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According to The New York Times, even after taxpayers rescued Citigroup, regulators at the New York Federal Reserve failed to monitor the company adequately. The regulators, although adequately staffed and proficient in training, failed to move swiftly as the bank’s financial condition deteriorated from as early as 2005, and were overly optimistic about the bank’s prospects as late as December, 2009. From 2006 to 2007, decisions on poorly underwritten loans were changed from “turned down” to “approved.” As many as 80 percent of the loans that Citigroup sold to Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and other investors were defective. “Although the dedicated supervisory team is well-qualified and generally has sound knowledge of the organization, there have been significant weaknesses in the execution of the supervisory program,” according to one excerpt of the 2009 review. Tim Geithner, who as president of the New York Fed from 2003 to 2008 was in charge of overseeing Citigroup, went on to become the US Secretary of the Treasury.

In questioning a panel testifying before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on April 7, 2010, Brooksley E. Born, the former regulator in the Clinton administration who had lost the battle over derivatives regulation to Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and Larry Summers, called on Greenspan in his testimony to defend his longtime deregulatory bent. “The Fed utterly failed to prevent the financial crisis,” she said. She went on to claim, “The Fed and the banking regulators failed to prevent the housing bubble. They failed to prevent the predatory lending scandal. They failed to prevent our biggest banks and bank holding companies from engaging in activities that would bring them to the verge of collapse without massive taxpayer bailouts… . Didn’t the Federal Reserve fail to meet its mandates, fail to meet it responsibilities?” Greenspan replied that there was a failure: an underestimation of the “state and extent” of financial risks and the ability of private counterparties to assess them, but he added that, “(t)he notion that somehow my views on regulation were predominant and effective at influencing the Congress is something you may have perceived,” he said. “But it didn’t look that way from my point of view.” However, according to other accounts, the trioka of Summers, Rubin and Greenspan had gone after Born for wanted to regulate the derivatives (see, for example, Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail). The three did indeed lobby Congress in an effort to sabatage Born’s proposal. Besides reporting this, Sorkin also points out that Citigroup’s CEO and its major stockholder were instrumental in getting Geithner appointed as President of the New York Fed. A coincidence with the overly optimistic view of the Fed’s regulators regarding Citi?

In questioning Robert Rubin on April 8th, Born (and other commissioners) asked why derivatives were kept unregulated. Rubin replied that the bankers were strongly opposed to such regulation, and they were able to effect their stand in Congress. Rubin did not go into the efforts of him, Summers and Greenspan to lobby Congress to keep the instruments unregulated; instead, he claimed that he favored regulating the derivatives even when he was at Goldman Sachs supervising the bank’s trading desk, and that when at Treasury he was merely concerned that regulating the instruments under the existing regulatory structure could cause delaying legal challenges. While Rubin’s frankness concerning the influence of the bankers in the US Government is useful, his testimony regarding himself seems less than forthcoming. Presumably he could have lobbied Congress as the Treasury Secretary for a new regulatory authority to regulate the derivatives on a solid legal basis. Instead, he lobbied against Born’s efforts to get the instruments regulated. He admitted that the financial sector would have been strongly opposed to such a regulatory authority. Also, he had been on the board of Citigroup and an executive at Goldman Sachs. The conflict of interest is too strong in his case for his asseverations that he had always acted in favor of regulating the instruments to be believable. His “worry of legal challenges” strikes me as a technical excuse that he was using as a subterfuge to “explain” his opposition to Born’s efforts to regulate the derivatives. Doubtless he could count on the American public and its media for not digging sufficiently to expose his duplicity. That is to say, it is likely that Rubin got away with protecting his ex-bank’s interests when he was Secretary of the Treasury and was strategically able to come off as having advocated the public interest all along. Hence, in general, the culpits were able to maintain their credibility and position themselves to be the officials we turn to to fix the problem.

The influence of the bankers in the halls of government (and its central bank) is perhaps the cause of the Fed’s deficiencies in regulating Citigroup (and in the Clinton Administration’s position against regulating the sub-prime mortgage derivative securities). In the case of the New York Fed, the board that appoints the NY Fed President consists of Wall Street bankers. There is a structural conflict of interest in having the regulated appoint the regulator. This structural conflict of interest manifested itself materially in the case of Tim Geithner and Citigroup. This is a textbook example of a conflict of interest, and yet it went under the radar screen. The focus in regulatory deficiency is typically instead on whether the regulators are sufficiently staffed and trained, and perhaps on whether they are relying too much on information from the regulatees. The more basic structural conflicts of interest are rarely made transparent, yet we will continue to see regulatory “deficiencies” manifest from them unless structural or institutional reforms are made. I am continually amazed at how such glaring institutional conflicts of interest are ignored by the public and the media. I would expect the politicians and the business practioners to try to keep it hush hush, but the inability of the American people to grasp the problem confounds my attempt to explain it.

Sources: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/business/08panel.html?ref=us ; CSPAN.

In 2010, Eric Jackson, an activist investor and hedge fund manager, averred that Goldman’s board was too cozy and too lacking in financial know-how to diligently oversee top management. He claimed the board was packed with honchos who led companies that had paid large fees to Goldman. Jackson pointed to Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal and former Fannie Mae chief James Johnson as cases in point. The problem with these choices, Jackson said, is that “these people seem to be favorably disposed to senior management’s way of thinking,” and are therefore unlikely to act as a check on CEO Lloyd Blankfein and his team. Colin Barr of Fortune argued that the bank’s system of corporate governance was behind the times. He pointed out that Lloyd Blankfein continued to serve as chairman and CEO, even as the trend in recent years had been toward independent board leadership.

After all, one of a board's main functions is to oversee and evaluate the CEO as well as the other top executives. The duality of chairman/CEO is the epitome of a structural or institutional conflict of interest; a CEO who is also chair of the group whose job it is to evaluate the CEO is presuming to evaluate him or herself, in effect. The sheer existence of such an obvious conflict of interest can be viewed as presumptuous. Furthermore, the arrangement itself is an incentive to engage in duplicitous subterfuge. A board of directors is by definition independent of the management because the board’s function is to oversee it.  Overseeing and being cozy are like oil and water.  A “trend” away from conflating the two minimizes the decadence in the problem.  Instead, corporate governance ought to require independence.

