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In 2010, Eric Jackson, an activist investor and hedge fund manager, averred that Goldman’s board was too cozy and too lacking in financial know-how to diligently oversee top management. He claimed the board was packed with honchos who led companies that had paid large fees to Goldman. Jackson pointed to Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal and former Fannie Mae chief James Johnson as cases in point. The problem with these choices, Jackson said, is that “these people seem to be favorably disposed to senior management’s way of thinking,” and are therefore unlikely to act as a check on CEO Lloyd Blankfein and his team. Colin Barr of Fortune argued that the bank’s system of corporate governance was behind the times. He pointed out that Lloyd Blankfein continued to serve as chairman and CEO, even as the trend in recent years had been toward independent board leadership.

After all, one of a board's main functions is to oversee and evaluate the CEO as well as the other top executives. The duality of chairman/CEO is the epitome of a structural or institutional conflict of interest; a CEO who is also chair of the group whose job it is to evaluate the CEO is presuming to evaluate him or herself, in effect. The sheer existence of such an obvious conflict of interest can be viewed as presumptuous. Furthermore, the arrangement itself is an incentive to engage in duplicitous subterfuge. A board of directors is by definition independent of the management because the board’s function is to oversee it.  Overseeing and being cozy are like oil and water.  A “trend” away from conflating the two minimizes the decadence in the problem.  Instead, corporate governance ought to require independence.

When Armstrong was chair/CEO of ATT, I asked him whether giving up the chairmanship wouldn't enable his board to better evaluate him as there would not be the suspicion of a conflict of interest. He replied as though he were president of the United States, saying "the buck stops here."  He went on to say that he had to have complete control or he could not rightly be blamed if his strategy (which was broadband at the time) didn't work.  If his board said no to part of his strategy, it would not be fair to blame him for the failure of his entire strategy. Of course, he could have presented his strategy to his board and if it objected to part of it, the resultant strategy, it could be agreed, would not be considered to be his; he would be evaluated on how well he implimented it. The notion that any sort of check on power renders the power compromised or impotent ignores the basic difference between a board and a management. Managers work within broad strategic guidelines that are set as a matter of policy by a board, and managerial implimentation can indeed be evaluated without compromising it.  In effect, Armstrong wanted to go beyond managing to the property-rights goal-level of owning.  That he was overreaching is all the more reason why an independent board would have been a valuble commodity for ATT.

To be sure, it is difficult to counter the influence that a management has on account of its position vis a vis the company and its board. As a starting point, people having former ties to the management, or even hand picked by the CEO, ought to be barred from serving as directors. It should go without saying that a CEO ought to be barred from serving as the chair of the board.  Conflating these two roles is tantamount to suggesting that a CEO can (and should) oversee himself, which is nonsensical. For there simply to be a mere trend away from this duality essentially “normalizes” that which ought to be approached as an oxymoron--a contradiction in terms. That such a phenomenon would be allowed to exist at all points to the power that CEO's have to define social reality for society. Such power is very dangerous, especially if left unchecked even in the name of "the buck stops here."

Source: http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/20/news/companies/goldman.board.fortune/index.htm

Structural, or institutional, conflicts of interest are of great significance in applied ethics, even though they are often disregarded or ignored. Far more salient are personal conflicts of interest, such as when an employee pockets money meant rather than declares it as revenue for his or her company. Structural conflicts of interest are institutional in the sense that organizational arrangements inherently evince a conflict of interest such that people in them are necessarily subject to a conflict in their interests simply by participating in one of the organizations in the arrangement. An organizational or institutional conflict of interest, whether within one organization or involving relations between organizations, is not any less unethical than a personal conflict of interest because in both cases people are subject to a conflict of interest--only one being valid.  I present two cases and an argument that “firewalls” in an organization to prevent it from a conflict of interest are insufficient.

In the EU, the European Commission (the executive branch of the EU Government) sued four elevator companies that were part of a cartel in Belgium and Luxemburg.  Essentially, the Commission was seeking anti-trust damages—a first in EU jurisprudence.  Benoit Allemeersch, attorney for one of the companies, argued that the jurisdiction of the the commercial court of Brussells, the Tribunal of Commerce, violated the jurisdictional clauses in the contracts between the companies and the Commission.  He argued that the Commission acted as “police officer, prosecutor, jury and sentencing judge” in finding the existence of a cartel, and then used its own decision to make a private claim for itself before the commercial court. He argued that “the mere statement by the Commission that they respected their own ‘Chinese walls’ in making their decision and bringing the claim is not a sufficient guarantee to the defendants nor to any other citizen.” He maintained that in the case being argued, there was no “equality of arms” between the two sides, given the commission’s privileged position. According to Allemeersch, “the European Court of Human Rights requires that justice is not only done, but is also seen to be done.”  In other words, even the appearance of a conflict of interest, which can be in an institutional arrangement even if not acted upon, is enough to dismiss claims. The existence of “firewalls” within an organization does not sufficiently mitigate either the dismissal or, more generally, the institutional conflict of interest.

