Showing posts with label liberty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label liberty. Show all posts

Saturday, April 2, 2011

MSNBC reports that “Arizona's cash-strapped Medicaid program is considering adding a $50 tax on single patients who smoke, have diabetes or are overweight. Arizona Health Care Cost  Containment program spokeswoman Monica Coury says the tax is intended to push patients to take better care of themselves. Coury says the issue is getting at the cost of health care while trying to stretch dollars and get people to take better care. ‘If you're not going to manage those things and take some personal responsibility, and in turn that costs the state more money, then you need to have some skin in the game,’ Coury said. . . . ‘You need to be responsible for the fact that your smoking costs us more.’ . . . State Sen. Kyrsten Sinema of Phoenix says it isn't fair to charge diabetics $50. Sinema says the fee fines people who may have medical conditions beyond their control. . . . The changes are part of a major revamp of Arizona's Medicaid program to find funds to restore transplant coverage — eliminated amid much controversy [in the fall of 2010].”

Ethical Analysis:

Focusing here on the ethical dimension of the proposed changes, I lay aside here the worthy question of whether the proposed changes are the optimal way to restore transplant coverage, or, more generally, to make up the funding shortfall facing Arizona’s Medicaid program. Ethically speaking, Coury’s reference to personal responsibility clashes head-on with Sinema’s claim of the conditions being beyond the patients’ control. Responsibility presumes that the agent has control over that which he or she is to be responsible. It makes no sense, for example, to hold President Obama responsible for the weather (unless the federal government has a top-secret way of controlling and changing the weather over U.S. territory).

In terms of smoking, the question is perhaps whether a drug addict has control of his or her addiction. To be addicted, according to the World English Dictionary, is to be dependent on something. Meriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary asserts that dependence in turn involves being “unduly subject to the influence of another.” The question is thus whether being “unduly subject to” implies or involves the loss of control as opposed to merely control being more difficult. The qualifier of “unduly” suggests being subject to something excessively, according to the World English Dictionary. This does not signify the loss of control. Therefore, ethically speaking, smokers can be held responsible for their addiction to nicotine even though it is very difficult for them to quit. That smokers have quit demonstrates that those who do not quit cannot fall back on the fallacy that they have no control over their addiction. So to the extent that the smokers cost others, it is ethical to charge smokers more.

With regard to diabetes and obesity, a distinction can be made in terms of control. Losing weight, if only from restricting the quantity (and types) of food ingested, is within a person’s interval of control unless the excess weight if due to a disease and cannot be lost without risking the loss of minimal nourishment and health. I suspect that this qualification is misapplied by overweight people who presume that their “condition” is a result of an illness when over-eating (as well as a refusal to exercise) is the actual cause. Such persons, doubtless the overwhelming majority of obese people, can be distinguished ethically from those whose excessive weight is caused by a disease and cannot be lost without risk to one’s health and perhaps even life.

Apart from the illness caveat, the argument that overweight people have no control over their excess weight is effectively countered by the success that people have had in losing weight. Prima facie, one can reduce one’s consumption even in the midst of a presumed overwhelming urge to eat more. Therefore, it is ethical to hold overweight people responsible for their weight, and thus to charge them more if they cost others more. Diabetics are a more complex case.

Regarding obesity and (the ensuing?) diabetes, it may be that once a patient has the disease, nothing she could do would cure her of the disease. Otherwise, the person’s failure to reduce his weight while diabetic would be a basis for holding the person responsible not only for remaining overweight, but also for suffering from worsening diabetes. Furthermore, if being overweight is necessary for the onset of the disease, the diabetic could be presumed to be responsible for having developed the disease, and thus properly charged more for having it treated. However, to the extent that overweight people do not necessarily become diabetic, it may not be reasonable to assume that an overweight person should have acted to avert what is a mere possibility. In terms of a diabetic’s choices, if losing weight lessens or eliminates the (chances of, or continuance of) the sickness and the diabetic does not lose weight, a diabetic could rightly be held responsible and thus properly charged for the extra cost borne by others.