When Armstrong was chair/CEO of ATT, I asked him whether giving up the chairmanship wouldn't enable his board to better evaluate him as there would not be the suspicion of a conflict of interest. He replied as though he were president of the United States, saying "the buck stops here."  He went on to say that he had to have complete control or he could not rightly be blamed if his strategy (which was broadband at the time) didn't work.  If his board said no to part of his strategy, it would not be fair to blame him for the failure of his entire strategy. Of course, he could have presented his strategy to his board and if it objected to part of it, the resultant strategy, it could be agreed, would not be considered to be his; he would be evaluated on how well he implimented it. The notion that any sort of check on power renders the power compromised or impotent ignores the basic difference between a board and a management. Managers work within broad strategic guidelines that are set as a matter of policy by a board, and managerial implimentation can indeed be evaluated without compromising it.  In effect, Armstrong wanted to go beyond managing to the property-rights goal-level of owning.  That he was overreaching is all the more reason why an independent board would have been a valuble commodity for ATT.

To be sure, it is difficult to counter the influence that a management has on account of its position vis a vis the company and its board. As a starting point, people having former ties to the management, or even hand picked by the CEO, ought to be barred from serving as directors. It should go without saying that a CEO ought to be barred from serving as the chair of the board.  Conflating these two roles is tantamount to suggesting that a CEO can (and should) oversee himself, which is nonsensical. For there simply to be a mere trend away from this duality essentially “normalizes” that which ought to be approached as an oxymoron--a contradiction in terms. That such a phenomenon would be allowed to exist at all points to the power that CEO's have to define social reality for society. Such power is very dangerous, especially if left unchecked even in the name of "the buck stops here."

Source: http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/20/news/companies/goldman.board.fortune/index.htm

For years, banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to rate their securities. This is a bit like restaurants paying food critics to write on their food.  In the wake of the SEC’s charge that  people at Goldman Sachs built the Abacus investment to fall apart so a hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson, could bet against it, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations questioned representatives from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s about how they rate risky securities. Carl M. Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate panel, said in a statement: “A conveyor belt of high-risk securities, backed by toxic mortgages, got AAA ratings that turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on.” Throughout the testimony, the institutional conflict of interest was salient whereby credit-rating agencies put market-share considerations foremost in rating securities presented by the banks that are paying the agencies. Someone at one bank, J. P. Morgan, went so far as to communicate to one of the agencies that the agency’s ratings should reflect market-share considerations.  Essentially, the bank was reminding the agency that the bank was a client. To be fair, the agency replied that such considerations are not part of the ratings process.  However, the testimony before the committee suggested that the reality has often been quite otherwise. The upper managements of the agencies in particular regularly pressure their ratings analysts to rate in such a way that the agency’s market share does not suffer.  In other words, the message is: “Rate so we don’t lose any clients.”

In fact, the agencies even shared their models with the banks.  As a result, the banks could game the models so the securities would get high ratings.  To be sure, there was also fraud involved, such as making it seem like the mortgages in a CDO came from different servicers or different regions of the US.  Some bankers relabeled parts of collateralized debt obligations in two ways so they would not be recognized by the computer models as being the same. Others were also able to get more favorable ratings by adding a small amount of commercial real estate loans to a mix of home loans, thus making the entire pool appear safer. “If you dug into it, if you had the time, you would see errors that magically favored the banker,” said one former ratings executive.  The assymetry was no accident, for there is an underlying structural conflict of interest at the core of the ratings system. The actual clients–the general public that relies on the ratings–are not the parties paying the agencies.  Also, the agencies get more when their ratings are higher because more of the underlying securities are sold.   To demand that an agency be independent of the “client” paying it is to place the agency in a structural or institutional conflict of interest that cannot be effectively remedied by simplying subjecting the agency to higher regulatory standards. Worse still, often times the underlying structure is ignored.

Although not made transparent in the Senate hearing, I want to point to the assumption that the agencies would be able to handle their conflict of interest, even in the face of rising pressure for profits as increasing attention was directed to their stock prices. There seems to be a belief in American society that businesses can rise to the occasion when a structural conflict of interest is involved.  In other words, we tend to mitigate the force of such ethical dilemmas, essentially assuming that human nature can be relied upon to surmount them.  Even in the committee testimony, former employees from the rating agencies suggested that common regulatory standards for rating, similar to the FASB standards in accounting, would suffice. This is actually a rather poor choice of comparison, for the public accounting profession is rife with its own conflict of interest that has thus far been shoved under the rug.  One need only look to Arthur Andersen in giving the go-ahead to Enron’s use of “unrelated” partnerships to hide debt or to Arthur Young knowing of the Repo 105s at Goldman Sachs to question whether using regulatory standards goes far enough.

Institutional conflicts of interest are not solved by common regulatory standards because they too can be gamed. The incentives have not been changed, so we can expect the pent-up water to eventually make its way through the muddy dams we construct.  In both public accounting and securities rating, the “independent” assessors cannot be paid by the institutions whose books or products are being assessed.  The unwarranted assumption that turning these functions over the government is the only alternative adds to the easy decision that simply creating or tweeking regulatory standards must suffice.

As an alternative to having the government rate securities, the financial industry as a whole could be required to contribute to a pool that would fund the rating agencies. The SEC would assess the agencies periodically and decide how much each would receive.  Essentially, the government would be the umpire rather than perform the rating function itself.  As long as the banks do not capture the SEC (which is another problem in need of a solution), they would not be able to pressure the rating agencies.  It might be suggested that industry self-regulation could work. That is, the banks altogether would assess the rating agencies.  However, this alternative would simply allow the banks to collude to pressure the agencies.  We ought not replace the government with one of the teams in performing the role of umpire.

It is unlikely that Congress will go beyond mandating stricter disclosure statements and allowing plaintiffs to sue the agencies. Within the fecklessness of Congress in extracting the structural conflicts of interest from the rating function is a fear that tampering with it might risk the salubrity of the credit markets.   Under this logic, riding the ratings function of a structural bias would somehow compromise the function because the public might get a true look at the lack of credit-worthiness of some of the securities currently deemed credit-worthy. An illusion is thought better, or more expedient, than a solid economy. Besides the dubiousness of such reasoning, there is the argument more generally that we can’t afford to tamper with our financial system as long as it is still at risk.  However, before assuming power, Barak Obama argued that the only time when real change can happen is during a crisis–while the forces of the status quo are temporarily marginalized.   So it would seem that we are in a catch 22–or, more accurately, we have put ourselves in one.   In actuality, riding our financial system of institutional conflicts of interest would strengthen rather than risk our economy.
I suspect that the true reason why neither the ratings nor the public accounting structural conflicts of interest have been removed goes beyond our collective ignorance of the nature of an institutional conflict of interest.  As Dick Durbin said after the  banking industry scuttled foreclosure reform, “the banking industry owns Congress.”  Apparently it owns the credit-rating agencies too, as well as the public accounting firms. The wolves are paying the guards of the chicken coop.  Regulating the pay does not go far enough; we need to address the question of the payor.  Until we do so, we are bound to keep scratching our heads as chickens continue to come up missing.

