Showing posts with label budget policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label budget policy. Show all posts
Thursday, April 14, 2011
A Basis for Entitlement Programs in Individualism via Collective Means
0 comments Posted by Find Insurance Online at 11:30 AMIn his speech on April 13, 2011 on reducing U.S. Government deficits, President Obama identified two strains that have run through the country’s political history and inform our political culture even today. “More than citizens of any other country, we are rugged individualists, a self-reliant people with a healthy skepticism of too much government. But there has always been another thread running throughout our history – a belief that we are all connected; and that there are some things we can only do together, as a nation. We believe, in the words of our first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, that through government, we should do together what we cannot do as well for ourselves.” These two strains can be identified as individualism and collectivism, respectively.
I contend that collectivism enables both individual and collective security. Individual security is oriented to a person’s survival and collective security is exemplified by national defense. In his speech, the president explicitly placed individual security within the collectivist strain. “Part of this American belief that we are all connected also expresses itself in a conviction that each one of us deserves some basic measure of security. We recognize that no matter how responsibly we live our lives, hard times or bad luck, a crippling illness or a layoff, may strike any one of us. ‘There but for the grace of God go I,’ we say to ourselves, and so we contribute to programs like Medicare and Social Security, which guarantee us health care and a measure of basic income after a lifetime of hard work; unemployment insurance, which protects us against unexpected job loss; and Medicaid, which provides care for millions of seniors in nursing homes, poor children, and those with disabilities.” In other words, the president rests entitlement programs on compassion for others with whom we share a society.
According to Obama, our societal connectedness with others implies a duty to contribute to the survival needs of those who cannot fend for themselves. I contend that most Americans are not likely to relate to this deontological basis that relies on the sentiment of compassion. Bluntly stated, too many of us are too selfish (or self-absorbed) to be motivated by such a normative basis. Fortunately, there is an alternative basis of individual security through collective means. Such a basis more firmly integrates the individualism and collectivism that the President identified as running through American history.
Specifically, as the president pointed out in his speech, hard luck can befall each of us; no one is immune from calamity and ruin. Perhaps the richest Americans feel confident that they will never be without their fortunes even in spite of the crushing experiences of many wealthy investors in the stock market crashes of 1873 and 1929, for instance. Yet for even the rich, and certainly for the rest of us, there is a basic psychological ease of mind in being able to have confidence that even in the worst case scenario concerning oneself, a safety net dependent only on the continued existence of the social contract (i.e., the collective) exists. Regardless of income, we all tend to ignore the foundational peace of mind that comes with security in
survival. Hence, each individual tends to understate the interest that he or she has in contributing to a fund even if he or she never has to use it.
In other words, self-interest and individual security by collective means are not incompatible. Therefore, the duty of compassion need not be relied upon as a motivation. Even if I never need to draw on Social Security (taking this program as insurance to be issued only to those who need it rather than as a combination of retirement savings accounts with the wealthy retirees having a claim on at least the money they paid in), it is in my self-interest that there be such a program available to me should I be impoverished at retirement. Even if I never need to draw on the program, the psychological security afforded to me by it through my life—and, indeed, to a society made up of people of such a psychology—makes being taxed to support the program quite valuable to me even if the value is subtle in my daily life. In a basic sense, each of us lives with a quiet anxiety concerning one’s own survival being less than certain. Perhaps the existence-anxiety is not consciously felt by those of us who have means; the poor surely are in touch with it. Yet we are all affected by it, like radiation, whether we know it or not.
Therefore, it is in an American’s self-interest to be taxed for survival-oriented entitlements even if the need is never actually realized; the psychological benefit begins immediately. We are “in it together” in that each of us, being a human being, is subject to the basic existence anxiety as well as to the beneficial effects from the reduction of it. Additionally, should a person be in need of an entitlement for survival, there is that more tangible benefit too. In isolating only this benefit and calculating the probability of one’s eventual need for it, the typical American tends to understand the value to himself of individual security by collective means. This understatement of the value may involve a rather narrow selfishness that is not in one’s own self-interest, fundamentally speaking. Besides being contrary to compassion for others in need, the narrow breed of self-interest (i.e., selfishness) is not even in one’s own interest.