A few nuances should be made transparent. First, if the charges are not merely to reimburse others for the increased cost, but also to manipulate the “offender” to change his or her ways, it can be asked whether such manipulation is itself ethical and effective. If a person believes that his addiction, eating habits, or disease is a “condition” rather than a result of his choice, then it is unlikely that he would suppose that having to pay more would have anything to do with even a potential change in his “condition.” In other words, a link in the chain of reasoning presumed in the manipulation would not exist for the person to be manipulated.  Moreover, manipulation itself may be unethical unless, as in Kant’s categorical imperative, the rational being to be manipulated is treated not merely as a means, but also as an end in herself. If the end includes the patient recovering, this criterion may well be satisfied in Arizona’s proposal. In such a case, the noxious smell of manipulation may still pass the smell test.

Second, throughout this analysis, I have been assuming that the additional charges can be afforded by the patients and/or their insurance companies. If a patient cannot afford the extra fee and still provide for necessities such as food, shelter and obviously health care, as well as incidentals, then a basic human rights factor intercedes and it could be quite unethical to impose the fine/fee. Relatedly, to the extent that Arizona’s proposal involves reducing the number of enrollees in Medicaid, the goal itself may be unethical from the standpoint of the human right to survival, or life.

Third, if smokers and obese people are to be held responsible for their choices in health-care policy, it would be unethical to be selective in leaving out other choices that have negative consequences in terms of health (and cost). Even so, consistency zealously pursued can put the government into all of our lives with the result being that we have lost our liberty. That is, we might ask ourselves whether there is not a slippery slope involved in opening up our various decisions to governmental overview and charges. The imposition itself could be regarded as unethical, especially in a free society. Yet being forced to pay for the egregious choices made by others, such as by smokers and obese people, can also be regarded as involving an unethical transfer of responsibility. Accordingly, it is well and good, ethically speaking, that a society makes judgment calls respecting how far “egregious” extends. Being a matter of judgment and balance, there is no pre-established line in the sand to be sought in making this determination.

In conclusion, my ethical analysis supports the proposition that smokers and overweight people can be held accountable for their smoking and obesity, respectively, and perhaps even for being diabetic to the extent that mitigating the illness is within the patient’s previous or, more strongly, current control. This conclusion is of course beset by conditions. However, they do not deprive my conclusion of its main thrust—namely, that society has an ethical basis, and thus a right, to hold smokers and overweight people responsible for their inherently unhealthy choices by imposing an extra fee for government-supported health-care. To treat either smokers or the obese as somehow simply affected by, rather than as the agents of, their smoking or obesity is to engage in the subterfuge of an ideological agenda in the guise of science. Such a cloak is of course highly unethical.