Even though the commission had previously argued that its own “Chinese walls” ensured the independence of the claim, Allemeersch correctly maintained that these safeguards could not be proven, tested or substantiated. I contend that the counsel is correct. Even if the Commission could show policies and procedures that act as its safeguards, such internal guidelines do not have the force of law and thus are insufficient to be relied upon—especially by external parties.  It can not be assumed, moreover, that an organization’s policies and procedures outweigh whatever internal interest happens to be dominant in the organization, given the nature of power to overflow its boundaries.

To say that the most powerful person a room is constrained by parchment alone is to be woefully ignorant of the reality of human nature.  Even if there are two equally-powerful people in the room with antipodal objectives, institutional checks and balances can only work as long as too great of a power imbalance does not exist.  If a US President is intent on invading a country, for example, and the Congress does not have sufficient power over his, the separation of powers institutionally could not be counted upon to keep Congress from rubber-stamping the President’s declaration of war.  For the President to be able to effectively declare war while being the commander in chief of the US military and the armies of the union’s republics is itself a structural conflict of interest.

Essentially, I am making a Nietzschean and Hobbesian argument that the most powerful person in the room is not apt to be constrained by invisible ”firewalls” in the room that are intended to level the powers of that person and a weaker person.  As Nietzsche writes, the strong must be strong and the weak cannot be other than weak.  To ask the strong to be weak or treat the weak as though it were strong goes against the nature of power.  In my analogy of the room, the two persons can represent heads of departments whose respective goals are at odds with each other. A “firewall” of policies and procedures is not sufficient to inhibit the more powerful head from pressuring the other.  Furthermore, the existence of a person whose authority includes both departments relativizes the firewall.  To bring in this element, I turn to the roles of rating agencies and Goldman Sachs in the American financial crisis of 2008. In the case of Goldman, the bank sold what its salespeople referred to as “crap” because the bank’s own proprietary position profited by the sales. In the case of the rating agencies, they were paid by the issuers of the securities that they were rating.  That either of these conflicts of interest were allowed to exist at all points to a proclivity among the general public to ignore institutional conflicts of interest—focusing instead on personal ones involving someone’s compensation and job.

In listening to and reading about the banks and rating agencies culpable in the American financial crisis, I doubted the “firewalls” argument given by the rating agencies.  The CEO of Moody’s for example, stated in Congressional testamony that he placed an equal emphasis on market-share and the quality of the ratings.  However, several of his former employees testified that they had been pressured not to lose a client to a competitor.  They stated that when ratings were changed, it was typically to protect the firm’s market-share (i.e., out of fear of losing the issuer).  The CEO’s faith in his own equipose as well as his firm’s “firewalls” was mistaken, even if he didn’t realize it.  To be sure, he may not have been aware of a more-powerful department putting such pressure on a less-powerful one.  It is possible, however, that the CEO was actively pushing his subordinates behind the scenes for more market-share, essentially profiting from the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays system.

In general, because an organization has an official above its firewalls, it is possible, even legitimate in terms of that position’s authority, for that official to put pressure on one side of the wall to capitulate in the interest of the whole (i.e., the entire organization).   Consider, for example, Lloyd Blankfein, who was CEO of Goldman Sachs at the time of the financial crisis.  He was over both the market-making and proprietary-trading units.  He could therefore have put pressure on the units selling securities to do so in a way that complements the bank’s own proprietary holdings.  For example, he (or his VP’s) could have pushed shorting sub-prime mortgage-backed derivatives in market-making (the clients taking long positions) because the proprietary interests of the bank would benefit from a fall in the housing market.  The bank’s sales people did indeed clients to go long even as the bank itself was going short in the belief that the housing market bubble was headed for a hard landing.  Before a US Senate committee, Blankfein claimed that the market-making and bank’s trading on its own books were unrelated unless the bank took out a position on its books as a counter-party needed by a client.  However, the bank sold clients on taking long rather than short positions on the housing-based securities even as the bank was taking a net short position on its own books above and beyond what was necessary to be a counter-party to its clients’ transactions.  This conflict of interest manifested in the duplicity involved in selling clients on what the sales people knew privately was “crap.”  As one of them wrote, if the clients knew the bank’s reason for going short, that would interfer with the bank’s ability to profit from the shorts.  Structural conflicts of interest are designed such that there is an incentive in favor of duplicity. Given a company’s overall interest and the fact that senior managers have authority over the entire firm, firewalls should not be relied upon by outside parties (or by those inside).
In the end, given the nature of human beings and power, we ought not be blindsided by claims of the efficacy of paper “firewalls.”  We ought not assume that the most powerful person or coalition in an organization will necessarily be voluntarily restrained by a weaker party in the same organization.  Moreover, we ought to take more seriously institutional or structural conflicts of interest in how we design and reform arrangements between institutions.  Where the status quo contains a structural conflict of interest, that condition ought to be put on a limited lifeline, with a deadline set for changing the arrangements.  Even if the alternative is not as efficient (it would doubtlessly not be flawless), it would be better than the status quo.  Charges of an institutional conflict of interest can be treated as red flags that instantly move to the front burner on people’s agendas.  We need not be hoodwinked by the duplicitous and self-interested into believing their asseverations concerning their own paper “firewalls.”