Sources:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/business/24rating.html?hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1272117625-MtgpixNdFNobkGOTVoD0NA ; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/business/08ratings.html?_r=1&ref=business

After watching hours of the US House Government Affairs committee on Investigations’ hearing on Goldman Sachs,  I concluded--totally contrary to the disavowals by the Goldman managers who testified--that there was indeed a conflict of interest between Goldman’s proprietary and market-making functions.  By proprietary, I mean a bank trading on its own books beyond simply being the counter-party in its market-making transactions. In their testimony, Goldman managers presumed that all of the bank’s proprietary transactions are part of its market-making role. However, I contend that the bank has been both a market-maker and a player in those markets, and furthermore that the latter function has affected the former in ways that are intended to benefit the bank. That is to say, Goldman Sachs’ financial interest has been put before that of its customers. In some cases, Goldman’s employees refused clients’ requests for shorts related to the housing market so Goldman’s own profits in shorting the market  could be preserved. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) said, “There is something unseemly about Goldman betting against the housing market as it is selling housing-related products to its customers.” Sen. Conrad, a more conservative Republican, echoed this sentiment.  The fact that Republicans on the subcommittee joined with Democrats rather than joined in Goldman’s paradigm points to a major disconnect between Wall Street “speak” and the discourse of the general public.  In other words, the financial managers and the politicians were largely talking past each other.  Even so, the two “worlds” can be translated into a common language that nonetheless finds Goldman culpable, while acknowledging some of the managers’ points.  In what follows, I discuss a number of the points raised in the hearing to bear out my contentions here.

Broker dealers do not have a legal fiduciary obligation to their clients in the US. This, Sen. Collins argued, is the root cause of the conflict of interest at Goldman (i.e., pitching toxic investments to its clients while betting against them).  Goldman bankers view their obligation being to be market makers.  A duty to serve the clients or act in their best interest?   Goldman’s managers tended to affirm the former because where the bank is making markets, similarly to an exchange, it is not in an advising capacity. According to one of the managers, market-makers do not have an obligation to tell clients of the market-maker’s position in the market.  The manager contended that how Goldman is positioned may not affect how the instrument performs.  So long as clients understand what they are investing it, the position of the market-maker is not relevant to the client.

Paulson (of the hedge fund, Paulson & Co) had a role in picking the securities in the Abacus CDO. The rating agency said that if the rating analyst had known this, the rating would have been far different.  Torre, the manager at Goldman who oversaw the deal, claimed in testimony that he had told ACA (the major long buyer) that Paulson was going short, but in a memo from ACA afterward refers to Paulson going long. Paulson was involved in the selection of the securities, according to Torre, though ACA left off more than half of the securities that Paulson had recommended. Even so, Paulson was in the room as the securities were being selected, and he had selected the criteria of their removal. Goldman employees did not indicate in the Abacus CDO that Paulson, whose intent it was to short, had been involved in the selection of the securities (which were subprime mortgages from 2006—presumably the stated-income-only variety).

In replying to Sen. Levin’s questions regarding whether it is correct that Goldman made money on its net short position in 2007, two of the Goldman managers replied, “I didn’t write that.” A third replied, “I can only comment on what I did.” Although such non-answers could have been directed by lawyers or the answers could be due to the difference in general paradigms between Wall Street and the general public, I submit that the managers’ underlying attitude is particularly troubling because it involves some cognitive warping.  Because Chairman Levin (D-MI) was not asking  whether they wrote the Goldman document he was referring to, the reply “I didn’t write it” simply doesn’t apply.  At the very least, the managers were adding assumptions into Levin’s question that simply were not there. My question is this: what, cognitively or affectively speaking, would prompt such “value-added addendums”? After a similar answer to one of his questions, Sen. Colburn (R-OK) replied, “Mr Burnbaum, you didn’t hear what I said.”  Similarly frustrated after a question, Sen. Levin gave up with the witness, saying, “I think you’ve not answered the question as best you can.” At one point, Sen. Colburn asked Mr. Burnbaum whether he had any knowledge of whether his firm had a short position on an issue, he replied that he didn’t take the position.  “I don’t speak for the firm; I speak only for my position.” But Sen. Colburn didn’t ask him to speak for his firm; rather, he asked him whether he knew anything about something regarding the firm.  What could prompt such mistaken assumptions?  I don’t think it is entirely a subterfuge; rather, I suspect that the managers’ cognitive processes had been distorted by a particular organizational or industry culture. Such cognitive warping could be part of the reason why Goldman’s managers have blind-spots concerning the institutional conflicts of interest.

To potential customers who asked how Goldman got comfortable with Anderson securities, which were put together by New Century (a mortgage servicer), the sales people at Goldman did not say that the bank was comfortable because it was betting against them by buying 51% of the shorts.  Did Goldman have an obligation to disclose the fact that the bank had bought shorts (i.e., that Goldman had an adverse interest to the client)?   Goldman’s bankers point to the potential buyers’ ability to investigate the securities themselves. The Anderson was downgraded from AAA to junk in seven months.

“Boy, that Timberwolf was one shitty deal.”  This is from an internal Goldman email from the head of a division prior to the bank selling hundreds of millions from that deal to customers. Sales people were told that that deal was their top priority. “Should Goldman be trying to sell a shitty deal?”, Sen. Levin repeatedly asked throughout the hearing.  Seventeen of the people at Graywolf’s research group were Golden alums. Was that why the sales people were told to make the deal a priority?

In general terms, some of the managers at Goldman liked the risk involved in securitizing stated-income mortgages because clients wanted to buy them.  As a market-maker, Goldman’s managers believe that there is a price for any risk, so they would sell a deal they believed to be bad because some clients would like the price. In one case, 90% of the mortgages from an originator were stated-income.  In spite of the high number of stated-income mortgages, the rating agency involved gave some of the securities the AAA rating. Did the Goldman sales people tell their clients of the extent of the stated-income mortgages in the securities? Or did the sales people assume that the clients could investigate the securities in spite of there being the AAA rating on at least some of them?  Goldman claims that it investigated the due diligence of originators, like Long Beach.   So why did the investment bank not cut off that originator?