Tuesday, March 29, 2011

The question of the role of social media internet companies as protesters use them to communicate on their protests and governments exploded on the world stage in the context of the protests going in the Middle East in early 2011. Lest it be presumed that the firms’ respective policies are relevant only in terms of what content (or users) is allowed and how that content could impact events on the ground, the policies themselves reflect on the claim made by the West that we are the land of the free. In other words, if social media companies are (allowed to be) oppressive or otherwise not respectful of their customers, the overall message to the oppressed in the Middle East cannot be that greater freedom is indeed possible because it exists here. Lest our own private sector unwittingly undercut the words and efforts of the protesters, we might want to use this case to ask if we couldn’t be freer too.
According to Ebele Okobi-Harris, the director of the business and human rights program at Yahoo, which owns Flickr, the case of el-Hamalwy, an Egyptian activist whose uploaded pictures of security agents were abruptly taken down by Flickr staff, has prompted internal discussions about whether Flickr should reconsider its approach. What if the photos had been his own and he had not yet backed them up? Flickr’s abrupt and unannounced action suddenly seems quite oppressive. Fortunately, managers at Flickr are at least thinking about the issue. “As the uses of these social networks evolve,” Harris said, “we have to start thinking about how to create rules on how to apply rules that also facilitate human rights activists using these tools.”
According to The New York Times, Harris “pointed to the challenges of balancing the existing rules and terms of service for users with the new ways that activists are using these tools. One challenge is whether a company should maintain its commitment to remain neutral about content, even when politicized content could offend users or even put people in danger. ‘Does a company take responsibility for the content?’” Okobi-Harris asked. For instance, what, el-Hamalawy asks, would Flickr do if a group that opposes abortion wanted to post photographs of doctors who perform abortions? In his own case, el-Hamalawy “said Flickr’s decision to take down the photos left him not only frustrated and angry but also terrified. ‘Everyone knew that I had released those photos,’ he said. ‘Then the photos were gone. I couldn’t sleep. I was thinking that at any minute, they were going to come for me.’” Would Flickr managers be responsible for el-Hamalawy’s death if it was occasioned by Flickr’s action?  Or was it his own act in uploading the photos in the first place that put his life at risk? To be sure, Flickr should have notified him before taking down his pictures; the company is responsible for causing him fear. However, this seems more like bad business than unethical conduct on Flickr’s part. Whether a customer is a protester oppressed by a dictatorship or simply a novice photographer who has uploaded her own pictures, there does appear to be reason to withhold one’s trust from Flickr staff.
Beyond the matter of bad customer relations—which seems to be ubiquitous in American business—the question of whether social media, which includes Facebook, Flickr, Twitter and YouTube among others—is unwittingly biased toward oppressive governments even if only from a desire to maintain control over its site must be addressed. In early 2011, it became clear that such companies were increasingly being used by activists and pro-democracy forces, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, to the notice of their governments. As Harris asked of Flickr, does a social media company have responsibility for the content?  Furthermore, it should be asked whether such a company should be susceptible to the influence of governments, whether in identifying users or barring their content?
According to The New York Times, the “new role for social media has put these companies in a difficult position: how to accommodate the growing use for political purposes while appearing neutral and maintaining the practices and policies that made these services popular in the first place.” The New York Times reports that “YouTube was one of the first social media networks to wrestle with content posted by a human rights advocate that conflicted with its terms of service. In November 2007, YouTube removed videos flagged as “inappropriate” by a community member that showed a person in Egypt being tortured by the police. They were uploaded by Wael Abbas, another Egyptian blogger involved in opposing torture in Egypt. After a public outcry, YouTube staff members reviewed the videos and restored them.” Had YouTube managers been influenced by Egypt in taking down the video, the company would have effectively taken sides in the Egyptian dispute between its government and people. Absent such pressure, the issue could simply be whether a warning notice is appropriate given the graphic nature of the violence being shown. I made the horrible mistake, for example, of watching the slow beheading of a Western hostage by a terrorist group in the Middle East. Even a year or two later, I can still hear the man’s raspy voice shouting for dear life as his throat was being deprived of air while his murderers pathologically invoked their deity’s name as if their act had been sanctioned by a power higher than, and thus somehow justifying, their own anger and resentment. Because I looked ignored the “graphic content” warning (as they are perhaps too commonly used), perhaps the issue facing YouTube does indeed go beyond whether such a warning should apply. In my case, my curiosity got the better of me. Should YouTube have been responsible for protecting me from myself? This seems like a tall order, especially as it could invite the staff to discriminate between content based on their political or ideological positions. It could be that the staff could limit their intervention only to extremely graphic content, with review taking place in the company in the particularly cases.  Still, in a free society, citizens ultimately must take responsibility for ignoring warnings; I don’t believe that a government or private company can protect citizens from themselves, even if it can protect us from others of us who would seek to harm, mislead or cheat us.