Perhaps it is in each of us enjoying the same feeling that comes with having security in our survival being bolstered by social contract that we can feel community. Perhaps such a shared basis can trump even the different experiences in being rich and poor. That is to say, community may simply be the recognition of having the same feeling or experience. In the case of individual security by collective means, the basis of community can be located in individualism rather than the less reliable motive of compassionate duty.
Click to add a question or comment on President Obama on social programs and the deficit.
Source:
Barak Obama, “Text of Obama Speech on Deficit,” The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2011.
Friday, April 8, 2011
Was President Obama's Role in Budget Negotiations Undercutting his Role in Presiding?
0 comments Posted by Find Insurance Online at 10:51 AMOn April 5, 2011, President Obama observed, “We’re going to have some very tough negotiations. And there are going to be, I think, very sharply contrasting visions in terms of where we should move the country. That’s a legitimate debate to have.” (1) He sounded very presidential in making the statement because he was taking the perspective of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, he used that vantage-point to try to keep negotiations from falling off the track. “If they can’t sort it out,” he said, “then I want them back here tomorrow.” (2) In short, he was presiding, rather than being partisan in taking a side, as he framed the situation facing the union.
Doug Mills, The New York Times
However, even as the president was referring to the two sides sorting the budget out as “they,” he himself was on one of the sides. That is, even though he “sought to position himself above the nitty-gritty haggling going on in Congress, which . . . limited his influence on the process” yet distanced him from any blame, his taking a side in the dispute subtly worked against his attempt to preside to hold the process as a whole together. (3)
Michael Shear of The New York Times claims that Obama had "assumed the role of mediator in chief" in part to avoid a government shutdown. (4) Attempting to distance himself from both sides, the president told reporters after a negotiation session on April 7th, “What I’ve said to the speaker and what I’ve said to Harry Reid is, because the machinery of the shutdown is necessarily starting to move, I expect an answer in the morning.” (5) Shear maintains that Obama's language here "suggests that he sees himself more as a bridge between the warring political parties than an active participant in the high-stakes discussions." (6) Crucially, the president's motivation may have enabled him to unwittingly compromise his own credibility, and therefore his situs from which to preside.
Shear suggests that Obama was taking on the mediator-in-chief role not only as a means to avoid a shutdown, but also, and perhaps more saliently, "to try to show that a government shutdown, if it happens, would be the result of a disagreement between the two sets of lawmakers — not a failure of his own. But there is a long-term goal as well: to convey to a restless public, and especially to moderate voters, that Mr. Obama is above the petty Washington bickering that many Americans say turns them off. That will be especially important for Mr. Obama as his re-election campaign tries to woo back independents who had become disillusioned with him." (7) Jeff Zeleny reports that at times the president even referred "to Democrats in the third person, as though he is not the leader of the party. . . . 'Republicans and Democrats both start making a lot of speeches,' Mr. Obama said. 'Usually the Democrats blame the Republicans, the Republicans blame the Democrats.'" (8) "It remains an open question," Zeleny observes, "whether the distance he seeks to place between himself and Democrats on Capitol Hill — his own version of triangulation — will attract independent voters or antagonize members of his party." (9) Were the president's motivation more oriented all along to presiding so negotiations would have a buffer or safeguard of last resort, Obama would not have staked out a position in line with Harry Reid.
Aside from trying to distance himself from blame, a president alone can hold “the process” itself from falling off the ship of state by speaking to the encompassing interests of the country, thereby having credibility to both sides in holding them to the table. I contend that being a party to a dispute works against this presiding role that only a president can fulfill. In other words, a partisan president is an oxymoron even if the forced combination has become the bromidic default in practice. All too often, presidents have tried to have it both ways. In so doing, they have undercut their own presidencies and deprived the country of the function that only the president is in a position to accomplish. President Obama was not immune from the temptation.
Even though The New York Times reports that "Obama sought to present himself . . . as the man of reason and compromise, a disappointed father figure having to mediate a dispute between two squabbling siblings,"
USA Today points out that Sen. Harry Reid and the president objected to GOP proposals to cut funding for Planned Parenthood and the Environmental Protection Agency. (10) At one crucial point, the president and the speaker of the House went head to head in the oval office on the Planned Parenthood funding. According to The New York Times, the president said “Nope. Zero” to the speaker, who then tried again. “Nope. Zero,” Obama repeated. “John, this is it,” the president finally said. The paper reports that "a long silence followed, said one participant in the meeting. 'It was just like an awkward, ‘O.K., well, what do you do now?’'” (11) The president was not only partial to one of the sides; he was one of them.