A year after the financial crisis of 2008, Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs,  found himself vilified for his firm’s quick return to risky trading in spite of its new bank holding company status. Populist resentment at the time was especially pitted against the hefty bonuses from the trades. Also, people were upset about the benefits that the bank had obtained from the decisions of its alums in the U.S. Government—specifically, in the U.S. Department of the Treatury. For instance, Goldman Sachs and other AIG counterparties got a the dollar-for-dollar payout from AIG thanks to an infusion of funds for that specific purpose by Treasury. Regardless, in an interview with the London Times, the highest-paid CEO (at least in the financial sector) dismissed such talk and defended his money-making machine and its compensation.  In addition to being the engine of economic recovery, according to Blankfein, Goldman Sachs provides a social function in making capital available to companies so they can expand. Stunningly, he adds, “I’m doing God’s work.”[i]  Such a claim is a far cry indeed from Thomas Jefferson’s warning that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.[ii]  Perhaps God intends to undo our liberties by bailing out the banks.

Besides these rather obvious problems with Blankfein's religious claim is his presumption to know what God's work is, and, furthermore, that he is doing it.   Even though a feckless system of corporate governance can enable a CEO to essentially function as his or her own boss, including doing the board's job of evaluating his or her own performance, it is a tall order for a human being to be able to evaluate his performance as God's work.   To be sure, it is possible that God is an intelligent being that bestows favor on his golden stewards for doing His work.

Lloyd Blankfein may have been involved in two conflicts of interest: 1) that of having excessive power over the board whose principal task it is to oversee him, 2) having communicated with GS alums in high posts in the U.S. Government (e.g., Hank Paulson) and perhaps having them enact policies on GS's behalf.   It may be that institutional and personal conflicts of interests can become so ubiquitous that they are simply not seen by the culprits. Furthermore, it could be that the denial enabled by a tacit presumptuousness is like a white movie screen on which even doing God's work can be projected. How ironic it is, that sordid proprietary interest could operate not merely under the subterfuge of being a neutral "market-maker," but also as God's work. Such work is two degrees of freedom away from squalid greed. So it is remarkable that the two could become conflated in a mind.

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[i] John Arlidge, I’m doing ‘God’s work. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, The Sunday Times, 11/9/09.
[ii] Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, Monticello, May 28, 1816, in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-99),  XI, 533.

Goldman Sachs’ (GS) board considered buying AIG in late June, 2008, so GS could use AIG’s premium float for capital (rather than becoming a bank holding company and using deposits to fund trades or as collatoral for leveraged trading).  Strangely, GS’s board didn’t realize that another part of GS was questioning the “mark to market” valuations that AIG was making on its swaps.  Also, AIG had revised its Nov and Dec 07 losses from $1b to $5b.  GS and AIG had the same public accountant (Price), which GS was using to get AIG to down-value the value of its assets. On that week in Sept, 2008, when Lehman went under, JP Morgan and GS were working to put together a loan of $50 billion to cover AIG’s deepening hole  At the same time, the two banks were demanding new collateral payments from AIG, pushing the insurance giant deeper into its hole.  The Fed and AIG wondered if the fees and interest rate being set by the two banks for themselves and other contributing banks wasn’t essentially stealing the company.

As it turned out, AIG received funding from the Federal Reserve in exchange for the government taking warrants on a 79.9% ownership of the company.  Goldman had bought $20 billion of insurance from AIG and received as much as $13 billion from AIG when the Fed funded AIG with $90 billion.  The counterparties were paid in full, rather than the sixty cents on the dollar that AIG negotiators had been pressing. Even though GS was hedged because it had purchased credit default swaps in case AIG were to default, one has to ask whether Blankfein at GS used Paulson to have the government pay GS through AIG.  Blankfein claims that his bank would not have gone under had AIG imploded, but surely GS relies on there being a financial market. Also, when the Fed essentially took over AIG, Paulson wanted to appoint a new CEO.  Paulson was of course an ex-CEO of GS.  Paulson had one of his advisors, also a GS alum, look at candidates.  The aid favored Ed Liddy, who was on GS’s board.   GS would be running AIG.  Hence, the insurance giant would not run interferance on the $13 billion going to GS.