Regarding Facebook, The New York Times reported on March 26, 2011, the company “has remained mostly quiet about its increasing role among activists in the Middle East who use the site to connect dissident groups, spread information about government activities and mobilize protests. But Facebook is now finding itself drawn into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has been pushed to defend its neutral approach and terms of service to some supporters of Israel, including an Israeli government official. Yuli Edelstein, an Israeli minister of diplomacy and diaspora affairs, sent a letter [in March] to Facebook’s chief executive, Mark Zuckerberg, asking him to remove a Facebook page created on March 6 named the Third Palestinian Intifada. The page, which calls for an uprising in the occupied Palestinian territory in May, has more than 240,000 members. ‘As Facebook’s C.E.O. and founder, you are obviously aware of the site’s great potential to rally the masses around good causes, and we are all thankful for that,’ Mr. Edelstein wrote. ‘However, such potential comes hand in hand with the ability to cause great harm, such as in the case of the wild incitement displayed on the above-mentioned page.’ Facebook has, so far, not removed the page. The administrators are not advocating violence, and therefore, it falls within the company’s definition of acceptable speech, company officials said. ‘We want Facebook to be a place where people can openly discuss issues and express their views, while respecting the rights and feelings of others,’said Andrew Noyes, a spokesman for public policy at the company.”
“Wild incitement” can pertain to the pro-democracy rallies that had been taking place throughout the Middle East. Even if violence were being called for in the Intifada, would Facebook (or Twitter) remove such content if it had been put up by an Egyptian or Libyan protester?  More pointedly, what if a page or tweet referred to “wild incitement” in the midst of being attacked by government troops or police? How far removed is an occupied people to such intimidation on a daily basis? Should they be barred from tweeting, “Come help me at X intersection b/c police are beating my elderly parents”? The staff at Facebook are smart not to intervene in disputes between a government and its people. If anything, an America-based company has a basis in taking the side of the oppressed, for the United States came into existence from British oppression. Relatedly, the U.S. Government acts in concert with its own beginning whenever it takes the side of a people protesting against governmental oppression.
Even if Facebook does not intervene to censor content, it is possible, even likely, that particular policies are inherently in the advantage of vengeful government agencies and a threat to Facebook’s customers. For example, The New York Times reports that “Human rights advocates have also criticized Facebook for not being more flexible with some of its policies, specifically its rule requiring users to create accounts with their real names. Danny O’Brien, the Internet advocacy coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists, cited the case of Michael Anti, an independent journalist and blogger from China whose Facebook account was deactivated in January because he had not used his state-given name to create it. In addition to losing the ability to publish and communicate on Facebook, and not wanting to use his real name because of China’s strict rules governing freedom of speech and harsh response to those activists who violate them, he has lost the contact information for thousands of people in his Facebook community. ‘One can’t expect all of these services to provide everything to everyone,’ said Mr. O’Brien. ‘I think that part of the solution is to provide people with a dignified way of leaving the service.’”
O’Brien was giving too much to Facebook. It is insufficient to expect Facebook to merely provide its customers with a dignified way to leave (or be deprived of service). In addition, Facebook ought to respect the preference of some of its customers to anonymity. Facebook’s staff would still have those customers’ contact info (more of which could be demanded and verified in such cases), so anonymity would not be an excuse to get away with unethical or illegal conduct, such as publically defaming someone by making false claims. At the very least, a person’s anonymity being refused is a basis for that person to lie ethically about being on Facebook. Moreover, Facebook’s insistence that real names be used adds to the argument that the U.S. Constitution should be amended to include an explicit right to privacy. Much of the criticism of Roe v. Wade is actually that the justices “found” such a right being implicit in that constitution. While the problem regarding Facebook insisting that customers use their real names may have implications for U.S. constitutional law, we may simply have a matter here of bad business (i.e., bad customer service). In an economy kept competitive by anti-trust law, the emergence of a competitor with more respect for its customers could be anticipated. Ironically, having a government strong enough in resisting the lure of industry lobbyists that it enforces anti-trust law with sharp teeth can actually spread liberty by allowing for competition. Such liberty could be expected to leave its own imprint in the world in the midst of the pro-democracy protests in the Middle East. In fact, Facebook having respect for its potential and actual customers who prefer anonymity could send a message stronger than any from the protesters or human rights advocates in the Middle East—namely, “Look over here! Real freedom is possible!”
Click to add a Comment or Question (or View Posted Comments) on social media companies on democracy and protesters.