The presider having become the one of the combatants, he could not exactly turn around and save the process. To accomplish that, he would have needed to have been in a position of credibility to both sides. When the partisans get to "what do we do now?" partisanship trumps the public good. Lest the partisans be left to stare at each other, twiddle their thumbs, and finally leave the room, this is precisely the point at which the presider is of such value--meaning that role alone. Wading into a pool only to step out should the water get too hot in order to rescue both sides simply doesn't work; the combatants whom the "presider" had confronted will be hesitant to take the outstreached hand even as the water begins to burn. Neutrality and the resultant credibility is absolutely essential to presiding at times when the partisans have reached a dead end and the greater good is threatened because of the paralysis. A partisan president trying to have it both ways doesn't cut it.
At one point during the days of negotiations on the stop-gap budget during the second week of April, the president took sides even as he was trying to come off as presiding in the interest of the union itself. While evincing political skill, the feat tacitly undercut his presiding credibility. Specifically, the president took a swipe at the Tea Party influence on the House Speaker keeping him from compromising. “The only question is whether politics or ideology are going to get in the way of preventing a government shutdown.” (12) Of course, this line could be interpreted as presidential, or presiding, because politics or ideology could apply to either party. However, given Reid’s charges two days later in the U.S. Senate chamber that the Tea Party’s ideology was keeping Speaker Boehner from compromising, the president had probably been maintaining a partisan script. That is, he had most likely been trying to have it both ways: seeming to preside while actually trying to further one of the sides.
The presider having become the one of the combatants, he could not exactly turn around and save the process. To accomplish that, he would have needed to have been in a position of credibility to both sides. When the partisans get to "what do we do now?" partisanship trumps the public good. Lest the partisans be left to stare at each other, twiddle their thumbs, and finally leave the room, this is precisely the point at which the presider is of such value--meaning that role alone. Wading into a pool only to step out should the water get too hot in order to rescue both sides simply doesn't work; the combatants whom the "presider" had confronted will be hesitant to take the outstreached hand even as the water begins to burn. Neutrality and the resultant credibility is absolutely essential to presiding at times when the partisans have reached a dead end and the greater good is threatened because of the paralysis. A partisan president trying to have it both ways doesn't cut it.
At one point during the days of negotiations on the stop-gap budget during the second week of April, the president took sides even as he was trying to come off as presiding in the interest of the union itself. While evincing political skill, the feat tacitly undercut his presiding credibility. Specifically, the president took a swipe at the Tea Party influence on the House Speaker keeping him from compromising. “The only question is whether politics or ideology are going to get in the way of preventing a government shutdown.” (12) Of course, this line could be interpreted as presidential, or presiding, because politics or ideology could apply to either party. However, given Reid’s charges two days later in the U.S. Senate chamber that the Tea Party’s ideology was keeping Speaker Boehner from compromising, the president had probably been maintaining a partisan script. That is, he had most likely been trying to have it both ways: seeming to preside while actually trying to further one of the sides.
Even though striking out at the other side while seeming to preside can evince cleverness applied to political skill, and this in turn can elicit respect and perhaps even admiration, I contend that such respect is fleeting. Indeed, there is something seemly for a father figure to openly side with one of his sons against the other. How is the other to feel? Such "objectivity" amid such favoratism is clearly not good parenting. In fact, it points to a parent with a questional character and psychological constitution. The analogy of parenthood goes only so far, however, as a president is one adult among others rather than a superdad over children (hence government officials, such as those in China, who tell citizens to obey or be punished are making a category mistake in a very hauty way).