When asked about the bonuses paid out even as the clients lost money, the Goldman managers said that the compensation incentives were or are in line with ethical behavior.  Even if Goldman lost money, its executives didn’t. So it is reasonable to ask whether the incentives are in line with “performing.”

Goldman magnified the rise and fall of the housing market. Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s Chairman and CEO (which is itself a conflict of interest) admitted that the bank had played a role, as did the other investment banks, in the system that included too loose lending criteria. The managers at Goldman said the bank was a market-maker for instruments that reflected those low standards. Sparks, who headed the mortgage securities unit at Goldman, said he didn’t think Goldman did anything wrong; rather, some of the deals it put together did not “perform”—meaning that they were downgraded to junk.  “Goldman made some bad business decisions.”  In a business sense, “bad” does not mean “wrong” in the sense of “ought not” (i.e., unethical).  Rather, “bad” refers to making an error in business calculations.   Similarly, David Vinair, Goldman’s executive VP, said he didn’t think there is a conflict of interest in Goldman selling a security long while shorting it on its own books.  The client buying the security long may have a different stance toward risk as well as a different time horizon than the bank.  Also, the bank may change its short to a long depending on factors that are different from those impacting a given client.  Sen. Levin countered that the conflict of interest is at the moment of sale (hence the bank’s changing preferences are irrelevant). The customer, Levin said, has a right to expect that the bank selling the security wants it to do well.  “In what sense do you mean well?”, Vinair countered.  More semantics ensued. In spite of using vague terms like “perform” (which is actually relevant to acting), Vinair wanted a definition of “doing well” from the chairman. Blankfein also said that there is no conflict of interest; he likened Goldman’s market-making function to that of a stock exchange. Investors don’t ask what positions the exchange has in given stock.  But unlike the NYSE, Goldman Sachs is not limited to its market-making function; the bank takes proprietary in the markets, or instruments, that it “creates” not only to protect its positions in the market-making transactions, but to make a profit by trading on its own books. Hence Goldman, unlike the NYSE, has financial interests other than simply making a market and such interests can warp its market-making function in ways that are not transparent to Goldman’s clients.

It seems to me that the major conflict of interest at Goldman manifests when Goldman managers suspect that a security won’t “perform” (hence the desire to short it) without telling the potential buyers of this belief.  The Goldman managers want to make money not only off its shorts, but also off the client, whom the Goldman sales staff have given a misconception of the security’s soundness either by omission or lying).  The conflict of interest deepens if Goldman managers actually know that a derivative has been put together to fail, and because the bank (or a favored client) will profit from its failure (having bought shorts), the relevant manager does not disclose what he or she knows to the client so the latter will purchase the security.  Goldman would profit both from trading the security (shorting it) on its own books aside from being a counter-party to clients taking long positions, and from being such a counter-party.  That is, profiting from Goldman’s books entails transactions beyond the counter-party transactions prompted by a client wanting to buy or sell. Not recognizing this as a conflict of interest, Sparks limited conflicts of interest at Goldman to picking between two customers, or between one of its customers and Goldman’s proprietary bank. The problem with such a narrow reading of the bank’s conflicts of interest is that it omits the impact of Goldman’s proprietary transactions based on profiting on its own capital. I wonder if this narrowness of perception isn’t related to the “cognitive warping” that was evinced in many of the non-answers of the managers testifying before Congress. “I didn’t write that” is irrelevant; so too are the bank’s proprietary transactions geared to profiting from the bank’s own books aside from being a counter-party to a client in the bank’s market-making function.

I believe that even Lloyd Blankfein viewed all of Goldman’s transactions as market-making.  But he was correct, then every single economic transaction by any party constitutes market-making; every business is making a market.  At Goldman, there was still the conflict of interest regarding the bank’s profiting on its own books not from being a counter-party to a client as part of serving the client versus from serving a buyer or seller client by being the counter-party if necessary.  Goldman can be understood to profit as a broker (a fee in putting a buyer and seller together), as well as from how it does as a counter-party in such a transaction. In addition, Goldman can profit from trading on its own books irrespective of being such a counter-party. I contend that if Goldman is to do the first function, then either of the latter two—and especially the third—constitutes a structural or institutional conflict of interest.  The second function would not be a conflict of interest were Goldman’s counter-party profits (and losses) passed on to the client.  Perhaps even the third function would not constitute a structural conflict of interest were the profits distributed to the bank’s clients.  However, to the extent that there could be an interest in currying favor with particular clients who would benefit differentially in either the second or third function, there could still be a conflict of interest for Goldman.

In general terms, a conflict of interest can be seen as involving lying (or duplicity) in order to benefit “both ways” from having two conflicting interests.  The solution is to reduce the number of interests that a party has such that he or she has no interests that could or do conflict.  This is a different question than asking what legislation is needed, for the field of business ethics ought not be conflated with the field of business & government (i.e., institutional political economy) or even with that of business & society.

Societal norms are not justifying regarding whether a given practice is or is not a conflict of interest.  Theoretically, a firm could deviate from the norms of a society in order to avoid structural conflicts of interest, or a society could simply be blind to such conflicts and a firm act to avoid them anyway.  In other words, business ethics need not involve “social responsibility”  (and the latter need not involve the former).   In the case of Goldman, the social norms regarding such conflicts of interest (i.e., structural) are in their infancy, at least in the US.  Hence, this discussion of business ethics is a distinct project.  Business & Society would investigate the disjointedness of the paradigms of the bankers and the general public–that is, how and why they differ. Business & Government would investigate legislative and/or regulatory matters concerning the conflicts of interest as evinced by Goldman.

While the three fields are related, so too are medical ethics, sociology and biology. You don’t find schools putting these three in one class because it would be cheaper.  So part of the problem concerning business ethics might be how it is treated by business schools; it (as well as CSR and business & goverment) is essentially relegated to one third of a course in most undergraduate and MBA curriculi.  Among the lessons that we ought to have learned from the financial crisis of 2008 is that of the value, or importance, of the fields of business ethics, business & society, and business & government in business schools.  Sadly, even in educating their respective scholars, these fields are conflated–hence the scholars are not apt to study sufficiently in the basic discipline of their particular field.  That is, they tend to skim along the surface in order to cover three rather than one field. Perhaps business schools have a conflict of interest of their own whereby they have an interest in cost-saving expediency and in covering all of the fields of business. The three fields being discussed here have been willingly mitigated (or enervated) into “one” such that business schools could appear to have it both ways.  The problem is when something happens like the financial crisis of 2008, which shows just how vital each of the three fields are–meaning worthy of courses of their own.