Source:
Jennifer Preston, “Ethical Quandary for Social Sites,” NYT, March 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/business/media/28social.html?_r=2&hp

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Perhaps by looking back on one's own time as though it were already historical, it is possible to assess whether what one is witnessing on the global stage is truly significant from the standpoint of human history or merely of that which history is replete. In the context of the popular protests in the Middle East in early 2011, the question is perhaps whether the world was witnessing a Hegelian burst of freedom or merely more of the same in terms of political revolutions.

According to The New York Times, popular movements were "transforming the political landscape of the Middle East" in the wake of the protests in Tunesia and Egypt.  For example, in Bahrain, "as in Tunisia and Egypt, modest concessions from the government [were] only raising expectations among the protesters, who by day’s end [on February 15, 2011] were talking about tearing the whole system down, monarchy and all."  The prime minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the king’s uncle, had been in office for 40 years. Accordingly, the protesters were asking not only for the release of political prisoners, but also "the creation of a more representative and empowered Parliament, the establishment of a constitution written by the people and the formation of a new, more representative cabinet."

The New York Times placed the protests in Bahrain in the wider context of the protests that had recently occurred in Tunesia and Egypt. The Bahrain protests, "inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, have altered the dynamics in a nation where political expression has long been tamed by harsh police tactics and prison terms." (italics added)  However, it was not clear at the time of the protests whether the thread of inspiration was determinative to such an extent that the landscape of the Middle East itself would be transformed as a result. In allowing the protests, the king of Bahrain may have assumed that he could stay in control and thereby reduce the strength of the "inspiration" by giving the protesters some space to do their thing and presumably get it out of their system. However, Ibrahim Matar, an opposition member of Parliament who joined the crowd of protesters, said, “Now the people are the real players, not the government, not the opposition.” It is interesting that he dismissed his own movement (i.e., the opposition) rather than trying to take credit for the uprising.  If Matar was correct, the spread of protests throughout the Middle East had the wherewithal to fundamentally change the means by which people would be governed in the region. That is, the protests could have been a transformative wave wherein people finally had within their sight the possibility that government could be of and by the people. The revolutions in Tunesia and Egypt would not have been isolated incidents in a long world history of sporatic revolutions without autocratic government itself being expunged from the tired face of the earth. The question that captivated the world watching the Egyptians protest was whether something different might have been going on. 

Whereas the twentieth century had hosted technological change on many fronts, political development was not among the areas of progress. When the twenty-first century had gained enough of its own years to claim its own time, the question may have become whether the human race was  ripe then for a leap in political development. If so, the trigger would not be in the democratic nations that preach representative democracy; rather, it would be in the people themselves who had lived under autocratic rule. It is as though there were a spreading suddent awareness that they didn't have to take the abuse anymore; they could simply say no--though "simply" is the wrong word here as saying no in a state such as Iran, for example, was at the time still prompting a barrage of bullets from government soldiers. It was clear that the autocratic governments had different strategies with respect to the protests.  The question was perhaps whether the thrust of the wave had rendered the choice of strategy nugatory. In other words, was the world witnessing the beginning of the end for autocracy or dictatorship as a means of governing human beings, or merely the latest round in a series of revolutions that have been an intractable part of human history?  Did Tunesia unleash a burst of freedom that can be placed in a Hegelian progression of human history wherein human spirit comes to realize itself in greater freedom, as per its nature? That is to say, were we witnessing a Hegelian moment? Can the protests in the Middle East in 2011 be interpreted as marking a fundamental political change or even a new awareness in humanity?  I suppose the answer would depend on whether the protests spread like a forest fire across highways and byways such that no dictator would remain standing not only in the Middle East, but, moreover, in the entire world as well.

Lest we get too carried away in celebrating the salubrius evisceration of autocratic government, we should not forget that representative democracy is far from perfect. Left without any viable competitors, this system of government could be more subject to abuses from within. If representative democracy is the beneficiary of the extinction of autocracy, might democracy as an ideal be like capitalism in the wake of the demise of the USSR (and communism in China)?  In other words, might the hegemony of representative democracy ironically make it more likely that the drawbacks of such democracy gain in force, or at least become more transparent?  Just as the financial crisis of 2008 rather than the USSR demonstrated that the market mechanism itself is flawed in how it accommodates increased volatility (by freezing up rather than accommodating it), perhaps once the world is populated by republics we might come to see the internal flaws in what the U.S. Founders called "excess democracy."