As the "what do we do now?" question proffered after the president had said "nope, zero" to the speaker demonstrates, a great opportunity cost is entailed in a presider taking sides on every quotidian matter that crosses his or her desk. A president doesn't have to take this bait. Many players are available to dive into a dispute, but only the presider stands for the whole and is therefore in a position to hold the ship itself together when the partisans lose control of the process. Neither fusing partisanship and presiding nor playing mediator-in-chief simply to distance oneself from blame generates credibility sufficient to meet what is necessary for presiding in a crisis. Without a presider credible to both sides, the ship of state in such a case is bound to hit the rocks. Therefore, a truly great presidency resists the temptation to win the day; instead, a true president speaks to the nation as a nation so as to be able to keep it from the abyss when the partisans have tied each other in knots. Lest a president throw an arm or leg into the knot, who is left to untie the self-inflicted ropes? I’m afraid we all have forgotten what a presidential role was designed to do, and this has put the United States at great risk. Sadly, we don't even see it.
As the "what do we do now?" question proffered after the president had said "nope, zero" to the speaker demonstrates, a great opportunity cost is entailed in a presider taking sides on every quotidian matter that crosses his or her desk. A president doesn't have to take this bait. Many players are available to dive into a dispute, but only the presider stands for the whole and is therefore in a position to hold the ship itself together when the partisans lose control of the process. Neither fusing partisanship and presiding nor playing mediator-in-chief simply to distance oneself from blame generates credibility sufficient to meet what is necessary for presiding in a crisis. Without a presider credible to both sides, the ship of state in such a case is bound to hit the rocks. Therefore, a truly great presidency resists the temptation to win the day; instead, a true president speaks to the nation as a nation so as to be able to keep it from the abyss when the partisans have tied each other in knots. Lest a president throw an arm or leg into the knot, who is left to untie the self-inflicted ropes? I’m afraid we all have forgotten what a presidential role was designed to do, and this has put the United States at great risk. Sadly, we don't even see it.
Literally, to sit before that body or society over which one is presiding is the essential, or root, nature of a presidency. This function naturally involves protecting and enunciating the interests of the whole--hence choosing one's battles carefully and selectively. To be effective in a matter that suits the design of the office, a presider must ensure that his or her credibility is intact when it is needed in taking a stand on those few grave matters of crisis on which the system itself really does depend. Picking fights on a daily basis wastes this sort of capital. Lest it be forgotten, less can be more. In this case, the “less” is actually that which builds great legacies because it is in line with the nature of the office.
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Click to listen to the author's podcast commentary on this essay.
Click to add a question or comment on the impact of partisanship on a president presiding.
Footnotes:
1. Gregory Korte, “Meeting Fails to End Impasse on Federal Budget,” USA Today, April 6, 2011, p. 2A.
2. Naftali Bendavid, Jonathan Weisman, and Carol E. Lee, "Budget Talks Head to Brink,” Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2011, pp. A6.
3. Ibid.
4. Michael D. Shear, "On Budget Dispute, Obama Casts Himself as Mediator in Chief," The New York Times, April 8, 2011.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Jeff Zeleny, "Rifts within Both Parties Test Leaders in Budget Fight," The New York Times, April 6, 2011.
9. Ibid.
10. Jeff Zeleny, "Rifts within Both Parties Test Leaders in Budget Fight," The New York Times, April 6, 2011; Gregory Korte, “Meeting Fails to End Impasse on Federal Budget,” USA Today, April 6, 2011, p. 2A.
11. David M. Herszenhorn and Helene Cooper, “Concessions and Tension, Then a Deal,” The New York Times, April 9, 2011.
12. Gregory Korte, “Meeting Fails to End Impasse on Federal Budget,” USA Today, April 6, 2011, p. 2A.
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Disentangling the House Republican Health Care Budget: Redistribution, Government and Federalism
0 comments Posted by Find Insurance Online at 10:35 PMThere is a saying in politics. “Elections have consequences.” In 2011, the impact of the 2010 election was particularly obvious in that the Republicans had gained control of the legislatures of Wisconsin and Ohio as well as the U.S. House of Representatives. While the governments of Wisconsin and Ohio were going after public-sector unions (or restricting them to reduce government deficits), the House Republicans had their eyes on health-care. Rep. Paul Ryan, an up and coming Republican from Janesville Wisconsin—a town with high unemployment after the auto plant there closed—was producing a budget that he claimed would cut $5 trillion over 10 years. His proposal reflected, or conflated, two salient traditional Republican aims: to shift power from the U.S. Governments to those of the states and to reduce the size of government. These are distinct, albeit not disparate, goals. Shifting power does not in itself imply or mandate a reduction in the size of government. For example, in shifting public health-care policy, an expansion of government could result if enough states develop programs further-reaching than what Congress had enacted. Of course, as per the nature of federalism, particularly in an empire-scale instance, the resulting health-care programs would differ from republic to republic, given the innate heterogeneity that exists at such a scale.