Besides these conflicts of interest, Goldman trades securities for big firms and pension funds. It also acts as adviser to many of the companies whose securities it trades.   In other words, the problem is in its core business. So a person could be excused for wincing at Lloyd Blankfein’s statement that his bank is performing not only a social function in providing capital to firms so they can expand, but is “doing God’s work” as well.   John D. Rockefeller used the same expression in regard to his Standard Oil monopoly that offered its remaining competitors the choice to be bought up or drowned.  According to Rockefeller, Standard Oil was Noah’s Ark, saving the oil refining industry from destructive competition.   So what if the uncooperative were put under?  They deserved it. Besides, the industry would be saved.  In this regard, the monopolist viewed himself as a Christ figure.   Are the golden boys the incarnation of this figure?   It goes without saying, but I will anyway, that Blankfein has no misgivings in paying (and being paid) record bonuses in 2009.    The presumptuousness of those bankers aside, Jefferson’s dictum that a national bank would be more dangerous than a standing army to democracy seems apt.  We, the American citizens, have an amazing ability not to see things, and then to tacitly enable that which is in actuality hardly a savior.

Source: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6907681.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1

In the wake of the financial crisis that came to a head in September of 2008, people might have been wondering if sufficient normative constraints on Wall Street greed are available, even possible. The ability of traders to create complex derivative securities that are difficult for regulators to regulate, much less understand, may have people looking for ethical or even religious constraints. It would be only natural to ask if such “soft” restraint mechanisms really do have the puissance to do the trick. Here’s the rub: the tricksters are typically the last to avail themselves of ethical or religious systems, and they the wrongdoers are the ones in need of the restraint. Blankfein said of his bank, Goldman Sachs, that it had been doing God’s work. About a week after saying that, he had to walk his statement back and admit that the bankers had does some things that were morally wrong. Although divine omnipotence is by definition not limited by human ethical systems, it is hard to imagine a divine decree telling bankers to tell their clients one thing (buy subprime mortgage derivatives) while taking the opposite position on the bank’s proprietary position (shorting the derivatives, beyond being a counterparty to clients). Divine duplicity seems to represent an oxymoron on a megascale rather than a justification for greed.

As the crisis erupted and was subsequently managed by public offiicals in government and new managers brought in to salvage AIG, I was researching the history of Christian thought on profit-seeking and wealth. I had found evidence of a gradual shift in the thought between Aquinas and the fifteenth-century Christian Humanists (mainly in what is now Italy). Whereas early Christian thought had tended to stress the negative attitude toward riches—the camel being in extreme pain in getting through the eye of the needle—in the Renaissance Christian theologians tended to argue that being wealth is necessary for a Christian to exercise the godly practical virtues of liberality and magnificance (particularly the latter, which alone permits gifts reflective of God’s majesty). Something had happened in the dominant Christian attitude on wealth that made the religion less of a buttress against greed because it had become possible for a Christian to be both rich and to go to heaven. Cosimo de Medici is a perfect example of a banker who was assured by the pope that a career based on urury would not necessarily bar a banker from entering heaven (assuming he gave financially to the Church). The various Reformers can be read as efforts to pull Christianity back from being so close to incorporating love of gain, or greed. I looked at the (Standard Oil) monopolist and devout Baptist, John D. Rockefeller, to get a sense of how efficacious the Reformation was in attempting to arrest and reverse the momentum of the pro-wealth Christian paradigm.

Having sketched the shift and subsequent reactions of the Reformers, I turned my attention to trying to explain both the shift itself and the efficacy of the Reformation. I believe the increasingly commercialized environment since the Commercial Revolution does not provide enough of an explanation; I contend that one must look at the religion itself to find the roots of the shift and the results of the Reformation as concerns the religion's theological attitudes toward wealth. In other words, Christianity itself must be examined. As you read through the book, you could do worse than ask yourself: is there something deeper in Christianity at work in the historical shift in thought on wealth and profit-seeking?  You will find my theory in the conclusion. Undoubtedly, you will develop your own as you reflect as you read.

The main question I want to pose through the treatise is whether religion itself, as a phenomenon touching the human domain of existence, can hold us back from ourselves even when we least want it to do so. If so, then a religion operating in the human domain can operate as a wholly-other mechanism by which sins such as greed can be reduced in force or perhaps even finally exterpated. To expunge the sordid stuff from our banks and corporations, human nature itself would have to be radically changed. Perhaps the question is whether it is possible even if not probable for religion operating through human beings to accomplish this task, given that religion cannot but interact with the world.

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Source: http://www.amazon.com/Godliness-Greed-Shifting-Christian-Thought/dp/0739139835/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1294957599&sr=8-1