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According to The New York Times, even after taxpayers rescued Citigroup, regulators at the New York Federal Reserve failed to monitor the company adequately. The regulators, although adequately staffed and proficient in training, failed to move swiftly as the bank’s financial condition deteriorated from as early as 2005, and were overly optimistic about the bank’s prospects as late as December, 2009. From 2006 to 2007, decisions on poorly underwritten loans were changed from “turned down” to “approved.” As many as 80 percent of the loans that Citigroup sold to Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and other investors were defective. “Although the dedicated supervisory team is well-qualified and generally has sound knowledge of the organization, there have been significant weaknesses in the execution of the supervisory program,” according to one excerpt of the 2009 review. Tim Geithner, who as president of the New York Fed from 2003 to 2008 was in charge of overseeing Citigroup, went on to become the US Secretary of the Treasury.

In questioning a panel testifying before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on April 7, 2010, Brooksley E. Born, the former regulator in the Clinton administration who had lost the battle over derivatives regulation to Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and Larry Summers, called on Greenspan in his testimony to defend his longtime deregulatory bent. “The Fed utterly failed to prevent the financial crisis,” she said. She went on to claim, “The Fed and the banking regulators failed to prevent the housing bubble. They failed to prevent the predatory lending scandal. They failed to prevent our biggest banks and bank holding companies from engaging in activities that would bring them to the verge of collapse without massive taxpayer bailouts… . Didn’t the Federal Reserve fail to meet its mandates, fail to meet it responsibilities?” Greenspan replied that there was a failure: an underestimation of the “state and extent” of financial risks and the ability of private counterparties to assess them, but he added that, “(t)he notion that somehow my views on regulation were predominant and effective at influencing the Congress is something you may have perceived,” he said. “But it didn’t look that way from my point of view.” However, according to other accounts, the trioka of Summers, Rubin and Greenspan had gone after Born for wanted to regulate the derivatives (see, for example, Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail). The three did indeed lobby Congress in an effort to sabatage Born’s proposal. Besides reporting this, Sorkin also points out that Citigroup’s CEO and its major stockholder were instrumental in getting Geithner appointed as President of the New York Fed. A coincidence with the overly optimistic view of the Fed’s regulators regarding Citi?

In questioning Robert Rubin on April 8th, Born (and other commissioners) asked why derivatives were kept unregulated. Rubin replied that the bankers were strongly opposed to such regulation, and they were able to effect their stand in Congress. Rubin did not go into the efforts of him, Summers and Greenspan to lobby Congress to keep the instruments unregulated; instead, he claimed that he favored regulating the derivatives even when he was at Goldman Sachs supervising the bank’s trading desk, and that when at Treasury he was merely concerned that regulating the instruments under the existing regulatory structure could cause delaying legal challenges. While Rubin’s frankness concerning the influence of the bankers in the US Government is useful, his testimony regarding himself seems less than forthcoming. Presumably he could have lobbied Congress as the Treasury Secretary for a new regulatory authority to regulate the derivatives on a solid legal basis. Instead, he lobbied against Born’s efforts to get the instruments regulated. He admitted that the financial sector would have been strongly opposed to such a regulatory authority. Also, he had been on the board of Citigroup and an executive at Goldman Sachs. The conflict of interest is too strong in his case for his asseverations that he had always acted in favor of regulating the instruments to be believable. His “worry of legal challenges” strikes me as a technical excuse that he was using as a subterfuge to “explain” his opposition to Born’s efforts to regulate the derivatives. Doubtless he could count on the American public and its media for not digging sufficiently to expose his duplicity. That is to say, it is likely that Rubin got away with protecting his ex-bank’s interests when he was Secretary of the Treasury and was strategically able to come off as having advocated the public interest all along. Hence, in general, the culpits were able to maintain their credibility and position themselves to be the officials we turn to to fix the problem.

The influence of the bankers in the halls of government (and its central bank) is perhaps the cause of the Fed’s deficiencies in regulating Citigroup (and in the Clinton Administration’s position against regulating the sub-prime mortgage derivative securities). In the case of the New York Fed, the board that appoints the NY Fed President consists of Wall Street bankers. There is a structural conflict of interest in having the regulated appoint the regulator. This structural conflict of interest manifested itself materially in the case of Tim Geithner and Citigroup. This is a textbook example of a conflict of interest, and yet it went under the radar screen. The focus in regulatory deficiency is typically instead on whether the regulators are sufficiently staffed and trained, and perhaps on whether they are relying too much on information from the regulatees. The more basic structural conflicts of interest are rarely made transparent, yet we will continue to see regulatory “deficiencies” manifest from them unless structural or institutional reforms are made. I am continually amazed at how such glaring institutional conflicts of interest are ignored by the public and the media. I would expect the politicians and the business practioners to try to keep it hush hush, but the inability of the American people to grasp the problem confounds my attempt to explain it.

Sources: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/business/08panel.html?ref=us ; CSPAN.