The protests in the Middle East reminded the world that history is not very predictable. Similarly, history can be quite ironic, given the fixity inherent in human expectations. As we the West welcome our brothers and sisters in the Middle East into the family of free nations, let us not get too self-congratulatory, for our institutions are far from perfect.  We are all human, all too human. Yet in spite of human nature as its constant, human history may contain a progression wherein humanity the world over comes to realisations that insist upon or inevitably lead to greater self-realization. Humanity's realization in the early twenty-first century may involve political development. I suspect that the next turn will concern religion. After that turn, the world will be quite different than for those who lived before even the technological revolution in the twentieth century.  In other words, modernity may well be characterized in terms of succeeding intervals of technological, political and religious transformation--altogether evincing a huge amount of change even as human nature remains constant.  The question might be how much change is possible given the constancy of our nature, or do some change elements change human nature? In the context of the protests in the Middle East, human nature looks pretty much the same as it has been for eons.  Yet the future change may shift the basis-point in human biology and psychology such that even more change becomes possible.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/middleeast/16bahrain.html?ref=todayspaper

Sunday, February 13, 2011

"In Beirut, gunfire broke out and crowds of people waved Egyptian flags. In Yemen, they gathered in front of the Egyptian Embassy chanting, 'Wake up rulers, Mubarak fell today.' In Gaza, they fired shots in the air and set off fireworks. . . . [However,] in a telling sign of the divide between the rulers and the ruled, the region’s leaders, presidents and monarchs remained largely silent." This depiction by The New York Times of ripple effects across the Middle East in the wake of the resignation of Egypt's Mubarak in February, 2011 intimates the hoped-for and feared possibility that the popular unrest could spread.  Moreover, the entire world, which had been been glued to the events unfolding in Cairo, wondered if a domino effect might be in store in countries under autocratic rule. Indeed, The New York Times wrote of a possible domino effect quite explicitly: "The popular uprising that started . . . in Tunisa had claimed its second autocratic government, this time in the largest country in the Arab world. With more protests planned in coming days, some governments were clearly worried they could be next." But do autocratic governments fall like dominos?  That is, is revolution contagious? Fawaz Traboulsi, a prominent Lebanese writer and columnist, thought so in the days following Mubarak's resignation. “All the regimes are shaking now . . . They are becoming more and more fragile. This is just the beginning.” In Bahrain, King Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa apparently thought so too, for he ordered the equivalent of $2,650 be given to every Bahraini family a few days before a planned "Day of Rage" protest. “Arab people discovered their ability to make change,” said Nabeel Rajab, a human rights activist in Bahrain. “And with Egypt in the leadership once again, the change will reach all the Arab world.” In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced he would suspend constitutional amendments that allow him to remain in his office for life. He also raised salaries for the military and civil servants and cut income taxes in half. In Algeria, the government promised to lift the state of emergency that had been in effect since 1992. To be sure, nineteen years is a rather long time for an emergency.  Such efforts can be likened to building up wetlands or widening a beach to take the wind out of the hurricane out at sea should it hit. In other words, it appears that there was "revolution watch" in effect for the Middle East in the wake of the fall of the Egyptian regime. One might reasonably question, however, whether revolutions are contagious.

It could be that autocracy itself had been weakened by the success of the protests in Egypt.  On the other hand, there had been revolutions before and dictatorship was not evicerated from the face of the earth. The belief that the Tunesian and Egyptian revolutions were the start of a wave that would flood all autocratic powers in the Middle East (or the world) might also consider that even autocratic states differ in their respective internal conditions. To use the hurricane analogy, some beaches are better protected than others. If the unrest in Tunesia and Egypt were linked in such a way that other countries could be impacted internally, the ensuing domino effect could perhaps be compared to that among Wall Street banks in September 2008.  The collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch as independent or viable going concerns contained a momentum that was beginning to bring down Morgan Stanley and threaten even Goldman Sachs when the ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs at Treasury effectively pushed for the construction of a fortified sand-dune (TARP) a.k.a. an infusion of funds into the remaining banks from the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve.  As a result, the force of the strengthening winds ceased to intensify and began to diminish, leaving the economy in a long rainy season (i.e., a recession and a subsequent nearly jobless recovery).