Structural, or institutional, conflicts of interest are of great significance in applied ethics, even though they are often disregarded or ignored. Far more salient are personal conflicts of interest, such as when an employee pockets money meant rather than declares it as revenue for his or her company. Structural conflicts of interest are institutional in the sense that organizational arrangements inherently evince a conflict of interest such that people in them are necessarily subject to a conflict in their interests simply by participating in one of the organizations in the arrangement. An organizational or institutional conflict of interest, whether within one organization or involving relations between organizations, is not any less unethical than a personal conflict of interest because in both cases people are subject to a conflict of interest--only one being valid.  I present two cases and an argument that “firewalls” in an organization to prevent it from a conflict of interest are insufficient.

In the EU, the European Commission (the executive branch of the EU Government) sued four elevator companies that were part of a cartel in Belgium and Luxemburg.  Essentially, the Commission was seeking anti-trust damages—a first in EU jurisprudence.  Benoit Allemeersch, attorney for one of the companies, argued that the jurisdiction of the the commercial court of Brussells, the Tribunal of Commerce, violated the jurisdictional clauses in the contracts between the companies and the Commission.  He argued that the Commission acted as “police officer, prosecutor, jury and sentencing judge” in finding the existence of a cartel, and then used its own decision to make a private claim for itself before the commercial court. He argued that “the mere statement by the Commission that they respected their own ‘Chinese walls’ in making their decision and bringing the claim is not a sufficient guarantee to the defendants nor to any other citizen.” He maintained that in the case being argued, there was no “equality of arms” between the two sides, given the commission’s privileged position. According to Allemeersch, “the European Court of Human Rights requires that justice is not only done, but is also seen to be done.”  In other words, even the appearance of a conflict of interest, which can be in an institutional arrangement even if not acted upon, is enough to dismiss claims. The existence of “firewalls” within an organization does not sufficiently mitigate either the dismissal or, more generally, the institutional conflict of interest.

Even though the commission had previously argued that its own “Chinese walls” ensured the independence of the claim, Allemeersch correctly maintained that these safeguards could not be proven, tested or substantiated. I contend that the counsel is correct. Even if the Commission could show policies and procedures that act as its safeguards, such internal guidelines do not have the force of law and thus are insufficient to be relied upon—especially by external parties.  It can not be assumed, moreover, that an organization’s policies and procedures outweigh whatever internal interest happens to be dominant in the organization, given the nature of power to overflow its boundaries.

To say that the most powerful person a room is constrained by parchment alone is to be woefully ignorant of the reality of human nature.  Even if there are two equally-powerful people in the room with antipodal objectives, institutional checks and balances can only work as long as too great of a power imbalance does not exist.  If a US President is intent on invading a country, for example, and the Congress does not have sufficient power over his, the separation of powers institutionally could not be counted upon to keep Congress from rubber-stamping the President’s declaration of war.  For the President to be able to effectively declare war while being the commander in chief of the US military and the armies of the union’s republics is itself a structural conflict of interest.

Essentially, I am making a Nietzschean and Hobbesian argument that the most powerful person in the room is not apt to be constrained by invisible ”firewalls” in the room that are intended to level the powers of that person and a weaker person.  As Nietzsche writes, the strong must be strong and the weak cannot be other than weak.  To ask the strong to be weak or treat the weak as though it were strong goes against the nature of power.  In my analogy of the room, the two persons can represent heads of departments whose respective goals are at odds with each other. A “firewall” of policies and procedures is not sufficient to inhibit the more powerful head from pressuring the other.  Furthermore, the existence of a person whose authority includes both departments relativizes the firewall.  To bring in this element, I turn to the roles of rating agencies and Goldman Sachs in the American financial crisis of 2008. In the case of Goldman, the bank sold what its salespeople referred to as “crap” because the bank’s own proprietary position profited by the sales. In the case of the rating agencies, they were paid by the issuers of the securities that they were rating.  That either of these conflicts of interest were allowed to exist at all points to a proclivity among the general public to ignore institutional conflicts of interest—focusing instead on personal ones involving someone’s compensation and job.

In listening to and reading about the banks and rating agencies culpable in the American financial crisis, I doubted the “firewalls” argument given by the rating agencies.  The CEO of Moody’s for example, stated in Congressional testamony that he placed an equal emphasis on market-share and the quality of the ratings.  However, several of his former employees testified that they had been pressured not to lose a client to a competitor.  They stated that when ratings were changed, it was typically to protect the firm’s market-share (i.e., out of fear of losing the issuer).  The CEO’s faith in his own equipose as well as his firm’s “firewalls” was mistaken, even if he didn’t realize it.  To be sure, he may not have been aware of a more-powerful department putting such pressure on a less-powerful one.  It is possible, however, that the CEO was actively pushing his subordinates behind the scenes for more market-share, essentially profiting from the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays system.

In general, because an organization has an official above its firewalls, it is possible, even legitimate in terms of that position’s authority, for that official to put pressure on one side of the wall to capitulate in the interest of the whole (i.e., the entire organization).   Consider, for example, Lloyd Blankfein, who was CEO of Goldman Sachs at the time of the financial crisis.  He was over both the market-making and proprietary-trading units.  He could therefore have put pressure on the units selling securities to do so in a way that complements the bank’s own proprietary holdings.  For example, he (or his VP’s) could have pushed shorting sub-prime mortgage-backed derivatives in market-making (the clients taking long positions) because the proprietary interests of the bank would benefit from a fall in the housing market.  The bank’s sales people did indeed clients to go long even as the bank itself was going short in the belief that the housing market bubble was headed for a hard landing.  Before a US Senate committee, Blankfein claimed that the market-making and bank’s trading on its own books were unrelated unless the bank took out a position on its books as a counter-party needed by a client.  However, the bank sold clients on taking long rather than short positions on the housing-based securities even as the bank was taking a net short position on its own books above and beyond what was necessary to be a counter-party to its clients’ transactions.  This conflict of interest manifested in the duplicity involved in selling clients on what the sales people knew privately was “crap.”  As one of them wrote, if the clients knew the bank’s reason for going short, that would interfer with the bank’s ability to profit from the shorts.  Structural conflicts of interest are designed such that there is an incentive in favor of duplicity. Given a company’s overall interest and the fact that senior managers have authority over the entire firm, firewalls should not be relied upon by outside parties (or by those inside).
In the end, given the nature of human beings and power, we ought not be blindsided by claims of the efficacy of paper “firewalls.”  We ought not assume that the most powerful person or coalition in an organization will necessarily be voluntarily restrained by a weaker party in the same organization.  Moreover, we ought to take more seriously institutional or structural conflicts of interest in how we design and reform arrangements between institutions.  Where the status quo contains a structural conflict of interest, that condition ought to be put on a limited lifeline, with a deadline set for changing the arrangements.  Even if the alternative is not as efficient (it would doubtlessly not be flawless), it would be better than the status quo.  Charges of an institutional conflict of interest can be treated as red flags that instantly move to the front burner on people’s agendas.  We need not be hoodwinked by the duplicitous and self-interested into believing their asseverations concerning their own paper “firewalls.”