Because restoring a balance of power to a federal system is distinct from decreasing (or increasing, for that matter) the size of government, it is important to distinguish them in Rep. Ryan’s proposal.
The New York Times points to the two aims in observing that “while saving large sums for the federal government, the proposals on Medicaid and Medicare could shift some costs to beneficiaries and to the states.” Shifting costs to the beneficiaries involves or implies a reduction in the size of government, while shifting costs to the states impacts the balance of power in the federal system. It is in the public interest for such items to be distinguished in debate and legislative votes because the people could want one without the other.
Under Ryan’s proposal, according to the paper, “Medicaid would be transformed into a block grant, with a lump sum of federal money given to the states to care for low-income people. States would be given more discretion over use of the money than they have under the current federal-state partnership.” Even though increased discretion adds to the power of state governments relative to the federal, or general, government, block grants maintain state dependence. In fact, if health-care is not among the enumerated powers of the U.S. Government, it could be argued that lump sum payments to the states for health-care are unconstitutional; otherwise, spending for the general welfare would eviscerate even having enumerated powers at all.
Regarding the “size of government,” The New York Times reports that “(f)or future Medicare beneficiaries — people now under 55 — Mr. Ryan’s proposal calls for the federal government to contribute a specified amount of money toward the premium for private health coverage. Under the traditional Medicare program, the government reimburses doctors and hospitals directly.” The “specified amount” element is “less government” than is an open-ended entitlement.
At the time of Rep. Ryan’s proposal, Medicaid and Medicare were open-ended entitlements. Anyone who met the eligibility criteria was entitled to benefits. Under a fixed lump sum, Republicans say the federal government could better predict and control its costs under Medicaid and Medicare, which as of the beginning of 2011 insured more than 100 million people and accounted for more than one-fifth of the federal budget. Unless the states would pick up the added costs (which would shift the taxing and spending federal balance), beneficiaries of these programs would be at risk for more of the costs if health-care costs rise.
Rep. Jan Schakowsky, a Democrat and a former executive director of the Illinois State Council of Senior Citizens, said “Mr. Ryan and the Republicans are declaring war on entitlements — and war on the elderly and the poor. . . . Beneficiaries will end up paying more.” The New York Times also reports that as of 2011, “(a)bout half of Medicaid recipients are children. Nearly two-thirds of the money spent on Medicaid benefits is [sic] for low-income people who are 65 and older or disabled.” For his part, Rep. Ryan said “he was not cutting Medicaid and Medicare, but rather slowing their growth rate. Furthermore, he insisted that if health costs for a group of patients exceeded the federal payment in a given year, the insurer would have to absorb the cost.” Finally, Rep. Ryan “claimed his proposal is equitable because Medicare would pay less on behalf of higher-income beneficiaries, and they would pay more of the cost of their health coverage.”
Whether the beneficiaries or insurance companies pick up the slack, the fact that public funds would not be used means that government would be reduced from what it otherwise would be. Yet if the states pick up the slack, the balance of federalism rather than the size of government would be changed. Moreover, in addition to the size of government (and federalism) elements, the matter of redistributive justice is involved. It is no wonder that these elements are conflated in the public sphere.
I contend that legislative representatives have an obligation to more clearly distinguish the elements of federalism, the size of government, and redistribution in public policy proposals. A desire to shift power to the states can be better distinguished from the questions of redistributive justice and the related matter of the size of government (and latter two can be better distinguished, since, for example, government could be expanded in a way that helps or hurts the poor, for example). Democracy itself would be improved were the people, either directly via a referendum or indirectly through representatives, able to decide on the three elements one by one. In fact, a decision for greater federalism would mean that questions of the size of government and redistribution would be decided on both the state and the federal level.
Click to add a question or comment on the impact of the Republican budget on health-care policy and federalism.
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