In the wake of the fall of the Egyptian regime, were the other regimes in the Middle East like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs after Lehman Brothers declared bankrupcy?  In other words, are autocratic regimes subject to a "run on the bank" in another? If so, there would still be a notable difference between the big banks and the governments.  Namely, the banks were deemed too big to fail, while the autocratic rulers were deemed too powerful to rule. That is to say, the continued viability of the Wall Street pillars was deemed essential to the world economy, while it was thought in the wake of the Egyptian regime of Mubarak that the world was better off less one autocratic regime. Hence there would not be likely to be a TARP program arranged to prop up dictators. Even with this difference noted, I contend that both big banks and big dictators are too big to exist in a world that values freedom and individual rights. Perhaps we ought to have been cheering the domino effect on Wall Street just as we cheered the fall of the Tunesian and Egyptian dictators. In both cases, destabilization that could lead to the collapse of the global economy and civic order would of course need to be avoided.  However, I contend that the U.S. Government could have intervened to maintain order on Wall Street by assisting as the big banks split into pieces, none of which being too big to fail and thus more in the public interest than retaining the big banks as such.  In the case of public autocratic regimes, their demise and replacement can typically be handled domestically, as in the cases of Tunesia and Egypt, rather than by an international organization such as the U.N.

In general terms, the "run on the bank" in Tunesia and Egypt may or may not be contagious in its nature, yet a consideration of the possibility of a domino effect can remind us of the domino effect that we witnessed in September of 2008 on Wall Street. Making this connection might prompt us to ask whether autocratic governments and big banks aren't both too big to exist. In other words, the collapse of one badly run bank after another and the subsequent need to deal with the question of such banks as going concerns can perhaps be likened to the collapse of one badly run government after another.  Was the world finally noticing around the end of the first decade (and the beginning of the second) of the twenty-first century that enormous concentrations of private capital (and thus power) and of public autocratic authority were not necessarily givens, and thus could, and perhaps should, be taken down? In other words, were long-standing givens finally seen as replacable?  The world was stunned when huge investment banks that had been around for more than a century were suddenly collapsing, just as the world was stunned when the government of the largest Middle Eastern country suddenly fell after two weeks of popular protests. Pillars, even those that are thought vital, can indeed fall, and the world can discover through the experiences that they are not essential--and they might even be bad for the public good. Surely this is the sense of the free world concerning autocratic governments, yet we are less convinced concerning the danger in continuing to allow banks too big to fail to continue to exist as they have for decades. In both cases, the domino effect may be natural and good, provided it is managed so public order does not collapse in the process. 

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12arabs.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

The "ardent glow of freedom gradually evaperates;--the charms of popular equality . . . insensibly decline;--the pleasures, the advantages derived from the new kind of government grow stale through use. Such declension in all these vigorous springs of actions necessarily produces a supineness. The altar of liberty is no longer watched with such attentive assiduity;--a new train of passions succeeds to the empire of the mind;--different objects of desire take place:--and, if the nation happens to enjoy a series of prosperity, volumptuousness, excessive fondness for riches, and luxury gain admission and establish themselves--these produce venality and corruption of every kind, which open a fatal avenue to bribery. Hence it follows, that in the midst of this general contageon a few men--or one--more powerful than all others, industriously endeavor to obtain all authority; and by means of great wealth--or embezzling the public money,--perhaps totally subvert the government, and erect a system of aristocratical or monarchic tyranny in its room. What ready means for this work of evil are numerous standing armies, and the disposition of the great revenue of the United States! . . . All nations pass this parokism of vice at some period or other;--and if at that dangerous juncture your government is not secure upon a solid foundation, and well guarded against the machinations of evil men, the liberties of this country will be lost--perhaps forever!"

Source: The Impartial Examiner, Essay (March 5, 1788), 5.14.15, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 290-91.

 

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