In 2009, Congress appropriated $16 billion in earmarks. In March of 2010, that the House eliminated earmarks to for-profit companies. However, enterprising managers soon found a way to get around the restriction. I contend that figuring ways to get around restrictions is the default in corporate responses to regulations where the latter cannot be used for strategic advantage.

In Marcy Kaptur’s (D-OH) district, a defense contracting company incorporated a nonprofit organization, the Great Lakes Research Center, at the same address and doing the same work. The center received earmarks of $10.4 million to sell the Pentagon small hollow metal spheres for body armor. Kaptur, who had received tens of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from the owner’s family and the company’s lobbyists told the media that the center “met the requirements of the Reform.” If this is true, the reform was in effect nugatory—so one might ask: why did the House go to the trouble unless for the short-term PR benefit? There is a deeper problem in even the appearance of a conflict of interest wherein a lawmaker has a role, whether direct or indirect, in money going to an organization that has contributed to the lawmaker’s campaign. Even if not intended, the conflict of interest should be sufficient as a red-light, yet as long as money is not being used by the company’s owner for personal use, such conflicts of interest are typically ignored.  I contend, however, that both types are equally sordid and hence that we should be on guard for them both.  If I am correct, there is an unduly lax and restrictive attitude in the US toward institutional conflicts of interest. This lapse has in turn enabled corruption in the Congress.

Source: Eric Lipton and Ron Nixon, “Companies Find Ways to Bypass Earmarks Ban,” NYT (7/5/10), 1A.

See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05/us/politics/05earmarks.html?_r=1&hpw

While creating and selling mortgage-based securities to some of its clients, Deutsche Bank AG was not only advising other clients to bet the other way, but also sometimes doing it itself, according to the Wall Street Journal. A trader at the bank would help create an index that made it easy for the bank to bet against housing even as sales people at the bank were selling the securities as if there were no downside to the American housing market. Then some of the tax-payer money was paid by the US Government to AIG to reimburse Deutsche’s hedge-fund clients who had bought the mortgage securities. American regulators looked at whether there were misrepresentations made to the hedge fund managers who bought the mortgage-backed securities even as Deutsche Bank was betting against the housing market.

The structural conflict of interest wherein a bank’s interest is antipodal to that of its clients raises the spector of misrepresentation. A spokesperson for Deutsche said, "We served clients whatever their investment objective, but only after being satisfied that they had arrived at their view after thorough consideration.” Furthermore, although Deutsche made tens of millions of dollars betting against the housing market, overall it “maintained a net long position in the housing market and ultimately suffered billions in losses, even after factoring in our hedges and offsetting positions.”  The more even proprietary position would relieve the bank of the conflict of interest; it is where the bank’s own position is skewed dramatically in one direction while it sells to clients in the other that at the very least the appearance of a conflict of interest arises.  The way out of this is to severely limit proprietary trades to those that are needed for clients (i.e., to manufacture a counter-party for a transaction desired by a client rather than the bank itself).  A second way out may have been illustrated by Deutsche. That is, a bank can hold a relatively balanced proprietary position such that the bank itself does not have an interest in the market going one way or the other. However, even with a balanced position, bankers can believe that a market will go down and lie to potential clients in order to sell long. 

For example, The Wall Street Journal reports that Deutsche trader Greg Lippmann encouraged an investor to go short against subprime bonds, telling him, “you should get some [courage] and do some shorts” because “these bonds are ging much lower.” Deutsche, however, continued to market new mortgage-bond deals predicated on the mortgage-securities market staying strong. The next day, M&T Bank of Buffallo, NY paid $82 million into a Deutsche deal known as Gemstone 7. Within ten months, the company had lost 98% of its investment.  A Deutsche spokesperson claims that employees bearish on the housing market had spoke at client meetings to make their views known and there is no indication that Lippmann was among those in sales urging clients to buy.  Even so, it would be odd were M&T managers willing to sink so much money into mortgage bonds after being told that the bonds would go much further down. Even if the bank’s proprietary interest was balanced, the information it had on the housing market went against its profit-motive in sales, so there may have been a conflict of interest even without a proprietary position to back it up.  Telling M&T managers that the “underlying structures in these bonds are built to withstand” adverse conditions shortly before the value of M&T’s holdings go from $82 million to $1.9 million strongly suggests that Deutsche’s bankers were at the very least incompetent. Given Lippmann’s email, there is evidence that Deutsche bankers knew that the bond’s underlying structures were vulnerable.  Withholding information in order to lie in order to profit is of course fraud. My point is that it can be looked at as a structural conflict of interest between one’s belief in one’s opinion and one’s profit-motive that can exist even where there is no (or a balanced) proprietary financial interest.

Carrick Mollenkamp and Serena Ng, “Dual Role in Housing Deals Puts Spotlight on Deutsche,” The Wall Street Journal (August 3, 2010), pp. A1.

The US Senate is “absurd.” So said Katie Connolly of MSNBC in 2010.  She was referring to Sen Shelby (R-AL) being able to singlehandedly place a hold on all pending nominations.  Citing a congressional scholar, Johathan Chait noted that a blanket hold has never been used before. Connolly argued that Shelb was doing it “because he wants a European corporation to build some planes in his state.”  Such a reason would be ubiquitous if not squalid enough in either body of the US Congress, so it is certainly plausable.  One might recall the money Sen. Ben Nelson got for Nebraska by agreeing to the health care reform bill.  In needing all 60 votes from the democrats and two independents, that bill gave us all a reminder of what an international body is like where each member has a veto.  In singlehandedly blocking all pending nominations before the US Senate, Sen Shelby was drawing on this theory as well.  While it is easy to trounce on each Senator (or each state) having a veto, I would argue that it is far less sordid than Shelby’s reason (i.e., more pork).  Because every state in the Union is semi-sovereign (and enjoys residual sovereignty as per the tenth amendment), there is constitutional support for any state represented in the US Senate having a veto on any legislation or appointment.  Because the veto is based on governmental sovereignty (i.e., the US Senate being in this respect an international body—unlike the US House), Alabama can use its veto even for reasons we might find disgusting.

