We are depending much too much on elected and appointed government officials to “make” policy. Ultimately, the will of the people should be freed up and exercised beyond the confines of simply electing representatives—being subject only to the judiciary protecting individual rights (which can be overruled by constitutional amendment, which can be of the people).  Sadly, those in power—the elected representatives—will naturally and ironically resist efforts to expand the will of the people. Because the election of a representative involves many elements, an elected representative could easily get around interpreting his or her victory as a mandate to expand the will of the people.  This is precisely part of the problem, and it maintains the monopoly of power that our elected representatives enjoy.  I suspect this is no accident. Hence I am not optimistic on any expansion of popular sovereignty any time soon.  Even so, I hope my thoughts here are thought-provoking. Although not the best person to cite, Richard Nixon pointed in one of his books to the need for political development: “In terms of material progress, the twentieth century has been the best in history, but in terms of political progress the record has been disappointing.”  (See Richard Nixon, 1999 Victory Without War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 16). What I am suggesting is that our political system is so antiquated that were it to develop as technology has, our use of elections could make quite a leap forward.  In spite of all the technological change, we tend to hold very rigidly to the way things have “always been done” in politics.  It is time for politics to catch up. In fact, the technological progress could facilitate the expansion of popular sovereignty.  For example, voters could surf the internet for information before voting on general policy areas. The challenge may well be in how to enable illiterate voters to be able to take part.  As one possibility, voters could vote at desks (as in a classroom) while a reader reads through the questions on the ballot. My point is that we can begin to think outside the box and shake loose our assumptions.

Source of Wilson quote: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 74.