So if each Senator (who represents his or her state as a political body even though he or she is elected by the citizens of his or her state) having a veto makes the US Senate “absurd” (and I join with those who are frustrated by it), we might want to consider the consequences that would be involved in depriving the political members of the Union of their vetos in the General Government (ie., Washington).  We could expect an acceleration in the consolidation of power in the General Government at the expense of the state governments—resulting in one size fits all in a heterogenous empire-scale Union (i.e., empire).  Any state government objecting to Washington taking over yet another domain of power would be powerless to stop that train without breaks running down the tracks toward a central state.  Meanwhile, that train would be able to pass more legislation through the US Senate, further accelerating its speed.

Some time back, I asked Sandra Day O’Connor of the US Supreme Court why she wasn’t objecting to the US Government going beyond its enumerated powers.  She replied to the small group that Congress was acting like a state legislature.  Disgust was palpable in her voice.  In a sense of futility, she added that it takes five on the US Supreme Court to have a majority decision (meaning that a majority would not go along with her on the enumerated powers matter).   You might be wondering what is wrong with Congress acting like a state legislature. The problem is that the US is in scale (and its make-up) commensurate with an empire by today’s standards.  In other words, most of our states are equivalent to countries.  You just can’t (or shouldn’t) run a combination of countries as though it were one country.  For one thing, a combo is inherently diverse.  Also, its center is further from the people.  It means less democracy or republican principles of representation because there are far fewer US Reps and Senators than state Reps and Senators.  Also, the US Government is designed as an empire-level polity.  Whereas the states’ Senates represent citizens (just as the states’ assemblies do), the US Senate (unlike the US House) represents political entities (the states) rather than US citizens.  In other words, both US citizens and US states are members of the US.  The US Government isn’t fashioned like a state government because the Union is a combination of such states (whereas a state is not a combo of republics in turn).

So we ought to be very careful about kneejerk reactions to fix the “absurd” US Senate.  To be sure, holding up appointments to get pork is squalid even by a pig’s standards, but turning the US Senate into a state senate would drastically alter what the US are.   Even though we use “the US” as a singular noun, the entity itself and its government were formed and designed with it as a plural noun (the states) in mind.  The US constitutional convention delegates invented modern federalism to suit this new genus of an empire: the Union.  The EU has since come into being along similar principles because it is of the same genus.  To treat either the US or EU as though it were commensurate with one of its states would be to treat something other than what it is.  That can only lead to a downfall.   So perhaps rather than change the US Senate to fit our understanding, we might alter our understanding to fit what the US are. This would entail taking the pressure off of the US Senate by returning most of the domestic legislation to the state governments (where there is more democracy).  Consider the coherence in having the US Senate  mainly involved in foreign policy (and regulating between the states) and having a filibuster (which is close to the principle of international organization).  That is, the state governments meet in the US Senate technically on an international basis. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution forms a hybrid between or composed of international and national governance.  This unique situs fits with the empire-scale of the United States, especially as they have expanded to fifty. 
Treating the US Senate as a state legislature…legislating on everything from healthcare to education…is a gross departure from this coherence.  It is indeed absurd—only we have the arrows reversed.  It is our use of the US Senate that is absurd—not the Senate’s principles (even though they can be abused, such as by Nebraska and Alabama). Treating the US Senate (and the Union) as other than what it is can only lead to the fall of our empire…our Union of States. To be sure, every empire that rises must fall.  So why write?  I’m merely trying to stay the fall a bit, but the outcome is certain.  In the meantime, let’s not help it along.  This will take more humility and much less presumptuousness in what we think we know about our system of public governance.  With more humility, perhaps more of us will be content to get involved in our state governments.  As it is, we overlook them and advocate changing the US Senate into our own image of what it should be, presuming the extant Senate is "absurd" (perhaps it is sheer hubris to make such a summary judgement?).
Source: http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2010/02/05/need-more-evidence-the-senate-is-absurd-look-no-further.aspx

Just as the US Senate was to take up the matter of Ben Bernanke’s re-appointment as Chair of the Federal Reserve in 2010, Time magazine came out with its announcement that he is to be its person of the year.  According to the magazine, “when turbulence in U.S. housing markets metastasized into the worst global financial crisis in more than 75 years, he conjured up trillions of new dollars and blasted them into the economy; engineered massive public rescues of failing private companies; ratcheted down interest rates to zero; lent to mutual funds, hedge funds, foreign banks, investment banks, manufacturers, insurers and other borrowers who had never dreamed of receiving Fed cash; jump-started stalled credit markets in everything from car loans to corporate paper; revolutionized housing finance with a breathtaking shopping spree for mortgage bonds; blew up the Fed’s balance sheet to three times its previous size; and generally transformed the staid arena of central banking into a stage for desperate improvisation. He didn’t just reshape U.S. monetary policy; he led an effort to save the world economy.”  Not to be outdone in service to the Chairman, CNN furnished its own reporters, who gave credit to Bernanke for these measures.  Interestingly, however, even though one reporter admitted that Bernanke had said in 2007 that the subprime market and its derivatives would not threaten the financial market and the banks, she attributed the fault there to the imperfections in the market rather than to Bernanke himself in being wrong.   So, he gets credit for cleaning up the mess (ignoring the foreclosed homeowners) but not the blame for being wrong about the contagion (and not urging regulation of the derivatives).  He could have urged the regulation of derivatives (he is a smart person), and once the crisis occurred, he could have tailored his response to the homeowners facing foreclosures that could have been stopped. For example, the Fed could have created dollars to subsidize the inordinate rates on the variable rate subprime mortgages (i.e. those bank assets would not have been toxic and the banks’ balance sheets would have been fine…two birds with one stone…rather than doing the bidding of one of the parties).  To be sure, if the Fed is inordinately friendly to banks because of the power they have in selecting their regulators (the NY Fed Chair’s appointing committee consists of bankers), then Bernanke might have simply been playing the good politics for staying in office.   “Our ships must all sail in the same direction; otherwise who can tell how long you will…last…with us.” (The Godfather, part III)  Bernanke is a player from the perspective of the real power behind the throne: America’s financial elite.  That elite literally owns the media companies. So what I want to point out here is that the timing of Time’s announcement and the asymetry in CNN’s laudatory coverage of the Chairman just as the Senate was about to consider his re-appointment led me almost instinctually to  be convinced that coincidence was not the driver here.  The Chairman undoubtedly had some powerful friends in the media who were giving him a publicity offensive, or campaign, just in time for the Senate debate on whether to appoint him.

Through all the admiration of this person of 2009, it should be remembered that he did not urge the regulation of sub-prime derivatives issued or held by the banks regulated by the Fed.  He was wrong about the subprime housing bubble being contained.  And he failed to protect homeowners sufficiently.  If the media was being used by the Fed Chair in his re-appointment campaign, it could be that what we are fed by CNN, Fox, MSNBC and the main network newscasts is not really as neutral or beyond their control as we think.   News as a campaign.  News because it is in some powerful actor’s vested interests.  While there is certainly coincidence in life, an alignment such as I have outlined here is far too transparent—or at least it ought to be.

The subtext here is that we, the American people, have become too much the pawns even as we think we are not.  The illusion of popular sovereignty is that we are in control.   I don’t think we have any idea of the extent to which we are manipulated by the powers that transcend our elected representatives and their appointees.  It is no wonder that real change does not get beyond the interests of the real power in America, whose interest is in the status quo or at best in an incremental change.   Essentially, we have allowed the anti-democratic power to concentrate to a degree that is dangerous to a functioning republic (i.e., a representative democracy).  We should not be surprised to find that powerful actors are operating at a subterranean level where transparency is intentionally lacking.    How do we get it back, you ask?  Hah!   We would have to see it first—realize its extent and depth—and I’m not holding my breath that enough people will wake up to see the light.

Too many of us are ensconced in Plato’s cave, taking what the puppets say for reality.  As Jack Nicholson said in A Few Good Men, “You want answers? YOU CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH!”    Even if we could stomach the emetic manipulation behind the scenes that is directed to us (and even our representatives—when they aren’t doing it themselves), we would have to be able to see it—and it is so well hidden.  We can only grasp at straws…confluences that seem like more than coincidences.  As a member of the black caucus of the US House (surprisingly) said to a reporter of Frontline on the TARP program passing the House just days after it had been voted down by that same body, “You have no idea how powerful the anti-democratic forces are here.”    You and I get only glimpses.  The puppets seem more real so we believe in them.   Please don’t take my thesis to be that there is one huge orchastrated conspiracy; rather, I’m simply suggesting that our system of representative democracy does not seem to be able to sufficiently constrain the invisible powers that are pulling strings without being accountable to the public power.  It is my ardent hope that the people will look beyond the status quo in voting for candidates—perhaps getting back to citizen representatives who do their duty then return to their preferred occupations—that we would elect people sufficiently principled and not desirous of a life in power to be willing to take on the financial power.   Do I think it will happen?  Sadly, no.  I’m sorry, but I just don’t think we have it in us…or we don’t have enough of what it would take to confront that which is in us that favors comfort and sleep.   In the story of the rise and fall of empires, the United States is not exempt.  The culprit, as with most things, lies within.   It is ultimately about what kind of people too many of us are.  Such a thing is very, very difficult to change, let alone see.  Decadence tends to be invisible to itself.

Note: A day after CNN covered the announcement, the Senate finance committee debated and voted on Bernanke’s re-appointment. See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34463144/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/

 Source: http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1946375_1947251,00.html#ixzz0Zs8WgpV1

WASHINGTON - Republican leaders expressed renewed skepticism Tuesday about President Barack Obama’s call for a bipartisan forum on health care, raising questions about how much can be achieved at the televised event later this month. “This is a clever tactic by the president to try to put the Republicans on the defensive,” said John Feehery, a GOP consultant and former congressional aide. With the two sides at such odds, some Republican activists privately worry that their party’s leaders might be walking into a trap on Feb. 25 designed to portray their health care proposals as thin. The House’s top two Republican leaders openly questioned Obama’s sincerity and hinted they might skip the meeting if he uses the Democratic bills as the starting point for discussions.

Analysis: 

The problem may well be that President Obama is trying to have his cake and eat it too—meaning that he is trying to draw on the credibility of a head of state (i.e., a neutral party who is presiding) while at the same time being the captain of one of the partisan teams.  This is a structural conflict of interest that is centered in having the head of state also be the head of one of the contending political parties.  Even in how he characterizes what is not bipartisanship, his bias is palpable. “Being bipartisan cannot mean that Democrats give up everything they believe in, find the handful of things that Republicans have been advocating for, and we do those things, and then we have bipartisanship.”  To make such a statement literally from the presidential podium undercuts the presiding nature of the office.  To consistently side with one side in a house over which one is presiding undercuts one’s credibility to preside.  In presiding, one is looking out for the good of the whole, and coming down on one side or the other can legitimately only be done when the whole is in jeopardy.  Hence, Andrew Jackson came down against Congressional encroachment on the states in vetoing a Congressional appropriation for a road completely within Missouri’s borders; he feared the precedent would ruin the system of federalism (which must be balanced to be viable). Shortly thereafter, he sent the US Army down to South Carolina after it passed the Nullification Acts by which the South Carolina government claimed it could nullify any federal law that was not in the state’s interest.  Jackson’s involvement in taking sides was both for the states and the federal government because his only criterion was the long term viability of the Union.  To take sides on lesser matters tends to reduce one to an ideology, hence to one of the partisan groups.  This undercuts the credibility of the presiding officer for people in the other parties.  To “spend” that credibility for expedient purposes (an ideological agenda)—trying to get the most out of the power of the office—is to lose the kind of power that the office of the US Presidency was designed to have.  No wonder most occupants of the office have failed.  Barak Obama on health care is only the latest. Had Barak pushed the need for health-care reform without taking sides as the legislators debate possible plans, he would be treated as much more credible in hosting a meeting.  In other words, the seriousness of the conflict of interest can be gaged by the trepidation of the Republican leaders.  A partisan evoking the credibility of a figure head is inherently duplicitous and bound to lead to failure.

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35313584/ns/politics-health_care_reform/

Secondary Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/us/politics/10obama.html?hpw